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In the nearly sixty years since reformulating the jurisdictional 
calculus in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court 
has issued only two holdings on a defendant’s amenability to suit 
predicated solely on its forum activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s 
causes of action.2  Unfortunately, neither decision provided much 
illumination regarding the due process strictures for general in 
personam jurisdiction, as the Court never developed either a 
theoretical foundation or a framework for resolving this query.3 
Commentators have intermittently proposed various theories to 
 
 1 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 2 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins 
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 3 See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the “Supreme Court has never outlined a test for 
determining whether a defendant’s activities within a state are sufficient for general 
jurisdiction”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General 
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 
567 (1998) (opining that Supreme Court’s holdings provide little guidance on the 
requisite criteria for general jurisdiction).  “General jurisdiction” is the term used to 
describe the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action based 
on activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims.  See Arthur von Mehren & Donald 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-
37 (1966). 
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fill the vacuum.4  Some of these theories espouse that a corporate 
defendant should only be subject to general jurisdiction in its 
principal place of business or place of incorporation,5 while others 
contend that such jurisdiction might also be proper if the defendant 
either “adopts” the forum as its sovereign6 or maintains a “branch” 
facility7 or corporate office8 in the forum.  But this prevailing 
academic view that a defendant should only be subject to general 
jurisdiction in a comparatively limited number of forum states cannot 
be reconciled with even the narrowest jurisdictional holdings of 
federal and state courts.9 
The academic commentary is thus of minimal assistance to the 
judiciary, which desperately needs a doctrinal formulation to illume 
 
 4 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 119, 137 (proposing that general jurisdiction is only appropriate in the 
states in which the corporate defendant has a place of incorporation, principal place 
of business, or “branch facility,” but not where the defendant conducts activities such 
as sales, purchases, or advertisements); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87 [hereinafter Brilmayer, 
How Contacts Count] (proposing that the appropriate test is whether the defendant is 
enough of a “political insider” to invoke the political processes of the state); Sarah R. 
Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and 
Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33-36 (propounding a “realist” theory 
of sovereignty for general jurisdiction under which a defendant would be amenable 
to general jurisdiction if it is incorporated, shapes its corporate policy, or conducts its 
core activities in the forum); B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. 
L. REV. 1097, 1129 (1990) (suggesting the requisite minimum contacts for general 
jurisdiction exist only if a corporate office is in the forum); Allan R. Stein, Styles of 
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 
758 (1987) [hereinafter Stein, Interstate Federalism] (urging that the appropriate 
standard is whether the “defendant has adopted the forum as its sovereign” by 
treating it as its home for most purposes); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General 
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell, Myth of General 
Jurisdiction] (advocating that general jurisdiction should be restricted to the 
defendant’s place of incorporation and principal place of business). 
 5 See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1141-44.  Compare Twitchell, 
Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 676 (advocating limitation of general 
jurisdiction to defendant’s principal place of business and place of incorporation), 
with Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction] (discussing a 
“change of heart” since her earlier article on such a limited conception of general 
jurisdiction). 
 6 See, e.g., Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra note 4, at 758. 
 7 See Borchers, supra note 4, at 137.  Dean Borchers acknowledged, however, that 
“the notion of what counts as a ‘branch’ is not self-evident.”  Id.  Accordingly, he 
recommended that the term “branch” be defined, “perhaps in terms of a fraction of 
the defendant’s total economic activity,” in order to “prevent twigs from being 
treated as branches.”  Id. at 137-38. 
 8 See George, supra note 4, at 1129. 
 9 See infra Part IV. 
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the incoherent “morass” of conflicting decisions that Judge Learned 
Hand described over seventy years ago.10  The decisions continue to 
“evince a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results,” as the 
courts “appear to summon one line of decisions and then another to 
support the varying moods of their opinions.”11  The resulting lack of 
predictability contravenes notions of both fairness and efficiency, as 
plaintiffs and defendants repeatedly litigate the propriety of 
subjecting a foreign defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum for 
any cause of action without guidance or notice as to the requisite 
forum activities allowing the sovereign to exercise such power. 
 Perhaps, though, an approach out of this quagmire may be 
found within it.  As Professor Mary Twitchell suggested, a 
methodology to formulate a better theoretical understanding of 
general jurisdiction might be to scrutinize past judicial decisions.12  
Such decisions, she hypothesized, “may reveal a great deal about 
when states feel that a nonresident business entity should be treated 
like an ‘insider’ for any and all judicial purposes.”13  Agreeing with 
her premise, the author and his research assistant reviewed 
approximately three thousand federal and state court decisions 
discussing this jurisdictional basis in an attempt to clarify the due 
process limitations on general jurisdiction.14 
 
 10 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(describing the impossibility of divining “any rule from the decided cases; we must 
step from tuft to tuft across the morass”). 
 11 Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 12 Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 206. 
 13 Id. 
 14 We identified the cases through two broad Westlaw searches in individual state 
and federal databases: (1) “general jurisdiction” & continu!, and (2) general w/3 
jurisdiction & contact!.  Additionally, we also ran Key Cite reference searches for 
cases finding general jurisdiction and discussing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  We primarily concentrated on appellate court 
opinions after 1984 (when the Supreme Court first explicitly adopted the general 
and specific jurisdiction terminology), but we also conducted additional research to 
locate significant federal district decisions and pre-1984 state and federal appellate 
court opinions.  Of course, by employing such broad searches, we unearthed a 
number of cases that mentioned—but did not apply—general jurisdiction, including 
cases involving procedural determinations such as the need for more discovery or the 
waiver of a jurisdictional challenge.  See, e.g., Szafarowicz v. Gotterup, 68 F. Supp. 2d 
38, 42 (D. Mass. 1999) (need for more discovery); Jacobs v. Walt Disney World Co., 
707 A.2d 477, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (same). 
Additionally, many of the opinions we located that reached general 
jurisdictional holdings were not within the scope of this Article.  This Article focuses 
on the due process limitations on amenability for a non-consenting, nonresident 
defendant whose forum activities are not related to the litigation.  As discussed in 
Part II, infra, numerous purported general jurisdiction decisions involved a 
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The Article first analyzes the Supreme Court decisions 
establishing the modern conception of general adjudicatory 
jurisdiction,15 concluding that contemporary general jurisdiction 
doctrine emanates from the pre-International Shoe fictional premise of 
a corporation’s constructive presence through doing business in the 
forum.16  The Article then recounts the judiciary’s continued 
difficulty in appropriately delimiting the parameters of general 
jurisdiction before identifying the approaches employed by the 
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts in resolving 
general jurisdictional queries.17  Concluding that none of these 
approaches is satisfactory, the Article proposes a new principle to 
clarify the general jurisdiction analysis that comports not only with 
the holdings of the Supreme Court and most federal circuit courts, 
but also with a number of federal district courts and state courts as 
well.18 
Under this principle, the requisite minimum contacts 
supporting general jurisdiction exist when the nonresident defendant 
is engaging in continuous activities in the forum similar in nature 
and volume to the in-state activities of an enterprise domiciled or 
based in the forum.19  This minimum contacts analysis incorporates 
two components—first, a qualitative aspect that the nature of the 
defendant’s forum activities are analogous to those activities that 
typically define a commercial domiciliary, and second, a quantitative 
aspect that such forum activities occur at a comparable frequency to 
at least some local businesses.  If the necessary minimum contacts are 
extant, the third and final consideration is whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction in a given case comports with “traditional notions of fair 
 
defendant with forum activities that are actually related to the litigation.  Still other 
decisions were not included because they primarily considered a state long-arm 
statute, statutory service of process requirements, or common-law alter ego theories.  
See, e.g., White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990) (long-arm statute); 
Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 466 N.E.2d 217, 221-23 (Ill. 1984) 
(parent-subsidiary relationship).  While personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting, 
nonresident defendant does require authorization for the service of summons on the 
defendant and adequate notice to the defendant, see Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987), this Article addresses only the due 
process aspect of the general jurisdiction calculus.  No discussion of the 
interpretation of long-arm statutes, the adequacy of service of process, or the 
problems of related business entities has been included. 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 See id; see also infra Parts III.E-IV.A. 
 17 See infra Parts II-III. 
 18 See infra Part IV. 
 19 See id. 
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play and substantial justice.”20 
After delineating the mechanics of this proposed three-pronged 
approach, the Article examines the theoretical foundation of general 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.  It first proposes, relying in part on an 
analogy to traditional substantive due process doctrine, that the 
constitutional limitations on a state’s jurisdictional reach are 
premised on both fairness and state sovereign interests.  The Article 
thereafter submits that the principal underpinning of the due 
process constraints on a state’s exercise of general in personam 
jurisdiction is the absence of sovereign authority over those 
nonresident defendants that do not engage in forum activities closely 
analogous to the activities of those owing allegiance to the state.21 
I. THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Pre-twentieth century jurisdictional theory predominantly 
focused on the state’s power over the defendant or the defendant’s 
property.22  For instance, if the defendant was either actually or at 
least deemed present in the forum, the court could exercise 
jurisdiction over any cause of action against that defendant, despite 
the absence of any nexus between the forum and the cause of 
action.23  Subsequently, the courts established additional theories 
allowing a state to exercise jurisdiction over certain claims related to 
the forum, but this jurisdictional basis was limited to the specific 
dispute at issue.24 
In the mid-twentieth century, International Shoe Co. v. Washington 
reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state’s power over 
those present within its territory to an analysis of the fairness or 
reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction premised on the 
 
 20 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 21 See infra Part V. 
 22 See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In 
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 569, 569-74 (1958); Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 614-15. 
 23 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136 (noting “American practice 
for the most part [has been] to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy 
when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum 
and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected”); see also Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that, because the 
defendant was engaged in business in the forum, “jurisdiction does not fail because 
the cause of action sued upon has no relation in origin to the business here 
transacted”). 
 24 See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 622-23. 
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defendant’s forum contacts.25  Yet International Shoe’s new conception 
still incorporated elements of the preexisting American jurisdictional 
theories.26  The Court first explained that due process was satisfied 
when the defendant’s continuous forum activities actually gave rise to 
the claimed liabilities at issue.27  The Court then noted that 
jurisdiction alternatively could be premised on a defendant’s 
continuous activities with the forum “thought so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising 
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”28 
 
 25 326 U.S. at 316.  The Court explained: 
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is 
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.  Hence 
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was 
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.  But 
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service or 
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 26 Id. at 317-18. 
 27 Id. at 317. 
 28 Id. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); St. 
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1915); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 
115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)).  Seven years later, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952), the Court explained that its citation to Reynolds did 
“not disclose the significance of this decision but light is thrown on it by the opinions 
of the state court below.”  Id. (citing Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 117 N.E. 
913 (Mass. 1917); Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 113 N.E. 413 (Mass. 1916)).  
Perkins also cited three other pre-International Shoe holdings as additional support for 
the concept of jurisdiction based on forum contacts unrelated to the litigation.  Id. 
(citing Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1917); Pa. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Barrow S.S. Co. v. 
Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)). 
The relevant pre-International Shoe cases cited by the Court as supporting the 
exercise of jurisdiction for causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
contacts all involved defendants who had employees or at least an independent agent 
who conducted some business for the defendant from a physical location within the 
forum state.  In Reynolds, the Court affirmed by a memorandum opinion the holdings 
of the Massachusetts state court.  Reynolds, 255 U.S. at 261.  The state court had held 
that a Kansas railroad was subject to jurisdiction in Massachusetts for a suit based 
upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in another state merely because 
the railroad appointed a Boston independent passenger agent who also conducted 
business on his own account and for another company from the office he paid for 
himself.  Reynolds, 117 N.E. at 914-15; see also Reynolds, 113 N.E. at 413.  Tauza held 
that New York could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania coal company for a 
cause of action having no relationship to New York because the coal company had a 
branch sales office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight salesmen, and clerical 
assistants from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders for continuous coal 
shipments from Pennsylvania to New York.  Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916-18.  Barrow 
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The Court subsequently relied on the defendant’s unrelated 
forum activities to establish the required constitutional connection 
for jurisdiction in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.29  Benguet 
Mining, a company created under the laws of the Philippine Islands, 
had ceased operating its gold and silver mines in the Philippines 
during the Japanese occupation of the Islands.30  The company’s 
president, general manager, and principal stockholder then returned 
to his home in Ohio where he established a company office staffed by 
two secretaries, maintained two bank accounts for the company, paid 
salaries and other expenses for the company, held directors’ 
meetings, corresponded on the company’s behalf, and supervised the 
rehabilitation of the company’s properties in the Philippines.31  
Hence, as the Court noted, the company’s president “carried on in 
Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily 
limited wartime activities of the company.”32  Based on the company’s 
conduct of such a “continuous and systematic, but limited part of its 
general business” in the state, the Court summarily concluded Ohio 
could exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over the company, even 
though the plaintiff’s claims “arose from activities entirely distinct” 
from the company’s Ohio operations.33 
The jurisdictional theory supporting Perkins became known as 
general jurisdiction, while the exercise of jurisdiction based on 
contacts connected to the cause of action was called specific 
jurisdiction.34  The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized this 
 
concluded a British corporation was amenable to jurisdiction in New York for an 
altercation in Britain because the corporation was doing business in New York 
“through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents.”  Barrow, 170 U.S. at 105.  
In contrast, in McKibbin, the Court held a Pennsylvania railroad could not be sued in 
New York for an injury occurring in New Jersey when the railroad merely sent loaded 
freight cars into New York over connecting carriers and a local carrier sold coupon 
tickets on its behalf.  McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 267-69. 
The relevance of the other two earlier decisions cited by the Court in 
International Shoe and Perkins is not as clear.  The defendant’s forum contacts in 
Alexander were related to the litigation as the plaintiff’s claim arose in part from his 
dealings with the defendant’s agents in the forum.  Alexander, 227 U.S. at 223, 226.  
Pennsylvania Fire appeared primarily to consider amenability for an unrelated cause 
of action predicated on service of process on a designated agent, although the lower 
state court had held the defendant was doing business in the state.  Gold Issue 
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 184 S.W. 999, 1020 (Mo. 1916), aff’d, 243 
U.S. 93 (1917). 
 29 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 30 Id. at 438, 447. 
 31 Id. at 447-48. 
 32 Id. at 448. 
 33 Id. at 438, 447-48. 
 34 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136. 
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dichotomy in terminology in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall,35 where it held that a foreign corporation was not amenable to 
general jurisdiction in Texas.36 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (“Helicol”), a 
Colombian corporation, provided helicopter transportation in South 
America for oil and construction companies.37  One of its helicopters 
crashed in Peru as it was transporting employees of a Peruvian 
consortium that was the alter ego of a Texas joint venture.38  The 
representatives and heirs of the four United States citizens who 
perished in the crash then sued Helicol in Texas.39  Since the parties 
both supposedly conceded that the claims neither arose from nor 
were related to Helicol’s Texas contacts,40 the Court examined 
whether such contacts were sufficient for jurisdiction when Helicol’s 
activities were unrelated to the asserted causes of action.41 
The Court posited that the nature of Helicol’s contacts was not 
similar to the “continuous and systematic general business contacts” 
extant in Perkins.42  The Court described three primary types of 
contacts Helicol had with Texas, discounting each in turn.43  First, 
while the chief executive officer of Helicol traveled to Houston for a 
negotiating session with representatives of the Peruvian consortium 
and its Texas alter ego, the Court reasoned that this singular trip was 
neither continuous nor systematic as required for the exercise of 
general jurisdiction.44  Second, the Court deemed insignificant the 
fact that Helicol received over $5 million in payments drawn upon a 
Houston, Texas bank because it was a unilateral act of the drawer not 
 
 35 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984).  The Supreme Court had, the month before, 
used the term “general jurisdiction” in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984), but 
the Court did not mention the term “specific jurisdiction.” 
 36 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18. 
 37 Id. at 409. 
 38 Id. at 410. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 415.  However, this supposed concession is questionable.  As Justice 
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, some portions of the briefs filed on behalf of 
Hall suggested that their claims were related to Helicol’s activities within Texas.  Id. 
at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Additionally, Hall’s oral argument, as some 
commentators have noted, “invited the Court to consider the nature and extent of 
the contacts and their relation to the cause of action.”  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET 
AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS 236 (8th ed. 
1999) (citing Tr. of Oral Argument at 20-21, 27). 
 41 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409, 416. 
 42 Id. at 416. 
 43 Id. at 416-18. 
 44 Id. at 410-11, 416. 
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imputable to Helicol.45  Finally, the Court determined that Helicol’s 
purchase of over $4 million in equipment (including eighty percent 
of its helicopter fleet) along with training and technical consultation 
for pilots, management, and maintenance personnel from Bell 
Helicopter in Fort Worth, Texas, was “not enough to warrant . . . in 
personam jurisdiction.”46  While certainly these activities could be 
described as “continuous and systematic,” the Court concluded, by 
relying on a pre-International Shoe case, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis 
Brown Co.,47 that mere purchases and related trips were insufficient to 
support the exercise of general jurisdiction consonant with the 
constraints of due process.48 
The Court’s determination that Helicol’s ongoing purchases and 
related trips did not establish its amenability to suit in Texas 
demonstrates that general jurisdiction requires more than merely 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum.  In other words, 
as the Court has remarked on other occasions, the test for 
jurisdiction is not merely quantitative.49  Instead, there is a qualitative 
aspect to the analysis as well, requiring that the defendant’s forum 
contacts must be “thought so substantial and of such a nature” to 
support the exercise of general jurisdiction.50  But a question left 
unanswered by both Perkins and Helicopteros is the type of forum 
activities that satisfy the qualitative aspect of this analysis. 
Perkins exhibits the unremarkable proposition that the situs of 
defendant’s “principal, if temporary, place of business” is a contact of 
 
 45 Id. at 411, 416-17. 
 46 Id. at 411. 
 47 260 U.S. 516 (1923).  In Rosenberg, the plaintiff’s cause of action was related to 
the defendant’s forum activities.  Id. at 518.  Nevertheless, the Court held that “the 
fact that the alleged cause of action arose in New York is immaterial” as jurisdiction 
at that time required a finding that “defendant was doing business within the state . . 
. in such manner and to such extent to warrant the inference it was present there.”  
Id. at 517-18.  In other words, the Court was concerned only with what today would 
be characterized as general jurisdiction.  See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 421 n.1 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If anything is clear from Justice Brandeis’ opinion for the 
Court in Rosenberg, however, it is that the Court was concerned only with general 
jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.”). 
 48 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18. 
 49 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (pronouncing 
that jurisdictional criteria “cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative” but instead 
must depend “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause 
to insure”). 
 50 See id. at 318 (explaining that a defendant could be subject to jurisdiction 
based on continuous contacts with the forum “thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities”). 
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a sufficiently substantial nature.51  Helicopteros establishes that 
purchases and related trips, on the other hand, are not enough.52  
These decisions provide the extent of the Supreme Court’s post-
International Shoe interpretation of the qualitative aspect of the 
general jurisdictional calculus, other than cryptic references in two 
other opinions: one not disputing the proposition vital to the 
decision below that a major insurance company “doing business” in 
all fifty states could be amenable under general jurisdiction 
principles in each state,53 and the other suggesting that defendant’s 
sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines a month in the forum might not 
support general jurisdiction.54  But the sum of these decisions lends 
de minimis assistance in resolving the substantiality of a host of other 
types of contacts. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have also not articulated any 
type of theoretical approach underlying general jurisdiction, instead 
merely employing an ad hoc comparative analysis to prior 
precedent.55  Intriguingly, though, such precedential comparisons 
include decisions predating, not just postdating, International Shoe.  
International Shoe itself cited several prior holdings that supported 
predicating jurisdiction on a defendant’s continuous, substantial 
forum activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action.56  
Likewise, Perkins referenced pre-International Shoe opinions as 
illustrative of the same doctrine.57  And, most significantly, the 
Helicopteros Court primarily relied on a 1923 opinion authored by 
Justice Brandeis to reach its holding that purchases and related trips 
were insufficient for general jurisdiction.58  The Court’s continued 
 
 51 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984). 
 52 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411-18. 
 53 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980). 
 54 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80 & n.11. 
 55 See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (exploring the nature of the defendant’s 
forum contacts “to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and 
systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”); Keeton, 465 
U.S. at 779-80 & n.11 (opining Hustler Magazine’s sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines 
a month in New Hampshire “may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over 
a cause of action unrelated to those activities” based on comparison to defendant’s 
contacts in Perkins). 
 56 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 
565 (1921); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1915); Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)); see supra note 28. 
 57 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952) (citing 
Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1917); Pa. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 
U.S. 100 (1898)); see supra note 28. 
 58 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown 
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reliance on these antecedent opinions demonstrates that the 
contemporary doctrine of general jurisdiction emanates from pre-
International Shoe jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, this connection does 
not resolve the conundrum of the appropriate framework or 
theoretical basis for general jurisdiction because the constructs 
underlying these earlier opinions were explicitly disavowed as fictions 
in International Shoe.59 
 As a result, any further judicial guidance must be sought from 
the lower federal and state courts.  But unfortunately, these courts 
often purport to find general jurisdiction by relying on the 
relationship of the defendant’s forum contacts to the dispute.60  Thus, 
the appropriate parameters of general jurisdiction must be 
demarcated before embarking on a doctrinal analysis. 
II. THE PARAMETERS OF DISPUTE-BLIND JURISDICTION 
The distinction between specific and general jurisdiction 
appears rudimentary.  Helicopteros articulated that specific jurisdiction 
is appropriate “in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum,” whereas general jurisdiction exists for the 
assertion of jurisdictional power in suits “not arising out of or related 
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”61  Yet alone these 
definitions are inadequate because they pretermit the discrepancy in 
the state’s jurisdictional power over the defendant in each 
circumstance. 
As discussed previously, International Shoe incorporated two pre-
existing jurisdictional concepts into its new model, one based solely 
on the relationship of the defendant to the forum providing 
jurisdiction for any cause of action and the other predicated on the 
nature of the specific dispute at issue.62  To clarify the alterity between 
these two types of jurisdictional power, Professors von Mehren and 
Trautman, in an influential article, proposed employing the 
terminology “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction,” which 
of course was later adopted by the Supreme Court.63  Under their 
formulation, general jurisdiction referred to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over all claims against the defendant based solely on the 
 
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)). 
 59 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
 60 See infra Part II. 
 61 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9. 
 62 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
 63 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 
(1984) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136-64). 
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nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum.64  
Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, granted adjudicatory power only 
“with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that established jurisdiction to adjudicate.”65 
Accordingly, a more precise distinction between general and 
specific jurisdiction is whether the relationship of the defendant’s 
contacts to the dispute impacts the court’s analysis of the requisite 
constitutional connection for jurisdiction.  If the relationship of the 
defendant’s forum activities to the dispute influences the court’s 
jurisdictional holding, the court is exercising specific jurisdiction, 
which grants only limited adjudicative power over the defendant.66  
On the other hand, if the court does not rely upon any connection 
between the forum and the causes of action asserted, but instead 
bases its jurisdictional finding only on the defendant’s relationship 
with the forum, the court is exercising general adjudicative authority 
over any cause of action asserted against the defendant.67 
Professor Twitchell proposed alternative nomenclature that 
would make this difference more pellucid in her seminal article, The 
Myth of General Jurisdiction.68  She advocated that the exercise of 
general jurisdiction should be termed “dispute-blind” because the 
exercise of jurisdiction does not depend on the nature of or the facts 
involved in the dispute.69  In contrast, she urged that jurisdiction 
predicated on the nature of the controversy should be referenced as 
“dispute-specific.”70 
Professor Twitchell also proffered an insightful analytical device 
to ascertain whether a court is actually relying on true dispute-blind 
general jurisdiction.71  Under this device, a court should construct a 
hypothetical claim without any forum connection to insure that any 
related forum activities of the defendant are not improperly 
infiltrating the dispute-blind query.72  As an example: are the 
 
 64 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136. 
 65 Id; see also id. at 1144-45 (noting specific jurisdiction “is limited to matters 
arising out of—or intimately related to—the affiliating circumstances on which the 
jurisdictional claim is based”). 
 66 In fact, some courts refer to this basis of jurisdiction as “limited jurisdiction” or 
“transactional jurisdiction” rather than specific jurisdiction for this reason.  See, e.g., 
Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 67 Cf. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.5, at 72 (5th ed. 2001); id.    
§ 2.8, at 87; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136. 
 68 Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 613, 680. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 642; Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 205. 
 72 See supra note 71. 
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corporate defendant’s actual activities in California so pervasive and 
extensive that it should be amenable to the adjudicatory jurisdiction 
of California for a hypothetical employment discrimination claim 
filed by a New York citizen employed at corporate headquarters in 
New York?  Or, with respect to a foreign corporation, do the 
corporation’s actual California contacts support jurisdiction even for 
a hypothetical cause of action arising from its sale of a product in 
Germany that injured a German citizen?  By constructing such a 
hypothetical, the court insures that the relationship between the 
defendant’s forum activities and the dispute does not influence the 
jurisdictional query. 
Unfortunately, however, many courts do not employ this simple 
analytical device, which would assist in restoring doctrinal purity to 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.73  Instead, courts still often  purport to 
employ general jurisdiction precepts while relying on the relationship 
of the litigation to the defendant’s forum contacts.74  This arises both 
in circumstances in which the defendant’s related contacts are 
sufficient to satisfy current constitutional doctrine for specific 
jurisdiction and those in which the resolution of the specific 
jurisdiction query is not as certain. 
A. Decisions Purporting to Find General Jurisdiction by Relying on the 
Defendant’s Contacts Clearly Giving Rise to the Litigation 
Amenability decisions frequently conflate dispute-specific and 
dispute-blind concepts even when the defendant’s forum contacts 
actually give rise to the litigation.75  The courts in these cases either 
ignore the dispute-blind nature of general jurisdiction or at least 
confuse its proper application. 
In some of these instances, the court itself appears uncertain as 
to the proper basis for its holding.76  These courts detail the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum, some giving rise to the litigation 
while others do not, before concluding that the defendant’s 
 
 73 But see Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir. 
1999) (relying on “dispute-blind” nature of general jurisdiction query); cf. Sternberg 
v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1117 n.23 (Del. 1988) (noting Professor Twitchell’s 
proposed “dispute-blind” terminology). 
 74 See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 190. 
 75 See infra notes 76-90. 
 76 See, e.g., Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512 So. 2d 1334, 
1335-36 (Ala. 1987) (holding Alabama court had “jurisdiction” over nonresident 
corporation without specifically articulating whether general or specific jurisdiction 
existed); Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273, 274-76 (Del. 1984) (holding foreign 
corporation was “doing business” within Delaware sufficient to satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement for due process without iterating the basis). 
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“continuous and systematic” contacts establish the purposeful 
availment of the privilege of conducting business within the forum 
necessary to support jurisdiction.77  Although these decisions cannot 
be properly considered dispute-blind because of the pervasive 
reliance on related contacts sufficient to support specific jurisdiction, 
subsequent courts, citing the “continuous and systematic” language, 
sometimes incorrectly interpret them as general jurisdiction 
decisions.78  This misconception is unfortunate, especially for those 
courts that rely on precedential comparisons on the quantity and 
quality of contacts, because the defendant’s activities in the forum 
often are insufficient to establish true dispute-blind jurisdiction.79 
Another even more common pitfall is to decree that general 
jurisdiction exists by relying, at least in part, on contacts giving rise to 
the litigation that are sufficient under current constitutional doctrine 
for specific jurisdiction.80  Occasionally, the courts even iterate that 
 
 77 See, e.g., Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d at 1334-36 (holding that nonresident 
corporation’s repeated wholesale auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama, 
including the automobile at issue in the underlying lawsuit, was purposefully 
directed forum activity that constituted a “‘continuous and systematic’ course of 
conduct in Alabama” supporting jurisdiction); Waters, 479 A.2d at 274-76 (holding 
German corporation was “doing business” in Delaware by shipping its manufactured 
tractors, including the tractor injuring the Delaware plaintiff, through its wholly 
owned American subsidiary into Delaware). 
 78 See, e.g., Ex parte Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1264-65 (Ala. 1998) 
(interpreting Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d 1334, as a general jurisdiction case); Ex 
parte United Bhd. of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 251-52 (Ala. 1997) (same). 
 79 Compare Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d at 1334-36 (holding that nonresident 
corporation’s repeated wholesale auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama, 
including the automobile at issue in the underlying lawsuit, was purposefully 
directed, “‘continuous and systematic’ course of conduct in Alabama” supporting 
jurisdiction), with Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984) 
(noting in dictum that business contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the 
forum a month might be insufficient for general jurisdiction). 
 80 See, e.g., Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Aerenson, 603 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (D. 
Del. 1985) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate in Delaware over Pennsylvania 
bank for cause of action arising from one of the bank’s Delaware mortgages); Ex parte 
Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d at 1265 (finding general jurisdiction in Alabama over 
Virginia construction management corporation based solely on contacts related to 
underlying breach of contract action, the sole transaction the corporation ever 
conducted in Alabama); Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So. 2d 389, 391-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1995) (finding general jurisdiction in Florida over Kentucky corporation and 
individual in part because of contacts “regard[ing] the subject matter of this lawsuit,” 
such as their execution of guarantees on a mortgage on real property in Florida 
when they were being sued for breach of the loan agreement); Zivalich v. Int’l Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 662 So. 2d 62, 64-65 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding general jurisdiction 
over union in part because union job allegedly offered to plaintiff that was the basis 
of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was to be partially performed in Louisiana); 
Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Florida subject 
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general jurisdiction is appropriate because either the suit arises from 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum or the state has an interest in 
adjudicating disputes related to the forum.81  Of course, by 
incorporating dispute-related contacts into the analysis, especially 
contacts alone sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, these cases 
fall outside the ambit of true dispute-blind jurisdiction.82 
More importantly, however, by relying on contacts giving rise to 
the litigation while purporting to find general jurisdiction, such 
decisions infuse a doctrinal impurity into the jurisdictional analysis.  
The harm is not limited to the particular decision, since a common 
methodology for resolving general jurisdiction queries is to compare 
the quantity and quality of contacts to those contacts found sufficient 
in prior cases.83  Thus, subsequent cases contemplating a truly 
dispute-blind situation analogize to the contacts from a prior 
purported general jurisdiction case that, in fact, involved related 
contacts adequate to establish specific jurisdiction.84  This inevitably 
dilutes the quantum and quality of activity necessary for dispute-blind 
general jurisdiction, culminating in “an impoverished body of 
general jurisdiction case law that fails to explore the question of the 
state’s general adjudicatory power over nonresident defendants.”85 
Finally, still other courts rely on general jurisdiction as an 
 
to general jurisdiction in North Carolina in part because one of the real estate 
broker plaintiffs was a resident of North Carolina and the property for which the 
plaintiffs sought compensation was located in North Carolina); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Brown & Ross Int’l Distribs., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 527, 531-32 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding 
New York corporation amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas based on the 
substantial sales of counterfeited GE parts in Texas when the basis for the lawsuit was 
the defendant’s counterfeiting and theft of trade secrets). 
 81 See, e.g., Ex parte Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d at 1264 (finding general 
jurisdiction in Alabama when plaintiff’s “breach-of-contract action arises from 
[defendant’s] contacts with Alabama”); Nichols, 652 So. 2d at 392 (relying on contacts 
“regard[ing] the subject matter of this lawsuit” in general jurisdiction analysis); 
Bruggeman, 532 S.E.2d at 219-20 (explaining “less extensive contacts” necessary for 
general jurisdiction because of forum’s interest when plaintiff was a resident of 
forum state and case allegedly arose from contract to locate property in the state). 
 82 See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 613. 
 83 See infra Part III.B. 
 84 Compare Temperature Sys., Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex. 
App. 1993) (citing Design Information Systems v. Feith Systems & Software, Inc., 801 
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1990), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 813 S.W.2d 
481 (Tex. 1991), as support for general jurisdiction holding), and Nikolai v. Strate, 
922 S.W.2d 229, 238-39 (Tex. App. 1996) (same), with Michel v. Rocket Eng’g Corp., 
45 S.W.3d 658, 673 (Tex. App. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in Design Info. Sys. 
was based on the plaintiff being “a Texas resident whose cause of action arose out of 
and was directly related to the sale and shipment of the allegedly defective product 
to him in Texas by the nonresident defendant”). 
 85 Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612. 
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alternative holding.86  While judicial opinions commonly embrace 
alternative holdings, alternative findings on general jurisdiction are 
often dubious, apparently influenced by the relatedness of the 
contacts.87  As an extreme example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
 
 86 See, e.g., Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46, 51 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding in the alternative, if specific jurisdiction did not exist, general 
jurisdiction was appropriate because of Missouri defendant’s business contacts with 
North Carolina plaintiff corporation, such as selling and shipping $65,000 in 
merchandise, purchasing merchandise on ten occasions, placing telephone calls, and 
participating in joint programs); Cherry Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 394 S.E.2d 651, 
656-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding individual had sufficient “‘systematic and 
continuous’ contacts with North Carolina” to establish general jurisdiction after 
finding jurisdiction based on execution of North Carolina partnership agreement 
that gave rise to the litigation); Fraser v. Littlejohn, 386 S.E.2d 230, 232-37 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding that judgment debtor was subject to general jurisdiction in 
North Carolina after concluding that prior Florida judgment against debtor was 
subject to full faith and credit in North Carolina, the only state in which the debtor 
had property); Ferrell v. Prairie Int’l Trucks, Inc., 935 P.2d 286, 288 n.2 (Okla. 1997) 
(refusing to address distinction between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction 
in suit against truck dealer because sufficient contacts existed for the exercise of 
either based on dealer’s advertisements and evidence of two forum sales); Ahadi v. 
Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 719-21 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding Michigan resident subject 
to general jurisdiction in Texas for guaranteeing twenty-three loans in Texas made to 
her husband’s business after concluding that she was subject to specific jurisdiction 
because the plaintiff’s claim arose out of her alleged promise made on the phone to 
him while he was in Texas); Transportacion Especial Autorizada, S.A. de C.V. v. 
Seguros Comercial Am., S.A. de C.V., 978 S.W.2d 716, 719-21 (Tex. App. 1998) 
(holding Mexican transportation company amenable to both general and specific 
jurisdiction in Texas in suit arising from company’s issuance of a bill of lading to 
transport equipment from Austin, Texas to Mexico City using itself and two Texas 
corporations when half of its business was derived from imports crossing the Texas 
border). 
 87 See, e.g., Cherry Bekaert & Holland, 394 S.E.2d at 657 (holding in the alternative 
that there was general jurisdiction over an individual based on his participation in 
North Carolina accounting partnership); Fraser, 386 S.E.2d at 235-37 (holding in the 
alternative that individual was subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina based 
primarily on his activities when he was residing in the forum two years before the suit 
was filed); Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d at 719-21 (finding general jurisdiction and specific 
jurisdiction over Michigan resident who personally guaranteed twenty-three loans in 
Texas made to her husband’s business).  These holdings are not dubious merely 
because they subject individuals to general jurisdiction based on continuous and 
systematic business activities, but also because their rationales collapse under reductio 
ad absurdum.  Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (“It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting ‘continuous and 
systematic’ contacts to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to 
activity in the forum applies only to corporations . . . .”) (citations omitted).  The 
rationale of Cherry Bekaert & Holland would support general jurisdiction in North 
Carolina over a partner in a Washington branch office of a North Carolina-based law 
firm.  394 S.E.2d at 657.  Fraser would allow general jurisdiction in North Carolina 
over an individual who resided and worked in North Carolina for several years who 
was still trying to sell his North Carolina home, although he moved to Alaska two 
years ago.  386 S.E.2d at 235-37.  Ahadi apparently would support general jurisdiction 
over a father in Michigan guaranteeing loans and leases for his children attending 
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found general jurisdiction over a corporation based on 
advertisements in Oklahoma and evidence of two forum sales.88  But 
this finding cannot properly be uncoupled from the court’s judgment 
on the appropriateness of specific jurisdiction when one of the forum 
sales actually gave rise to the litigation—indeed, the court provided a 
unitary analysis for its dual holding.89  And certainly, advertisements 
and evidence of two sales is not truly substantial enough, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively, for general jurisdiction.90  Such 
insignificant activities should not render the nonresident corporation 
amenable to jurisdiction on any cause of action having absolutely no 
connection to Oklahoma, such as an employment discrimination 
claim filed by an employee hired and working in another state. 
Hence, holdings finding general jurisdiction after finding 
specific jurisdiction are of practically no value in clarifying general 
jurisdiction.  These decisions, along with those in which the basis of 
the holding is ambiguous or in which related contacts exist sufficient 
to establish specific jurisdiction, are not incorporated into this 
Article’s doctrinal analysis of general adjudicatory jurisdiction 
decisions.  Such judicial determinations cannot be adjudged dispute-
blind when dispute-specific contacts justified their holdings. 
B. General Jurisdiction Cases Involving Contacts Tenuously Related to 
the Dispute 
The more difficult question is the appropriate categorization of 
those cases involving at least one dispute-related contact, although 
the relationship might be insufficient under current constitutional 
doctrine for specific jurisdiction.  Rather than finding jurisdiction 
predicated on the problematic specific jurisdiction question, the 
court embarks on a general jurisdiction query.91  The quandary such 
 
college in Texas.  61 S.W.3d at 719-21.  Such tenuous business contacts by an 
individual with the forum are not sufficient to force them to defend a wholly 
unrelated matter in the forum. 
 88 Ferrell, 935 P.2d at 288 & n.2. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984) (noting in 
dictum that business contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the forum a 
month might be insufficient for general jurisdiction); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, 
Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding mail-order New Hampshire limited 
liability company not subject to general jurisdiction in South Carolina based on sales 
made to twenty-six South Carolina customers, although finding jurisdiction 
appropriate under RICO’s nationwide service provision). 
 91 See, e.g., Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 n.9 (Conn. 1995) 
(noting that disposition of case on general jurisdiction grounds obviated need to 
resolve specific jurisdiction issue). 
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cases pose for this Article is whether they should be incorporated into 
the dispute-blind doctrinal analysis when the dispute-related contacts 
perhaps, even subconsciously, influenced the court’s decision.  This 
Article reaches a compromise solution for these cases, depending on 
whether the court’s ratio decidendi explicitly relies on the related 
contact. 
In many of these cases, the courts’ holdings rely on the 
relationship of the contacts to the dispute.92  An example is Glover v. 
Western Air Lines, Inc.93  The nonresident defendant, Avis U.S., was a 
franchisor licensing the Avis name and exercising “considerable 
control” over its franchisees, including several in Alaska, one of which 
paid Avis U.S. approximately $11,000 during a single year.94  Avis U.S. 
also placed advertising in national and international publications 
calculated to reach Alaskan consumers and maintained a toll-free 
number for Alaskans to make reservations for a rental car anywhere 
in the world.95  The Alaska Supreme Court held that these contacts 
with Alaska were “of a continuing, systematic, routine and substantial 
nature,” subjecting Avis U.S. to general jurisdiction in Alaska.96  The 
court then continued that it was not unreasonable to subject Avis to 
the jurisdiction of Alaska’s courts when the Alaskan plaintiffs alleged 
its advertising in Alaska caused them to rent the car in Mexico.97  Of 
course, advertising in Alaska that caused the plaintiffs to rent the car 
was an activity at least related to the dispute, a contact that some (but 
 
 92 See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that, although individual’s business contact was not sufficient to support an 
exercise of specific jurisdiction, “the fact that some connection exists between 
[plaintiff], the forum, and the controversy involved in the instant case is nevertheless 
relevant to our determination [of general jurisdiction]”); Johnson Worldwide 
Assocs., Inc. v. Brunton Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 901, 910-13 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (finding 
general jurisdiction in Wisconsin over Wyoming corporation when its forum 
connections, although not giving rise to the litigation, “relate[d] to the sale of 
compasses—the heart of this very case”); Hurlston v. Bouchard Transp., Co., 970 F. 
Supp. 581, 582-83 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate over 
nonresident owner and manager of vessel for claim arising from a personal injury 
suffered by the ship’s engineer off the coast of Florida in part because “the voyage at 
issue originated in Texas”); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 773 (Tex. 
App. 1999) (relying in part on “contacts with Texas related to this suit,” such as the 
plane that crashed in New Zealand killing six foreign nationals was originally sold to 
Texas residents and then allegedly defectively modified in Texas, in finding general 
jurisdiction over Kansas aircraft manufacturer), disapproved on other grounds, BMC 
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). 
 93 745 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1987). 
 94 Id. at 1366-67. 
 95 Id. at 1367. 
 96 Id. at 1369. 
 97 Id. at 1370. 
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not most) courts have held under analogous circumstances to be 
sufficient to support specific jurisdiction.98 
The courts’ reliance in such cases on a contact related to the 
dispute precludes their inclusion as paradigmatic dispute-blind 
decisions.  Would the Alaska Supreme Court have found Avis U.S. 
amenable to jurisdiction if the dispute had not involved alleged 
misrepresentations, fraudulent omissions, and unfair trade practices 
directed at Alaskan residents, but instead involved plaintiffs residing 
in Florida receiving Avis’s advertising in that state?  But, on the other 
hand, categorizing the decisions as quintessential specific jurisdiction 
cases is difficult when the courts may have correctly disavowed any 
reliance on specific jurisdiction principles.99 
Thus, these cases actually form a mutated, hybrid jurisdiction, 
neither truly specific nor truly general.  Certainly, an argument can 
be made in favor of recognizing a hybrid jurisdictional basis.100  A 
fundamental focus of the minimum contacts analysis is fairness, and a 
sliding scale, one could argue, is more fair and just than a rigid 
 
 98 See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 383-84 (9th Cir. 
1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Rutherford v. Sherburne Corp., 616 
F. Supp. 1456, 1460-61 (D.N.J. 1985); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 554 
(Mass. 1994).  But see Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 267-
68 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing several cases rejecting Shute rationale); Hesse v. Best W. 
Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76 (Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting advertisements to and 
solicitation of forum residents as a basis for specific jurisdiction when the injury 
occurred in another jurisdiction); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 
670, 676-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (same).  Additional factors besides defendant’s 
advertising may also have supported specific jurisdiction in the Glover case.  The 
plaintiffs were injured by Mexican bandits as they were driving a vehicle rented from 
a Mexican Avis franchisee.  Glover, 745 P.2d at 1366.  The plaintiffs’ suit alleged that 
Avis U.S. committed unfair trade practices, made misrepresentations and fraudulent 
statements, and failed to warn of the hazards of renting a car in Mexico.  Id.  If any of 
these alleged misrepresentations or fraudulent statements had been directed at the 
plaintiffs while in Alaska, specific jurisdiction might have been proper on this basis.  
See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 
F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972). 
 99 See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777-79 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting existence of specific jurisdiction in Texas as a result of contract executed 
with Texas resident but then determining “the fact that some connection exists 
between [plaintiff], the forum, and the controversy involved in the instant case is 
nevertheless relevant to our determination [of general jurisdiction]”). 
 100 See William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between 
General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (1984) (proposing a sliding 
scale approach to jurisdiction under which, “[a]s the quantity and quality of the 
defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between the plaintiff’s 
claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and quality of the defendant’s 
forum contacts decrease, a stronger connection between the plaintiff’s claim and 
those contacts is required”). 
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application of two categories.101  Nevertheless, there are difficulties 
inherent in such an approach.  First, and most importantly, the 
Supreme Court at least implicitly rejected the existence of hybrid 
jurisdiction in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.102  
Helicopteros did not consider the nature of the dispute in any fashion 
in denying Texas general adjudicatory jurisdiction, even though a 
number of the defendant’s Texas activities were at least tangentially 
related to the lawsuit.103  Second, as Professor Twitchell articulated, 
such a hybrid, or conditional, basis for jurisdiction inevitably dilutes 
the requirements for general jurisdiction and weakens the 
jurisprudential foundations of both specific and general 
jurisdiction.104  Instead of discerning the outer limits of specific 
jurisdiction, courts invoke the hybrid analysis as a convenient 
fallback.  Then subsequent cases contemplating a truly dispute-blind 
situation analogize to the contacts from prior hybrid cases, diluting 
the corporate activity necessary for dispute-blind jurisdiction and 
hindering the development of a cogent theoretical basis for either 
general or specific jurisdiction.105  As a result of these difficulties, the 
better reasoned decisions reject the existence of a hybrid 
jurisdictional basis.106 
In any event, such hybrid holdings are omitted from this 
Article’s doctrinal analysis.  At most, a hybrid holding only illustrates 
that the court deemed jurisdiction appropriate in that particular case 
predicated on a mixture of dispute-related and unrelated contacts.  
 
 101 See id.; cf. Holt Oil & Gas, 801 F.2d at 779 n.5 (noting that, although “the 
distinction between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ jurisdiction provides a useful analytic 
device, the use of these categories does not alter the fundamental [fairness] focus of 
the minimum contacts inquiry”). 
 102 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 103 Id. at 416-18.  The related contacts included a trip to Texas by the defendant’s 
chief executive officer for a negotiating session on the helicopter services contract by 
which the defendant was transporting plaintiffs’ decedents, payments under this 
same contract from a Texas bank, purchases of almost all the helicopters in 
defendant’s fleet (including the one involved in the crash) from the forum, and 
training for defendant’s pilots (including the pilot of the crashed helicopter) in Fort 
Worth, Texas.  Id. at 410-12; see also id. at 425-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  But, 
despite the related nature of these contacts, the Court never allowed relatedness to 
enter its general jurisdiction calculus.  See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra 
note 4, at 651 (averring Helicopteros Court thus “implicitly reaffirmed the principle 
that it will not look to the nature of the dispute in considering the propriety of 
subjecting a defendant to general jurisdiction in the forum”). 
 104 See id. at 612-13, 650; see also Simard, supra note 3, at 580. 
 105 See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612-13, 650. 
 106 See, e.g., RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1278 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting the existence of “a hybrid between specific and general jurisdiction” based 
on Supreme Court precedent). 
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Due to this partial reliance on contacts related to the dispute to 
justify the assertion of jurisdiction, these decisions do not assist in 
demarcating a state’s general adjudicative authority over causes of 
action with no relationship to the defendant’s forum activities. 
In other decisions with tenuously connected contacts, however, 
the courts disavow any reliance on the related contacts.  Despite 
reciting an asserted, but debatable, basis for specific jurisdiction, the 
courts either reject or refuse to address the contention.107  The courts 
then conduct an appropriate dispute-blind analysis, ignoring the 
arguable relatedness of the contacts to the litigation.108  Because these 
courts properly omit any consideration of relatedness in the general 
jurisdiction query, the traditional criteria for dispute-blind 
jurisdiction are satisfied.  The court’s holding is apparently based 
solely on the defendant’s relationship with the forum, justifying 
jurisdiction for any cause of action irrespective of any potential 
relationship of the litigation to the defendant’s forum activities.  
Nevertheless, it is still possible that the tenuously related contacts may 
have had some underlying, unstated impact on the court.109 
This Article hence adopts a compromise with respect to these 
decisions, incorporating them in the analysis of general jurisdiction 
decisions, but at least footnoting the existence of related contacts that 
might have influenced the court.  In contrast, any decisions in which 
the court explicitly relied on the relatedness of the defendant’s 
 
 107 See, e.g., Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding general jurisdiction, but not “transactional” or specific jurisdiction, existed 
over defendant with California sales office for California resident’s claim that he 
received advertisement and made reservation in California for defendant’s hotel in 
Mexico where he was injured); Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 & n.9 
(Conn. 1995) (refusing to consider specific jurisdiction over New York trustee bank 
based on finding of general jurisdiction); Verdin v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 655 
So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding Louisiana recruitment efforts of 
Delaware shipping corporation with principal place of business in New York too 
attenuated to plaintiff’s employment to support specific jurisdiction, but that general 
jurisdiction existed because of transportation services provided in Louisiana); 
Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670, 676-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding general jurisdiction proper, rather than specific jurisdiction, over a 
Wisconsin resort that directed an advertisement at a Minnesota resident who was 
injured while vacationing at the resort); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 
860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding Washington resident who suffered continued 
pain from alleged torts after moving to Oregon had to establish general jurisdiction 
in Oregon, not specific jurisdiction, over nonresident doctors, hospital, and medical 
equipment manufacturer who often served Oregon residents). 
 108 See, e.g., Hesse, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76-77; Thomason, 661 A.2d at 605; Verdin, 655 
So. 2d at 543-44; Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676-77; Bachman, 724 P.2d at 860-61. 
 109 Cf. John T. McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme 
Court Decisions, 10 VT. L. REV. 1 (1985) (maintaining the Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction decisions are often influenced by hidden agendas). 
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forum contacts have been omitted from the subsequent doctrinal 
analysis. 
III. DOCTRINAL APPROACHES TO GENERAL JURISDICTION 
The federal and state courts utilize several disparate approaches 
to resolving dispute-blind jurisdiction queries.  While the parameters 
of these models are not well defined—indeed, it is not uncommon 
for a single decision to incorporate more than one approach110—six 
basic patterns may be divined from a review of the case law.  Some 
courts use a conclusory, ipse dixit approach,111 while others rely 
primarily on comparisons to precedent.112  Additional methods 
include evaluating either a factor index or the defendant’s principal 
business activities.113  Still other jurisdictions employ foundational 
constructs such as presence or quid pro quo.114  But, as discussed 
below, none of these approaches is satisfactory. 
A. The Ipse Dixit Approach 
A misguided, yet unfortunately common, state court approach to 
evaluate general jurisdiction is merely to list the defendant’s forum 
contacts and hold that such contacts, without considering either their 
quality or nature, demonstrate the requisite “continuous and 
systematic” business activities.115  The court’s “rationale” is, in essence, 
the assertion that the contacts are sufficient for jurisdiction.  For 
instance, the Louisiana court’s ratio decidendi in Verdin v. Morania Oil 
Tanker Corp.116 was solely the dictate that “defendant’s overall contacts 
with this state [of having a ship repaired at a Louisiana shipyard and 
 
 110 See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on precedent and constructive presence 
theory); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 
(10th Cir. 1999) (employing a list of factors and comparisons to precedent); Haas v. 
A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Am. Type 
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 808-09 (Tex. 2002) (using a 
reciprocal benefits theory and precedential comparisons). 
 111 See infra Part III.A. 
 112 See infra Part III.B. 
 113 See infra Parts III.C-D. 
 114 See infra Parts III.E-F. 
 115 Federal district courts on rare occasions are also guilty of employing this 
approach.  See, e.g., Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(holding summarily that a law firm with its sole office in Chicago was subject to 
general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania solely because its client list revealed that it had 
assisted fifty-four past and present Philadelphia clients on legal matters, although the 
court did not consider either the method of solicitation of the clients or the relative 
quantity or quality of the firm’s Philadelphia business). 
 116 655 So. 2d 542 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
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providing marine transportation to a Louisiana corporation three to 
five times a year] . . . are sufficient to provide general jurisdiction.”117  
Courts in Connecticut,118 Florida,119 Indiana,120 and Texas,121 to name a 
 
 117 Id. at 544 (holding Delaware corporation with principal place of business in 
New York subject to general jurisdiction in Louisiana for workplace injury in New 
Jersey of Louisiana domiciliary hired in New York). 
 118 See, e.g., Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 (Conn. 1995) (holding 
New York trustee bank with no offices in Connecticut performed “continuous and 
systematic” business in Connecticut through “substantial credit card business,” 
regular solicitation of “general banking business,” and mortgagee title to a 
“substantial” amount of real property in claim for mismanagement of a trust). 
 119 See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, 739 So. 2d 617, 619, 620-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding Belizean shrimping corporation engaged in the continuous and 
systematic business activities with Florida necessary for general jurisdiction in lawsuit 
filed by Belizean citizen injured in Costa Rica through selling eighteen percent of its 
shrimp to Florida importers, moving almost all of its shipments through Florida 
either by air or boat, purchasing a variety of equipment and supplies from Florida 
sellers, using storage facilities in Florida when necessary, and utilizing a Florida 
broker for customs and FDA approval).  Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc., 
710 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), employed a similar methodology in 
holding that a California resident’s three-year business involvement as a distributor 
for a Florida corporation and subsequent involvement as a distributor for a 
competing company established continuous and systematic business contacts with 
Florida.  However, Achievers could have been decided as a specific jurisdiction case 
since the defendant allegedly engaged in an organized campaign to defame and 
disparage her former Florida distribution company and injure its business 
relationship with its distributors.  Id. at 718; cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 
(1984) (holding specific jurisdiction existed in California over Florida citizens 
intentionally directing defamatory statements at forum); Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that allegation that 
Mexican telecommunications corporation violated United States antitrust law by 
intentionally canceling a telephone line to harm a Texas business was sufficient to 
grant Texas courts specific jurisdiction over the claim). 
 120 See, e.g., Anthem Ins. Cos. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1238-40 
(Ind. 2000) (holding Nevada corporation with principal place of business in 
California subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana in suit alleging that one of its 
subsidiaries had submitted fraudulent claims to an Indiana insurance company 
through collective examination of parent corporation’s contacts, including twenty-
eight corporate business trips to visit hospitals owned by subsidiaries in Indiana, 
$385,000 in business transactions with Indiana entities in a five-year period, 
correspondence regarding Medicare and Medicaid audits to Indiana regulatory 
agencies, and prior defense and settlement of a lawsuit in Indiana). 
 121 See, e.g., Temperature Sys., Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex. 
App. 1993) (holding Wisconsin corporation distributing HVAC equipment in 
Wisconsin, Michigan, and northern Illinois amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas 
in suit arising out of alleged breach of employee recruitment contract because of 
corporation’s purchases in Texas of equipment and an inter-distributor relationship 
with all authorized United States distributors, including those in Texas); Project 
Eng’g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 722 (Tex. App. 1992) (finding 
general jurisdiction in suit alleging tortious conversion in California over a California 
corporation that had served as a sales representative or distributor in California for 
three Texas companies); Lujan v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 798 S.W.2d 828, 831-
32 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding New Mexico corporation subject to general 
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few, have similarly exercised jurisdiction predicated on nothing more 
than a conclusion. 
 This general jurisdiction template is fraught with difficulties.  
First, many of the holdings are wrong, some even directly 
contravening Supreme Court precedent.  For instance, the most 
significant forum contact in two Texas decisions appears to be the 
nonresident corporation’s purchases from Texas businesses.122  But 
the Supreme Court held in Helicopteros that such purchases were 
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.123  A similar deficiency is 
exhibited in those cases relying primarily on sporadic forum sales 
despite the Supreme Court’s intimation that even more regular and 
continuous sales are not enough for dispute-blind adjudication.124  
Such grave judicial errors eviscerate the fundamental constitutional 
rights of the aggrieved litigants. 
Yet even more importantly, a mere listing of contacts and 
conclusory determination of sufficiency provides no guidance for 
future cases as to the requisites for general jurisdiction.  Indeed, 
some cases are devoid of any specificity regarding the nature of the 
 
jurisdiction in Texas for accident occurring in New Mexico to New Mexican 
employee by relying on corporation’s occasional performance of work in Texas 
under one of its two contracts to perform oil field services on an “as needed basis,” its 
insurance coverage for any accidents in Texas, its occasional trips to Texas to 
purchase supplies, and its advertisements in a trade publication distributed in Texas 
and New Mexico).  The only “rationale” in these cases is merely the question-begging 
conclusion that the defendant should have “reasonably anticipated the call of a 
Texas court” based on its contacts, without appreciating the distinction in general 
jurisdiction cases that the contacts must be so substantial, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, that the defendant would expect that it would be required to defend in 
Texas any cause of action arising anywhere in the world.  See Temperature Sys., 854 
S.W.2d at 674; Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 721-22. 
 122 See, e.g., Temperature Sys., 854 S.W.2d at 676 (involving corporation’s purchases 
in Texas); Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 722 (involving a California corporation 
acting as distributor for Texas companies, purchasing their products and selling in 
California). 
 123 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984).  
The Texas courts’ disregard of Helicopteros is quite remarkable considering the 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Texas Supreme Court in that case.  Id. 
at 419. 
 124 Compare Verdin v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 655 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App. 
1995) (holding Delaware corporation with principal place of business in New York 
subject to general jurisdiction in Louisiana for workplace injury in New Jersey of 
Louisiana domiciliary hired in New York because corporation provided marine 
transportation services and equipment to Louisiana corporation five or less times per 
year and had one of its ships repaired at a Louisiana shipyard), with Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984) (noting in dictum that business 
contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the forum a month might be 
insufficient for general jurisdiction). 
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contacts at issue.125  For example, in Thomason v. Chemical Bank,126 the 
court held a New York bank subject to general jurisdiction in 
Connecticut, despite the lack of a Connecticut branch office, as a 
result of the bank’s “substantial” forum credit card business and 
“substantial” forum real property holdings as a mortgagee.127  But 
what did the court mean by the term “substantial”?  Was this term 
used in the qualitative or quantitative sense?  If employed as a 
quantitative yardstick, was it $11,000 in business, as some courts have 
found to be “substantial” enough for jurisdiction?128  Or was it 
hundreds of thousands, or even millions of dollars?  The court’s 
opinion offers no indication,129 a quite “substantial” defect in its own 
right. 
A defendant is not amenable under even specific jurisdiction 
principles unless it could reasonably anticipate being haled into the 
 
 125 See, e.g., Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 720-22 (finding general jurisdiction in 
Texas over California corporation that had served as a sales representative or 
distributor in California for three Texas companies without quantifying the business 
performed for these Texas companies on either an absolute, transactional, or 
percentage basis, other than to note that only one sale had been made for one of the 
companies and that the agreement with another company had been terminated); 
Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 831-32 (holding New Mexico corporation subject to general 
jurisdiction in Texas in large part because of performing “work in west Texas for 
others” without specifying the amount of work performed). 
 126 661 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1995).  The Thomason case involved some dispute-related 
contacts in that the settlor of the trust at issue was a resident of Connecticut, the 
beneficiaries were residents of Connecticut, and the trustee bank held informational 
meetings in Connecticut regarding the trust.  Id. at 597-98.  But the settlor both 
executed the trust in New York and directed that all communications related to the 
administration of the trust be sent to him at his office in New York.  Id. at 597.  
Additionally, New York law governed the trust agreement and the trust assets were 
always held and administered in New York.  Id.  As a result, the existence of specific 
jurisdiction was at least a close question under Hanson v. Denckla, 352 U.S. 235, 252 
(1958), which held that a foreign corporate trustee was not subject to specific 
jurisdiction in the state in which the settlor and beneficiaries resided.  The court in 
Thomason explicitly refused to resolve the specific jurisdiction issue, instead relying 
solely on dispute-blind contacts to find general jurisdiction over the trustee bank in 
Connecticut.  Thomason, 661 A.2d at 605 & n.9. 
 127 Id. at 598, 605; see also Verdin, 655 So. 2d at 544 (holding Delaware corporation 
with principal place of business in New York subject to general jurisdiction in 
Louisiana for workplace injury in New Jersey to Louisiana domiciliary hired in New 
York because corporation provided marine transportation services and equipment to 
Louisiana corporation five or less times per year without indicating either the 
absolute or percentage of revenue generated from such services in Louisiana). 
 128 See, e.g., Glover v. W. Air Lines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Alaska 1987) 
(holding collection of $10,985.12 from an Alaskan franchise contract was alone 
“more than sufficient to characterize Avis U.S.’ business activities within Alaska as 
‘substantial’”). 
 129 Thomason, 661 A.2d at 597, 605. 
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state’s courts.130  Of course, this concept applies a fortiari to general 
jurisdiction.131  If the defendant cannot reasonably anticipate that it 
has submitted to the sovereign authority of the forum for all causes of 
action, the defendant should not be amenable to general in personam 
jurisdiction.  But a mere listing of contacts, using perfunctory 
adjectives such as “substantial” without providing any qualitative or 
quantitative analysis, provides no basis for a defendant to predict 
what activities will subject it to the sovereignty of the forum. 
This offends the fundamental precept that corporations are 
entitled to structure their transactions to avoid the sovereign 
jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state.132  As the Supreme Court 
recognized, a corporation with notice that it is amenable to suits 
within the forum can either act to alleviate the risk by procuring 
insurance or passing its increased costs to consumers, or it can sever 
its connection with the forum if it determines that the risks are too 
substantial.133  But if the corporation is without notice as to what 
activities are sufficient for general jurisdiction, not only can it not 
adequately factor the risk, it has no guidance on what is necessary to 
sever the relationship.  Therefore, the ipse dixit approach violates one 
of the underlying premises of our current jurisdictional paradigm. 
The final defect of this model is that a collective examination of 
the contacts often ignores the quality or substantiality of any one 
contact in contravention of the Helicopteros methodology, where the 
 
 130 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see 
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (delineating that 
defendants must have “fair warning” that their activities subject them to the 
jurisdiction of the forum’s courts). 
 131 See, e.g., Int’l Med. Group v. Am. Arbitration, 312 F.3d 833, 847 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding exercise of general personal jurisdiction improper when nonresident 
defendant “could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court” on the basis of its 
forum activities); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tex. 
2001) (same). 
 132 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (noting Due Process Clause 
“allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”); 
Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (avowing that a 
defendant’s “obvious intent to exercise its due process rights” by deliberately 
executing its contracts outside of the forum state “should not be disregarded 
lightly”); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(acknowledging nonresident defendant’s “right to structure its affairs in a manner 
calculated to shield it from the general jurisdiction of the courts of other states”); 
Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. 2002) 
(explaining that a nonresident defendant that “purposefully structures transactions 
to avoid the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws” is not amenable to general 
jurisdiction). 
 133 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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Court examined the nature of each contact separately.134  As an 
example, in Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare 
Corp.,135 the Indiana Supreme Court refused to consider the 
individual substantiality of any of the defendant’s forum contacts, 
instead describing all the contacts collectively and summarily holding 
that they were sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.136  
But while the sum of the contacts should eventually be examined, this 
should not be accomplished without some consideration of the 
qualitative nature of the particular contacts.137  The sum of nothing 
and nothing is still nothing; thus, the courts should scrutinize each 
type of forum activity to determine that it equates to something 
before collectively reviewing the defendant’s contacts. 
In sum, the ipse dixit approach is without any redeeming virtue.  
The decisions following this template are often specious.  From a 
jurisprudential perspective, the approach is even worse, because it 
fails to provide any guidance for future decisions.  It thus contravenes 
the due process maxim that defendants must reasonably expect to be 
amenable to the forum before the exercise of jurisdiction is 
appropriate.138 
B. Precedential Comparisons 
The most frequently adopted construct for resolving general 
jurisdiction queries is comparing the quality and quantity of the 
defendant’s forum activities to the quantum of activities in other 
decisions.139  As an example, the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for rejecting 
 
 134 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984). 
 135 730 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 2000). 
 136 Id. at 1238-40. 
 137 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18. 
 138 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (delineating that defendants must have “fair 
warning” that their activities subject them to the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts). 
 139 See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 620 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(concluding foreign defendant bank’s contacts of advertising and entering into 
various contracts, including a joint venture with a forum bank and correspondent 
banking relationships and accounts with four forum banks, were “less continuous 
and systematic than contacts found to be insufficient for general jurisdiction in 
previous cases”); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998) (being 
“guided by the types of contacts deemed sufficiently continuous and systematic in 
other cases” to hold British corporation regularly soliciting business and obtaining 
$585,000 in orders from a Massachusetts corporation was not amenable to general 
jurisdiction in Massachusetts); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 624 
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding mail-order New Hampshire limited liability company not 
subject to general jurisdiction in South Carolina based on sales made to twenty-six 
South Carolina customers because such contacts were much less extensive than the 
contacts found sufficient in prior general jurisdiction decisions); Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
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the existence of dispute-blind jurisdiction in Submersible Systems, Inc. v. 
 
v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 571-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding adequate 
minimum contacts for general jurisdiction in Vermont over Delaware corporation 
with principal place of business in Pennsylvania for acts and omissions occurring in 
Texas and Florida based on comparing its contacts, such as sales, relationships with 
Vermont dealers, and deliberate targeted advertising in Vermont, to contacts held 
sufficient for general jurisdiction in other federal cases before concluding exercise of 
general jurisdiction would be unreasonable); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, 
Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 464-66 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding an Alabama corporation was 
subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan by equating its sales activities and 
solicitation efforts in the state to activities held to be sufficient in prior Michigan 
state court decisions); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (D. 
Md. 2002) (rejecting the propriety of dispute-blind jurisdiction because the 
nonresident defendant’s advertisements and forty-six forum transactions “pale[d] in 
comparison even to those of defendants in other cases where the Fourth Circuit has 
found general jurisdiction lacking”); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 649-50 (D. Utah 1998) (opining nonresident’s national and regional 
advertisements, direct mailings to the forum, a website accessible in the forum, one 
percent of its total sales to the forum, and presence of equipment in the forum were 
“substantially less significant” contacts with the forum than existed in Helicopteros); 
Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(holding New Jersey motor inn’s mailing of brochures to and solicitation of 
Pennsylvania citizens was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania 
because prior cases finding general jurisdiction “involved much more contact 
between the defendant and the forum state than that involved here”); Travel 
Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 
313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware corporation subject to 
general jurisdiction in Florida, after finding that the contract at issue did not have 
the required nexus to the forum for specific jurisdiction, by comparing its 
broadcasting of infomercials on forty-eight Florida cable channels to prior cases 
regarding television commercials and concerted mailings and by analogizing its 
$1.75 million in annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail to other 
sales cases); Dunham v. Hunt Midwest Entm’t, Inc., 520 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 1994) (concluding requirements of general jurisdiction had not been satisfied 
against nonresident amusement park conducting forum advertising “based on 
Helicopteros [and] other cases”); Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 5 (N.C. Ct. 
App.) (positing that Supreme Court precedent led to the conclusion that a 
nonresident defendant’s $520,000 of annual sales to forum residents through 
independent contractors was insufficient to establish jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s 
cause of action did not arise out of such a sale), aff’d, 349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986) 
(per curiam); Deerinwater v. Circus Circus Enters., 21 P.3d 646, 651 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2001) (determining nonresident casino owner’s forum advertising contacts were 
comparable to the contacts held insufficient for general jurisdiction in Ash and were 
“less substantial than those of the non-resident corporation in Helicopteros”); Am. 
Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. 2002) (holding 
that dispute-blind jurisdiction was inappropriate in Texas because the facts were 
“more closely aligned with Helicopteros than with Perkins”); James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 
965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding requisite minimum contacts 
existed for general jurisdiction in Texas over Illinois railroad with office in Texas 
generating $75 million in business annually through comparison to other cases 
involving offices and sales in the forum, but holding the exercise of general 
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice” as the 
accident did not involve activities similar to any activities conducted by the railroad 
in Texas and the injury occurred in Tennessee to a Tennessee resident). 
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Peforadora Central, S.A. de C.V.140 was that the defendant’s forum 
activities were “even less substantial than those of the Colombian 
company with Texas in Helicopteros.”141  Under this approach, then, 
the courts primarily rely on precedential analogies to determine 
whether the requisite substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts 
are extant. 
A factor favoring this approach is the Supreme Court’s iteration 
that the test for jurisdiction is not “simply mechanical or 
quantitative.”142  Hence, according to the Court, “talismanic 
jurisdiction formulas” and “clear-cut jurisdictional rules” are 
unavailing.143  Instead, the quantity and quality of activities sufficient 
for jurisdiction must be determined in each case.144  Such 
admonitions appear to counsel a case-by-case approach to 
jurisdiction, relying on prior precedent for guidance, but without 
applying mechanical rules.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself 
utilized a comparative approach in some of its general in personam 
jurisdiction decisions.145  Nevertheless, this model has its difficulties, 
including the lack of meaningful guiding precedent and the absence 
of a cogent rationale to aid the comparison. 
The Supreme Court’s two major general jurisdiction 
pronouncements, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.146 and 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,147 provide little 
comparative guidance.  The contacts in Perkins were extensive both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, as the defendant used the forum as its 
central office location for all the ongoing supervisory activities of the 
 
 140 249 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 141 Id. at 420. 
 142 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see also Kulko v. 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (noting that the “‘minimum contacts’ test of 
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of 
each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating 
circumstances’ are present”). 
 143 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 & n.29 (1985). 
 144 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 145 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) 
(exploring the nature of the defendant’s forum contacts “to determine whether they 
constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court 
found to exist in Perkins”); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 
& n.11 (1984) (asserting Hustler Magazine’s sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines a 
month in New Hampshire “may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a 
cause of action unrelated to those activities” based on comparison to defendant’s 
contacts in Perkins). 
 146 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 147 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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corporation during the war.148  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
subsequently described the forum as the defendant’s “principal, if 
temporary, place of business.”149  In contrast, none of the contacts in 
Helicopteros involved either supervisory corporate activities or even the 
conduct of revenue-generating activities in the forum; instead, the 
defendant made purchases in the forum state, trained personnel in 
the forum, and sent a corporate officer on a single trip to the forum 
for contract negotiations.150  Thus, a wide gulf exists between the 
contacts found sufficient in Perkins and those decreed insufficient in 
Helicopteros.  And many cases fall somewhere between these extremes, 
precluding meaningful analogies to Supreme Court precedent.151 
The absence of Supreme Court guidance thus requires 
comparisons to other lower court decisions that, at best, are still the 
conflicting “morass” depicted by Judge Learned Hand.152  At worst, 
the authority relied upon may be clearly wrong or inapposite.153  It is 
not uncommon for a general jurisdiction opinion to draw parallels 
on the substantiality of contacts from specific jurisdiction cases,154 
 
 148 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-48; see supra Part I. 
 149 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 n.11. 
 150 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411-18; see supra Part I. 
 151 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 
1996) (noting that “[m]any cases, including this one, fall between Perkins and 
Helicopteros”). 
 152 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, 
J.); see infra Part IV; cf. Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 572 (recognizing that two cases 
relied upon by the defendant in urging that the requisite minimum contacts for 
general jurisdiction did not exist were “arguably” analogous, but relying on two other 
decisions holding that similar contacts were sufficient); Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 
768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting that, due to the fact-
sensitive and somewhat subjective nature of the general jurisdiction query, “the 
courts appear to summon one line of decisions and then another to support the 
varying moods of their opinions”). 
 153 See, e.g., James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex. App. 1998) 
(finding contacts at issue “were more systematic and continuous” than the contacts 
in Project Engineering USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. App. 
1992), which held that a California company selling products in California was 
subject to general jurisdiction in Texas because it was a distributor for three Texas 
companies, despite Supreme Court’s holding in Helicopteros that purchases are 
insufficient for general jurisdiction). 
 154 See, e.g., Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465-66 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (comparing quantity and quality of contacts in underlying case to prior 
Michigan case, June v. Vibra Screw Feeders, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1967), in which the contacts were actually sufficiently related to the dispute to 
support specific jurisdiction as the Michigan plaintiff sued his former employer for 
breach of contract to recover commissions he was allegedly owed for selling the 
defendant’s products in Michigan); Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. 
Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (relying 
on eight cases that purportedly “control[led] the result” of its amenability 
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despite the oft-recognized maxim that a more stringent test must be 
employed for general jurisdiction.155  Without a coherent decisional 
foundation, precedential comparisons will only deepen the mire in 
the swamp. 
More importantly, however, this approach does not provide any 
cogent underlying rationale for effecting a comparison.  Businesses 
engage in numerous disparate activities to accomplish a wide variety 
of objectives.156  As a result, discerning a reliable similitude from a 
 
determination that general jurisdiction existed even though each of the cited cases—
Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 1977), Atlanta Gas 
Light Co. v. Semaphore Advertising, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715, 721-22 (S.D. Ga. 1990), 
Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Miss. 1970), Cable Home 
Communication Corp. v. Network Products, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 858 (11th Cir. 1990), 
Logan Products, Inc. v. Optibase, Inc., 103 F.3d 49, 53 (7th Cir. 1996), Clark v. City of St. 
Augustine, 977 F. Supp. 541, 543-44 (D. Mass. 1997), and Sollinger v. Nasco 
International, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Vt. 1987)—involved specific rather than 
general jurisdiction); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986) (citing two state court decisions, Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1982), 
and Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564 (Me. 1979), as holdings “on similar facts” even 
though cases involved specific jurisdiction rather than dispute-blind jurisdiction). 
 155 See, e.g., Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he constitutional requirement for general jurisdiction is 
‘considerably more stringent’ than that required for specific jurisdiction.”) (quoting 
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001)); ALS Scan, 
Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing 
that general jurisdiction entails a “more demanding standard than is necessary for 
establishing specific jurisdiction”); Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 
738, 747 (11th Cir. 2002)  (reiterating that “‘[t]he due process requirements for 
general jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction’”) 
(quoting Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000)); 
Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that “[t]he 
standard for evaluating whether [the defendant’s] contacts satisfy the constitutional 
general jurisdiction test ‘is considerably more stringent’ than that applied to specific 
jurisdiction questions”) (quoting Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 
1984)); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(detailing that “the threshold level of minimum contacts to confer general 
jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific jurisdiction”); Metro. Life Ins., 84 
F.3d at 568 (explaining that, “[b]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the 
events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test, 
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic 
general business contacts’”) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416); Dalton v. R & W 
Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (expressing that “contacts of a 
more extensive quality and nature are required” for general jurisdiction); Am. Type 
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002) (iterating that 
general jurisdiction entails a “more demanding minimum-contacts analysis than 
specific jurisdiction”). 
 156 See, e.g., Ex parte United Bhd. of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 252 (Ala. 1997) 
(detailing activities of national labor union designed to discourage “contractors who 
do not provide union labor”); Health Indus. Mfg. Ass’n v. Crabb, No. 14-99-00402-
CV, 1999 WL 1080662, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 2, 1999) (discussing position advocacy 
mission of medical device manufacturers trade association). 
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prior decision is often difficult.  So the courts resort to drawing 
comparisons from dissimilar precedents, which metaphorically 
resigns the courts, borrowing from Justice Scalia, to scrutinizing 
“whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”157  
And, even after the comparison, all the court can do is conclude that 
this is a little more, so general jurisdiction is present, or this is a little 
less, so no general jurisdiction exists.  The general jurisdiction 
decisions thus take on the aura of obscenity decisions—the courts 
purport to know it when they see it.  But this is no way to resolve a 
preliminary due process issue predicated in part on the defendant’s 
reasonable expectations regarding the situs of suit.158 
Of course, there is nothing wrong in the abstract in relying on 
precedent—on the contrary, precedent is a pillar of American 
constitutional judicial decisionmaking.159  But general jurisdiction 
precedent is often no assistance because the decisions are conflicting 
or inapposite.160  This precludes defendants from structuring their 
transactions to avoid the sovereign jurisdictional prerogative of a 
foreign state.  And, without an underlying rationale to serve as a 
compass, a comparative precedential template will keep the courts 
traipsing, as Judge Learned Hand remarked, “from tuft to tuft across 
the morass.”161 
C. Factor Analysis 
Some jurisdictions have adopted jurisdictional factors or 
indicators for dispute-blind queries.  Under one model, courts 
employ a five-factor analysis,162 while the other approach inspects 
whether the defendant’s forum activities satisfy certain traditional 
general jurisdiction criteria.163  But neither template bestows any 
doctrinal clarification. 
 
 157 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 158 See supra Part III.A. 
 159 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) 
(O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., plurality) (avowing “the very concept of the rule 
of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a 
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable”). 
 160 See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
 161 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, 
J.). 
 162 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 163 See infra Part III.C.2. 
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1. The Five-Factor “Whole-Hog” Approach 
Some courts outline five factors for resolving all in personam 
jurisdiction queries, examining (1) the quantity of the contacts with 
the forum, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the nexus 
between the cause of action and the contacts, (4) the forum state’s 
interest in the dispute, and (5) the parties’ convenience.164  This 
Article names this factor analysis the “whole-hog” approach because 
the test collapses the general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, and 
fair play and substantial justice analysis into one sweeping inquiry.165 
The origins of this approach predate significant modern 
refinements on amenability.  The Eighth Circuit employed the 
approach as early as 1965, in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.166  This 
sweeping test, then, is a precursor to the Supreme Court’s explicit 
adoption of separate reasonableness or fairness factors167 and the 
widespread acceptance of Professors von Mehren and Trautman’s 
 
 164 See, e.g., Sybaritic, Inc. v. Interport Int’l, Inc., 957 F.2d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(analyzing constitutionality of an assertion of jurisdiction by carefully considering 
“(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of 
the contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the 
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; 
and (5) the convenience of the parties”); Zumbro, Inc. v. Cal. Natural Prods., 861 F. 
Supp. 773, 778 (D. Minn. 1994) (detailing the above-referenced “five separate 
considerations . . . to be examined when determining whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in any case comports with due process”); Covia v. Robinson, 507 
N.W.2d 411, 415-16 (Iowa 1993) (applying test in case in which both general and 
specific jurisdiction were raised); Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. 1982) 
(adopting test in Minnesota); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670, 
674 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (applying test in general jurisdiction case); Bruggeman v. 
Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (applying test to 
hold nonresident defendant subject to general jurisdiction, even though case could 
have been resolved under specific jurisdiction principles since the contacts were 
related to the dispute). 
 165 Cf. Sybaritic, 957 F.2d at 524 (noting these five considerations incorporate both 
the notions of minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice); Zumbro, 861 
F. Supp. at 778 (same). 
 166 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.). 
 167 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-15 (1987) 
(holding California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer was 
unreasonable because of the severe burden on the defendant, the minimal interest 
of the plaintiff and the forum in California’s assertion of jurisdiction, and the 
procedural and substantive policies of other nations); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (articulating factors, such as the defendant’s 
burden, the interests of the plaintiff and sovereign, efficient judicial resolution, and 
social policies, to consider in scrutinizing the reasonableness and fairness of an 
assertion of jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980) (listing factors to consider in determining reasonableness of jurisdiction, 
including the burden on the defendant and the interests of the plaintiff and the 
forum, as well as the interests in resolving cases efficiently and advancing 
fundamental substantive social policies). 
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dichotomy between specific and general jurisdiction.168 
Not surprisingly, then, this sweeping approach often fails to 
adequately factor the quantitative and qualitative nature of contacts 
necessary for an assertion of general jurisdiction.  Indeed, the nexus 
between the cause of action and the contacts, i.e., whether the case is 
a specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction case, is only examined 
after analyzing the quantity of the contacts and nature and quality of 
the contacts.169  For example, in Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island,170 
the court first concluded that the defendant’s forum activities 
supported “personal jurisdiction” by relying on both specific and 
general jurisdiction precedent, and thereafter contemplated the 
relationship of the defendant’s forum activities to the suit.171  Of 
course, such a mode of analysis places the proverbial cart before the 
horse.  The court should first ascertain whether the defendant’s 
forum contacts are related to the dispute to discern whether the 
substantiality of the contacts are to be adjudged by the less stringent 
specific jurisdiction standard or the more rigorous dispute-blind 
criterion.  Otherwise, the analysis of the quantity and quality of the 
contacts will intermingle specific and general jurisdictional 
principles,172 failing to provide an ascertainable standard for the more 
 
 168 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1135-36, 1164-66. 
 169 See, e.g., Estate of Rick v. Stevens, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032-34 (N.D. Iowa 
2001) (concluding the nature, quality, and quantity of one defendant’s nine 
contracts with forum residents and the other defendant’s dozens of forum trips 
satisfied “due process” before determining that the contacts had no relationship to 
the plaintiff’s cause of action); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670, 
674-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the quantity of the contacts and the 
nature and quality of the contacts supported the exercise of “personal jurisdiction” 
before considering the relationship of the contacts to the cause of action).  Some 
courts purport to follow the “whole-hog” factors, but actually fail to apply them, 
instead engaging in a more traditional analysis separately considering specific 
jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, and the reasonableness factors.  See, e.g., Zumbro, 
Inc. v. Cal. Natural Prods., 861 F. Supp. 773, 778 (D. Minn. 1994) (discussing the five 
sweeping considerations, but separately scrutinizing the propriety of general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction). 
 170 610 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 171 Id. at 674-76.  The Marshall case arguably could have been decided as a specific 
jurisdiction case because the Minnesota resident learned about the Wisconsin 
defendant Inn in a magazine directed at Minnesota readers, the Inn managed the 
property in Wisconsin at which he was injured via a contract with the Minnesota 
owners of the property, and the Inn contacted the resident in Minnesota after his 
injury.  Id. at 676; see supra note 98.  However, the Minnesota court held that specific 
jurisdiction did not exist.  Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676-77. 
 172 Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 675-76 (holding the nature and quality of contacts by 
nonresident defendant of advertising in Minnesota publications and through direct 
mail to Minnesota residents, contracting for its services with Minnesota residents, 
and purchasing goods and services from Minnesota businesses supported “personal 
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substantial contacts required for an assertion of general 
jurisdiction.173 
This approach accordingly suffers from similar deficiencies as 
the ipse dixit and precedential templates.  While perhaps providing 
some superficial semblance of a jurisdictional “test,” the purported 
standard offers no insight on the substantiality of the contacts 
necessary for general jurisdiction.  Instead, courts employing this 
approach often conflate dispute-specific and dispute-blind doctrine, 
thereby impoverishing both.174  This prevents defendants from 
foreseeing the quality and quantity of forum activities establishing the 
requisite predicate for the foreign sovereign to exercise its 
jurisdictional prerogative over all causes of action. 
2. Contact Factors 
Other courts utilize a non-exhaustive listing of contact factors, 
sometimes referenced as the “traditional indicia” of general 
jurisdiction, in analyzing amenability based on unrelated forum 
contacts.175  The various factors employed by the courts include, inter 
alia, whether the defendant has an office, bank account, phone 
listing, or property in the state; whether the defendant continuously 
employs individuals in the state to advance its interests; whether the 
defendant serves the market or engages in business in the state 
through sales or other activities; whether the defendant advertises or 
solicits business in the state; whether the defendant has designated a 
registered agent within the state or is licensed to do business there; 
whether agents of the defendant travel to the state to visit customers 
or solicit additional business; and whether the defendant recruits 
employees in the state.176  These jurisdictional indicia are then 
 
jurisdiction” by relying on both specific and general jurisdiction precedent from 
Minnesota courts and the United States Supreme Court).  But see Fraser v. Littlejohn, 
386 S.E.2d 230, 235-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (analyzing nature and extent of contacts 
in light of prior United States and North Carolina precedent on general jurisdiction 
in alternative holding that judgment debtor was subject to general jurisdiction). 
 173 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 174 Cf. Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612. 
 175 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Dutch Royal Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(stating that court focuses “on a traditional set of indicia” in resolving general 
jurisdiction). 
 176 See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 
2001) (considering four factors, including whether the defendant solicited business 
in the forum through a local office or agent, sent agents to the forum on a regular 
basis to solicit business, conducted substantial business in the forum, or represented 
that it did business in the forum through advertisements, listings, or bank accounts, 
to hold that a Delaware corporation with its sole place of business in Colorado was 
not amenable to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey in suit filed by New Jersey 
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compared to the defendant’s forum activities to appraise the 
defendant’s amenability.177 
Courts employing these criteria create a narrow palladium from 
the forum’s dispute-blind adjudicatory power because the defendant 
is not amenable unless it conducts some of the delineated activities in 
the state.178  But to be certain of procuring this safe haven, the 
 
residents for injury occurring in Colorado); Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98 (opining that 
traditional indicia of general jurisdiction include “whether the company has an office 
in the state, whether it has any bank accounts or other property in the state, whether 
it has a phone listing in the state, whether it does public relations work there, and 
whether it has individuals permanently located in the state to promote its interests,” 
and holding that foreign oil corporation satisfied such indicia through the presence 
of a permanent office staffed by an employee); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta 
Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (iterating that a court should 
examine factors, such as “whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in 
business in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of 
process, holds a license, or is incorporated there,” in resolving general jurisdiction 
query); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Co., 90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding Colorado law firm without a Michigan office that did not advertise or 
hold itself out as doing business in Michigan was not amenable to general 
jurisdiction, despite representing twenty-four Michigan residents on 104 matters, 
because the “factors which are normally considered in making ‘continuous and 
systematic’ determinations” were not implicated); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 
F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding nonresident corporations were not 
amenable to jurisdiction based in part on the absence of any of the relevant 
jurisdictional factors); Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 609 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2000) (finding nonresident cattle selling operation not amenable to general 
jurisdiction when it did not designate an agent for service of process, hold a forum 
license, have employees in the state, or conduct any sales or solicitation in the state 
other than sporadic advertisements); Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d 
928, 930-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding Nevada casino with parking lots on the 
Utah side of the Utah-Nevada border subject to general jurisdiction in Utah after 
distilling from a survey of case law that the factors for the exercise of general in 
personam jurisdiction include whether defendant is engaged in or registered to do 
business in the state; generates a substantial percentage of its sales from residents of 
the state; advertises or solicits business in the state; owns property in the state; has 
offices, employees, shareholders, bank accounts, or phone listings in the state; visits 
customers or potential customers in the state; recruits employees in the state; or pays 
taxes in the state), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
 177 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98. 
 178 See, e.g., Doering, 259 F.3d at 1210 (holding Delaware corporation with its sole 
place of business in Colorado that advertised in national magazines and sent an 
employee to two trade shows in New Jersey was not amenable to personal jurisdiction 
in New Jersey in suit filed by New Jersey residents for injury occurring in Colorado as 
it had no agents, employees, or offices in New Jersey); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding British 
bank not subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Utah as it performed none of the 
twelve activities the court deemed to be relevant to the existence of general 
jurisdiction); Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a Mexican corporation not licensed to do business in Texas and that 
did not have an office, employees, or property in Texas did not have the requisite 
contacts for general jurisdiction in Texas); Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1533 (10th Cir. 
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defendant must perform none of the described activities, essentially 
requiring the defendant to sever all business relationships with the 
forum.  Otherwise, the defendant cannot predict its amenability to 
the state’s general adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
 This uncertainty arises because these traditional indicia provide 
no insight as to what general jurisdiction is.  Most of the factors 
viewed singularly are, according to the better-reasoned decisions, of 
negligible jurisdictional import.  For instance, owning property 
within the state is clearly not sufficient, standing alone, to subject the 
defendant to jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Shaffer v. Heitner.179 Similarly, a defendant’s forum bank account—
which is, of course, a species of property—should not justify general 
jurisdiction.180  Nor is the existence of a phone listing in the forum,181 
 
1996) (averring Colorado law firm without a Michigan office that did not advertise or 
hold itself out as doing business in Michigan was not amenable to general 
jurisdiction); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971) (concluding 
nonresident drug manufacturers without offices, property, or bank accounts in South 
Carolina not subject to the forum’s dispute-blind adjudicatory jurisdiction); Wims v. 
Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding New 
Jersey motor inn that had not paid taxes, made purchases, advertised in publications, 
maintained a telephone listing, owned property, or had agents in Pennsylvania was 
not amenable to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts); Dean Mktg., Inc. v. 
AOC Int’l (U.S.A.), Ltd., 610 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding 
Taiwanese corporation not amenable to general jurisdiction in Michigan because it 
had no property, employees, agents, phone listings, or bank accounts in Michigan 
and because it did not solicit business nor was it registered or licensed to do business 
in Michigan); Higgins, 609 N.W.2d at 718 (concluding nonresident cattle operation 
without forum employees, agents, or sales not amenable to general jurisdiction); CSR 
Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996) (holding Australian corporation did 
not have the continuous and systematic Texas contacts required for general 
jurisdiction as it did not have an office, employees, bank accounts, or property in 
Texas and it had not solicited business in Texas, paid taxes in Texas, or entered into 
contracts in Texas); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 771-74 (Tex. 
1995) (finding Maryland corporation not amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas 
when it had no office, employees, agents, assets, property, bank accounts, or place of 
business in Texas). 
 179 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977) (holding mere presence of property in forum, 
standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction). 
 180 See id.; see also Transportes Aeros de Coahuila, S.A. v. Falcon, 5 S.W.3d 712, 719-
20 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding Mexican corporation’s maintenance of Texas bank 
account did not support general jurisdiction), disapproved on other grounds, BMC 
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 n.1 (Tex. 2002); Primera Vista 
S.P.R. de R.L. v. Banca Serfin S.A., 974 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding 
Mexican corporation’s annualized deposits of over one billion dollars and thousands 
of transactions a year at eleven Texas banks were insufficient to support the exercise 
of general jurisdiction).  But cf. Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
819 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding California bank without Pennsylvania 
office or employees amenable to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in part because 
of zero-balance account with Pennsylvania bank that was central to the conduct of its 
business); El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V., 
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or the presence of an agent for service of process,182 significant to the 
general jurisdiction query.  And even the more superficially 
consequential factors, such as a forum office, forum sales, or forum-
targeted advertisements and solicitations, are not always enough to 
support dispute-blind jurisdiction.183 
Because the mere existence of one (or perhaps more) of these 
traditional indicia is usually insufficient, either a methodology or 
baseline for balancing the requisite jurisdictional criteria is essential.  
But the cases finding general jurisdiction under this paradigm have 
not elaborated on such a technique, instead being content to hold 
that the defendant’s forum business activities at issue, which were at 
least assisted by an office or business property within the forum, 
established the required minimum contacts.184  Thus, while a 
traditional indicia analysis may reveal the defendant’s non-
amenability due to the complete absence of the relevant factors, it 
does not provide much assistance in demarcating the boundary 
between some quantum of forum activities and those continuous and 
systematic activities considered so substantial and of the requisite 
nature to support dispute-blind adjudication. 
This deficiency could perhaps be mitigated if the traditional 
indicia were augmented by some justification for why these factors—
especially the relatively insignificant contacts of a phone listing or 
registered agent for service of process in the state—are relevant to 
the forum’s assertion of general jurisdiction over the defendant.  But 
the courts have never proffered such a justification.  And without it, 
this approach suffers from the same infirmity as the comparative 
 
82 S.W.3d 622, 633 (Tex. App. 2002) (concluding Mexican corporation conducted 
“‘substantial’ activities in Texas” through its Texas bank account, but not addressing 
whether the bank account would alone provide an adequate basis for general 
jurisdiction because other contacts existed). 
 181 See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910 (4th Cir. 
1984) (concluding listing in forum telephone directory not an activity supporting 
dispute-blind jurisdiction); Johnson v. Summa Corp., 632 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D. Pa. 
1985) (holding Nevada hotel not subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania 
based on toll-free number in the forum); Van Pelt v. Best Workover, Inc., 798 S.W.2d 
14, 17 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding telephone listing did not support general 
jurisdiction). 
 182 See infra Part IV.A. 
 183 See infra Parts IV.B-C. 
 184 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Dutch Royal Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(holding foreign oil corporation satisfied “traditional indicia” of dispute-blind 
jurisdiction through the presence of a permanent office staffed by an employee); 
Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding Nevada casino with parking lots on the Utah side of the Utah-Nevada 
border subject to general jurisdiction in Utah), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
  
846 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:807 
precedential model—all the court can do is compare to singularly 
trivial criteria and conclude that this is enough, so general 
jurisdiction is present, or this is not quite enough, so no general 
jurisdiction exists. 
D. Central Business Activities 
Another general adjudicatory jurisdiction template is 
scrutinizing whether the defendant’s forum activities are central to 
the conduct of its business.185  Under this approach, a defendant 
conducts the requisite substantial business activities for general 
jurisdiction if its forum activities are the “bread and butter of its daily 
business.”186  The Third Circuit adopted this model in Provident 
National Bank v. California Federal Savings & Loan Association,187 where 
it held that a California bank without offices or employees in the 
forum was nevertheless amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction 
primarily because its maintenance of a zero-balance, controlled 
disbursements bank account in the state was central to the conduct of 
its business.188 
The efficacy of this approach depends, of course, on judicial 
guidance regarding the methodology for adjudging which activities 
are “central” to a corporation’s business.  Unfortunately, however, the 
courts following this construct have not provided consistent answers.  
One court opined that the contemplated activity was “the day to day 
operation of the defendant’s business, not the resultant sales.”189  On the 
other hand, different courts have concluded that forum sales and 
other revenue-generating activities are the requisite “bread and 
butter” of a company’s business.190  Further, the decisions conflate 
 
 185 See, e.g., Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 438 
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding California bank subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania because it conducted forum activities central to the conduct of its 
business); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 
572 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (decreeing the dispositive general jurisdiction criterion—the 
centrality of the nonresident’s forum activities to the conduct of its business—was 
not satisfied when the principal business of the German corporation was selling 
steam in Germany rather than Pennsylvania). 
 186 Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 438. 
 187 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 188 Id. at 438. 
 189 Orange Prods., Inc. v. Winters, No. CIV. A. 94-CV-6004, 1995 WL 118461, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 1995) (emphasis added) (holding nonresident corporation not 
subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction because its forum sales were not “central to its 
business of producing precision plastic balls”). 
 190 See, e.g., Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 
559, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding defendant’s principal business was selling 
steam in Germany, none of which occurred in the forum state of Pennsylvania); 
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whether the standard depends on the importance of the activities to 
the defendant’s forum business or whether the comparison is to the 
defendant’s overall business activities.191  These uncertainties 
preclude defendants from obtaining needed guidance as to the 
quality and quantity of forum activities required for general 
jurisdiction. 
The uncertainties emanate, in part, from the suspect rationale in 
the case adopting this approach, Provident National Bank.192  The 
Third Circuit in that case distinguished Helicopteros on the basis that 
Helicol’s purchase of helicopters and training from Bell Helicopter 
was not central to the conduct of its business, while the zero-balance, 
controlled disbursements account the California bank maintained 
with a Pennsylvania bank was.193  But this distinction is dubious.  
Purchasing helicopters and training its pilots were just as central to 
Helicol’s business of providing helicopter services as the maintenance 
of a disbursements account for clearing checks was to the California 
bank’s business of borrowing and lending money.  Although 
purchasing helicopters and training pilots did not directly generate 
revenue for Helicol, Helicol would not have been able to produce 
income from its helicopter services without helicopters and trained 
pilots.  Similarly, the disbursements account itself did not generate 
revenue for the California bank, but such an account was necessary to 
support its activities that did.  Thus, the Third Circuit’s purported 
distinction between Provident National Bank and Helicopteros is 
doubtful, making it difficult for courts to apply in subsequent 
decisions. 
The central business activities approach also suffers from the 
absence of an underlying rationale.  The Third Circuit never 
explained why conducting activities in the forum central to the 
defendant’s business supports the exercise of jurisdiction for causes 
 
Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (E.D. Pa. 
1994) (iterating that sale of goods and services was “principal purpose” of marketing 
and technology business, but finding that its forum sales were not daily or regular as 
required for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Covenant Bank for Sav. v. Cohen, 806 F. 
Supp. 52, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1992) (opining loans to and deposits from forum residents 
were “bread and butter” of bank’s daily business, but holding that bank did not 
engage in required regular contact with forum state to service these loans as required 
for dispute-blind jurisdiction). 
 191 See Snyder v. Dolphin Encounters, Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440-41 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (citing earlier case purportedly holding foreign defendant’s websites were not  
“‘central’ to the defendant’s business in Pennsylvania,” but nevertheless conducting 
its analysis based on the centrality of Pennsylvania to defendants’ overall business 
activities) (emphasis added). 
 192 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 193 Id. at 438. 
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of action without any relationship to such activities.194  While one 
could argue that conducting principal business activities in the forum 
enhances the defendant’s reasonable expectation of being subject to 
the state’s judicial power for all causes of action, a difficulty arises 
because of the previously discussed uncertainties regarding the 
defining characteristics of central business activities.195 
Moreover, even if the courts marked the appropriate 
boundaries, the reasonable anticipation rationale may not justify the 
discrepant results expected under this model.  As an example, if Wal-
Mart maintained two of its thousands of nationwide stores in Alaska, 
its forum activities would not be central to the conduct of its overall 
world-wide business, presumably precluding the exercise of general 
jurisdiction by the Alaska courts.196  In contrast, a closely-held 
Washington corporation with only two stores, one in Washington and 
another in Alaska, would be conducting activities central to its overall 
business in Alaska.  Even though the closely-held corporation is 
conducting fewer activities in Alaska than Wal-Mart, its relatively 
paltry total business activities mandates that its smaller quantum of 
forum activities is more central to its overall business, subjecting it to 
general jurisdiction.  But what persuasive rationale could support this 
incongruous result?  It certainly is not fair or reasonable, as Wal-Mart 
has more substantial resources to defend itself in Alaska and conducts 
more of the same types of activities in the forum.  Nor could it be said 
that Alaska has a greater sovereign interest over the closely-held 
corporation when the quantity and quality of Wal-Mart’s activities is 
comparatively greater.  Quite simply, this approach may offend 
“‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” the very core 
of our modern jurisdictional model.197 
Thus, equating central business activities with dispute-blind 
jurisdiction is problematic.  Not only have the courts failed to adopt a 
consensus on the methodology for determining which activities are 
pivotal to the conduct of the defendant’s business, the approach does 
not offer a cogent underlying rationale.  Both of these defects 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text. 
 196 See, e.g., Snyder v. Dolphin Encounters, Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440-41 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002) (conducting its analysis based on the centrality of Pennsylvania to 
defendants’ overall world-wide business activities); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. 
Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (examining defendant’s 
forum activities in light of its overarching principal business of selling steam in 
Germany). 
 197 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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preclude this approach from offering any meaningful insight 
regarding the parameters of dispute-blind jurisdiction. 
E. Constructive Presence 
A number of courts utilize a constructive presence rationale in 
scrutinizing a defendant’s amenability to general jurisdiction.198  Such 
decisions typically evaluate whether a defendant’s forum contacts are 
so extensive that they either “approximate physical presence”199 or 
“take the place of physical presence.”200  In other words, these courts 
analogize the defendant’s forum activities to a jurisdictional baseline 
of a person’s actual physical presence in the forum. 
This approach is grounded in antecedent jurisdictional doctrine.  
Historically, the limits on personal jurisdiction were based on a 
court’s power over the actual physical person of the defendant.201  Of 
 
 198 See, e.g., Purdue Research v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 
2003) (finding no basis for exercising general jurisdiction when the defendant’s 
forum contacts were not tantamount to it “being constructively present in the state to 
such a degree that it would be fundamentally fair to require it to answer in an 
Indiana court in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking 
place anywhere in the world”) (emphasis in original); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. 
v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
general jurisdiction was not proper over defendant because its forum contacts were 
not “the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts that 
‘approximate physical presence’”) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta 
Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)); Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 
926 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Cal. 1996) (stating that general jurisdiction requires wide-
ranging contacts with the forum “that take the place of physical presence in the 
forum as a basis for jurisdiction”); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 
851, 853-54 (N.Y. 1967) (holding British hotel corporation conducted such 
continuous and systematic business activities through its agent in New York to justify 
its amenability to suit predicated on its “presence” in the forum); Bachman v. Med. 
Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding nonresident hospital 
and doctors not “present” in Oregon as required for general jurisdiction, while 
nonresident medical equipment manufacturer was deemed present). 
 199 See, e.g., Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1124; Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. 
 200 Vons Cos., 926 P.2d at 1092; see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 
F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (articulating dispositive issue is whether defendant’s 
forum activities are “so substantial that they amount to a surrogate for presence and 
thus render the exercise of sovereignty just”); Stover v. O’Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 
F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding nonresident private investigation firm’s 
telephone orders for investigation services from Maryland entities did not establish 
its “presence” in the forum as required for an assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction); 
Carretti v. Italpast, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 131 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding sporadic sales 
to California users were “not the kind of wide-ranging contacts that take the place of 
physical presence in the forum” as required to support general jurisdiction). 
 201 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to 
render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the 
defendant’s person.  Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
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course, corporations did not fit comfortably within such a regime, 
because a corporation has no tangible physical presence.  Unlike an 
individual, a corporation’s “presence” could “be manifested only by 
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act 
for it.”202  Thus, the pre-International Shoe jurisdictional formula for 
corporations typically depended on the corporation’s deemed 
presence through its business activities in the forum.203 
 International Shoe and its modern progeny relied on this earlier 
“presence” jurisprudence in illustrating a corporation’s amenability 
to suit based on substantial, continuous forum business activities 
unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim.204  Indeed, Helicopteros predicated its 
holding that purchases and related trips, standing alone, were 
insufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction on a pre-International Shoe 
decision, reasoning that “Shoe acknowledged and did not repudiate 
[this] holding.”205  Because the Court still examines these earlier 
decisions in evaluating general jurisdiction queries, contemporary 
dispute-blind jurisdiction appears to be a direct descendant of the 
pre-Shoe construct of presence.206 
Nevertheless, a constructive presence rationale is of little 
assistance when perpending dispute-blind jurisdiction because a 
corporation’s “presence” has always been a fiction merely begging the 
question of amenability.207  Since a corporation has no actual 
corporeal existence, the only method to gauge “presence” is 
evaluating the corporation’s ongoing forum activities to determine if 
jurisdiction is appropriate.  In other words, as International Shoe 
 
court was a prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”). 
 202 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 203 See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923) 
(noting sole issue presented was whether “defendant was doing business within the 
State of New York in such a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference 
that it was present there”); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 
(1913) (analyzing whether Texas railroad was “present” in New York). 
 204 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-18 (1984); 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952); Int’l Shoe, 326 
U.S. at 318; see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
 205 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown 
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)). 
 206 Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 141, 151 (noting that “presence” implied general jurisdiction); Allan R. 
Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373, 
380 [hereinafter Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction] (iterating that “general jurisdiction is 
derived from the power premise of Pennoyer, under which the exclusive test for state 
authority is the presence of the defendant or his property at the time of the 
litigation”). 
 207 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
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explained, the concept of “presence” is “used merely to symbolize 
those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which 
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process.”208  Because “presence” is just a symbol of corporate activities, 
courts must initially scrutinize the corporate defendant’s forum 
conduct to determine if the corporation is “present” and thereby 
amenable to jurisdiction, leading back to the original quandary of the 
quality and quantity of forum activities necessary to support dispute-
blind jurisdiction. 
While the Supreme Court accepted a fictional “presence” 
rationale as the polestar for jurisdiction before International Shoe, Shoe 
abandoned the construct in favor of directly examining the 
reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction based on the 
defendant’s forum activities.209  As the Court realized, a quest for 
“presence” leads nowhere because its ultimate resolution ipso facto 
depends on the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction based on 
the corporation’s underlying forum activities.210 
A deemed or constructive presence rationale hence moves us no 
closer to clarifying general jurisdiction than simply reciting that such 
jurisdiction is permissible if the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable in light of the corporation’s continuous, systematic, and 
substantial activities in the forum.  No matter which metaphor is 
adopted, the underlying jurisdictional enigma has not been resolved. 
F. Quid Pro Quo 
Another doctrinal framework for general jurisdiction queries is a 
quid pro quo or reciprocal benefits rationale.211  Under this exchange 
theory, a defendant’s business activities within the state provide a 
benefit that justifies imposing a corresponding burden of amenability 
for all causes of action in the forum.212  In Ex parte Newco 
 
 208 Id. at 316-17. 
 209 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (recognizing Court’s 
“continuing process of evolution” accepting and then abandoning “‘consent,’ ‘doing 
business,’ and ‘presence’ as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial 
power” over corporations). 
 210 Cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
 211 See, e.g., Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Burke/Triolo, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding nonresident defendant amenable to general jurisdiction 
because it solicited and contracted with forum customers); Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F. 
Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (D. Colo. 1999) (iterating that the dispositive inquiry for 
general jurisdiction is whether nonresident defendant enjoyed protections of 
forum’s laws such that it must submit to the burdens of litigation). 
 212 See, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985). 
  
852 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:807 
Manufacturing Co.,213 for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held 
that 2,000 sales made to Alabama residents in a five-year period in an 
amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was sufficient to subject a 
nonresident Missouri corporation to dispute-blind jurisdiction in 
Alabama even though the title to all goods was transferred outside 
the state.214  The court reasoned that in exchange for the “privilege of 
making sales (and profits) in Alabama in a continuous and systematic 
course of merchandising,” the defendant “must bear the burden 
commensurate with the benefits received from its sales in Alabama.”215 
However, this hardly appears a reasonable exchange.  Newco 
Manufacturing undoubtedly received some benefits from its sales to 
Alabama residents, but were such benefits really a fair bargain for 
being subject to suit for any cause of action in Alabama, even for an 
injury suffered by a Tennessee resident in Tennessee?  Most would 
probably think not.  Indeed, in Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,216 a case 
involving much more extensive sales to forum residents than Ex parte 
Newco, the Fifth Circuit utilized an exchange rationale to reject the 
existence of dispute-blind jurisdiction.217  Reasoning that “general 
jurisdiction is based on a concept of ‘exchange’” requiring the 
defendant to invoke “the benefits and protections of the forum’s 
laws,” the Fifth Circuit postulated the dispositive issue was whether 
Beech Aircraft benefited from the forum’s law in conducting its 
activities.218  Since Beech had meticulously negotiated, executed, and 
performed its contracts worth several hundred million dollars with 
forum residents outside the forum, the court determined that the 
defendant had “calculatedly avoided” the forum’s laws such that it 
was not amenable to general jurisdiction.219 
The difficulty is that even Bearry’s more realistic analysis does not 
demonstrate what constitutes a fair exchange for a defendant’s 
submission to the forum’s general adjudicatory power for all causes 
of action.  While Bearry correctly held that a defendant cannot be 
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in the absence of receiving 
benefits and protections from the laws of the forum,220 which indeed 
 
 213 481 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 1985). 
 214 Id. at 869.  The suit was based on a fatal accident involving equipment 
manufactured in Missouri that was sold in Maryland and allegedly injured a 
Tennessee resident in Tennessee.  Id. at 868. 
 215 Id. at 869. 
 216 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 217 Id. at 375-76. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id.; see also Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 
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is a prerequisite for the lower threshold of activity necessary for 
specific jurisdiction,221 the Fifth Circuit did not answer how much 
benefit and protection from the forum’s law is required for general 
jurisdiction.  Nor has any other court resolved this fundamental 
question. 
Instead, exchange theory is typically used—and it originated—to 
justify specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.  International Shoe 
first expressed the reciprocal benefits rationale explicitly in terms of 
specific jurisdiction: 
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of 
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and 
protections of the laws of that state.  The exercise of that privilege 
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out 
of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure 
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to 
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be 
undue.222 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson223 articulated a similar 
conception, remarking that it was not unreasonable to subject a 
manufacturer or distributor serving the state’s market to suit in that 
state when its “allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source 
of injury to its owner or to others.”224 
Such a quid pro quo justification for specific jurisdiction appears 
appropriate.  When a nonresident corporation conducts activities 
within the state obtaining the benefits and protections of that state’s 
laws, it seems a reasonable exchange to subject the corporation to the 
risk of the state’s assertion of jurisdiction if its activities cause a forum 
injury.  In essence, as Professor Twichell noted, “The scope of the 
defendant’s activity defines the scope of the risk.”225 
However, obtaining the same benefits and protections from the 
state is hardly proportional to the burden of unlimited jurisdiction 
for any cause of action arising anywhere in the world.226  A greater 
 
808 (Tex. 2002) (holding dispute-blind jurisdiction inappropriate when “a 
nonresident defendant purposefully structures transactions to avoid the benefits and 
protections of a forum’s laws”). 
 221 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957) (noting that adjudicatory 
jurisdiction “requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws”). 
 222 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added). 
 223 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 224 Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
 225 Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 175. 
 226 See id. 
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quantum of forum benefits would be necessary.  But the cases 
invoking this exchange rationale in the general jurisdiction context 
have never accounted for the more substantial forum activities 
required for dispute-blind jurisdiction, instead merely co-opting a 
specific jurisdiction justification to support the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.227 
The judiciary’s general jurisdiction exchange theory is therefore 
facile.  While commentators have proposed insightful alternatives 
that acknowledge a distinction in the requisite forum activities 
necessary for dispute-specific and dispute-blind jurisdiction, their 
theories unfortunately depend on a more limited doctrinal 
conception of general jurisdiction’s scope.  For instance, Professor 
Allan Stein, reasoning that the “fairness of a state’s jurisdiction over 
its citizens is based on a perceived equitable exchange of the 
privileges of citizenship for its burdens,” contended general 
jurisdiction is therefore appropriate over those defendants 
structuring a “citizen-like relationship” by adopting the forum as 
home for most purposes.228  But the general jurisdiction holdings of 
federal and state courts do not employ such a limited “adoptive 
home” theory.229  Professor Lea Brilmayer avowed a defendant should 
be subject to general jurisdiction under the reciprocal benefits and 
burdens rationale when “the defendant’s level of activity rises to the 
level of activity of an insider, so that relegating the defendant to the 
political process is fair.”230  Under her rationale, corporate efforts to 
influence the political process appear significant to the jurisdictional 
calculus.231  But, because the courts do not typically consider such 
efforts as a relevant contact for general jurisdiction queries,232 there is 
 
 227 See supra notes 211-24 and accompanying text. 
 228 Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra note 4, at 758. 
 229 See infra Part IV. 
 230 Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 
742 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., General Look]; see also Brilmayer, How 
Contacts Count, supra note 4, at 87 (urging that a defendant’s systematic activity within 
the forum, “such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business, suggests that the 
person or corporate entity is enough of an ‘insider’ that he may safely be relegated to 
the State’s political processes”). 
 231 Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 230, at 742 (noting that a 
corporation’s decision to exert political influence in a state depends “on whether the 
level of attachment in that state exceeds the threshold beyond which exerting 
political influence is profitable”). 
 232 See, e.g., Hollar v. Philip Morris, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801-02 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 
1998).  Indeed, the only general jurisdiction decisions scrutinizing lobbying efforts 
involved either businesses lobbying for governmental contracts or organizations 
engaged primarily in position advocacy.  See, e.g., Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. 
Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (lobbying of 
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no jurisprudence supporting her innovative proposition. 
The extant reciprocal benefits and burdens rationales are thus 
not the solution.  While obtaining the benefits and protections of the 
forum’s laws is a necessary predicate for jurisdiction, it is not 
sufficient by itself to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction.  Something 
more is required, but the contours of what this is have not been 
adequately answered by any of the existing jurisdictional templates 
employed by the state and federal courts.233  Another approach needs 
to be adopted. 
IV.  THE QUEST FOR A NEW DISPUTE-BLIND PARADIGM 
Because the existing doctrinal approaches to general jurisdiction 
are deficient, a new guiding principle is essential.  This theorem 
should incorporate the Supreme Court’s directives that the requisite 
forum activities must be of a substantial nature as well as continuous 
and systematic.234  Moreover, to the extent possible, a new principle 
should reflect the better-reasoned determinations of the lower 
federal and state courts.  Accordingly, the Article first evaluates the 
forum activities that have been decreed substantial enough for 
dispute-blind jurisdiction before contemplating a new paradigm. 
A. Judicial Appraisals of the Substantiality of Typical Forum Activities 
An infinite variety of activities exist that a nonresident defendant 
could potentially undertake in the forum.  Nevertheless, the judicial 
determinations on the requisite substantiality for dispute-blind 
jurisdiction commonly appraise four primary categories of activities, 
including the appointment of an agent for service of process, the 
existence of a forum office, revenue-generating activities in or 
attributable to the forum, and websites accessible to forum residents. 
 
Pennsylvania politicians for government contracts was a form of business solicitation, 
but not sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Health Indus. Mfg. Ass’n v. Crabb, 
No. 14-99-00402-CV, 1999 WL 1080662, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 2, 1999) (holding non-
profit medical device manufacturers’ trade association registered in Delaware with 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas as a 
result of lobbying efforts to Texas governmental bodies and submission of press 
releases to the Texas news media in support of its business mission of “‘advocat[ing] 
positions on issues that relate to medical device manufacturers’”). 
 233 See supra Parts III.A-F. 
 234 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1945).  Of course, 
another potential approach would be for the Supreme Court to adopt a new 
jurisdictional paradigm.  But an immediate foundational change in the Supreme 
Court’s adjudicatory jurisprudence is unlikely.  See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 4, at 
133; Juenger, supra note 206, at 167. 
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1. Appointment of an Agent 
The corporate laws of every state in the nation require foreign 
corporations to register and appoint an agent for service of process 
before transacting certain kinds of intrastate business.235  
Unfortunately, though, the jurisdictional effect of such a qualification 
and appointment is somewhat confused.236  The confusion emanates 
from superficially conflicting holdings of the Supreme Court on 
whether a foreign corporation’s qualification to do business in the 
forum and appointment of an agent establishes its amenability for 
causes of action unrelated to its forum activities. 
Justice Holmes first addressed this question for the Court in 
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.237  In 
Pennsylvania Fire, an Arizona corporation sued a Pennsylvania insurer 
in Missouri state court to recover for a loss suffered in Colorado.238  
The Pennsylvania insurer previously obtained a license to conduct 
business in Missouri and had filed with the insurance superintendent 
“a power of attorney consenting that service of process upon the 
superintendent should be deemed personal service upon the 
company so long as it should have any liabilities outstanding in the 
state.”239  While the insurance superintendent was served in 
accordance with the statute, the insurer contended that such service 
violated due process.240  But the Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning 
that the insurer performed a voluntary act consenting to such service 
by executing the power of attorney, thereby “hardly leav[ing] a 
constitutional question open.”241 
The Pennsylvania Fire decision is often cited for the proposition 
that the qualification to do business and appointment of an agent 
exercises as a consent to the forum’s jurisdiction for all causes of 
action.242  But the Court’s holding may not be this broad.  The 
 
 235 CT CORPORATION SYSTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS 1 (1992). 
 236 See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Del. 1988) (noting that federal 
and state courts “are divided as to whether statutory registration can operate as an 
express consent to personal jurisdiction in the absence of ‘minimum contacts’”). 
 237 243 U.S. 93 (1917). 
 238 Id. at 94. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 94-95. 
 241 Id. at 95-96. 
 242 See, e.g., Sondergard v. Miles, 985 F.2d 1389, 1397 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Pennsylvania Fire as support for holding that construing registration statute as a 
consent to jurisdiction for causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
activities did not violate due process); Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Del. 
1988) (relying on Pennsylvania Fire for proposition that registration operates as a 
consent to the forum’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction); Bianco v. Concepts 
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Missouri Supreme Court had held that the insurance company was 
actually “doing business” in the state of Missouri, leading to the 
inference that jurisdiction was not predicated solely on the mere 
presence of a designated agent.243  Additionally, the Missouri 
registration statute arguably required a forum nexus in addition to 
registration, as service was considered valid only if the company “had 
any liabilities outstanding in the state.”244  Thus, Pennsylvania Fire’s 
holding may have merely entailed the propriety of jurisdiction when 
the nonresident corporation appointed an agent and actually 
conducted some measure of forum business. 
In any event, Pennsylvania Fire predated International Shoe and its 
reformulation of the jurisdictional query from fictional constructs to 
a minimum contacts analysis.245  Indeed, Perkins subsequently 
minimized any impact the appointment of an agent may have had on 
the minimum contacts analysis.246  The quantum and quality of 
activities requiring the appointment of a designated agent under 
state law, Perkins pronounced, was a “helpful but not a conclusive test” 
for ascertaining whether the nature of the defendant’s forum 
activities supported jurisdiction for an unrelated cause of action.247 
The Court again considered the jurisdictional effect of the 
appointment of an agent in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco 
Enterprises, Inc.,248 which involved an Ohio statute tolling the statute of 
limitations against a foreign corporation that did not have a 
designated agent for service of process within the state.249  Relying on 
this statute, Bendix, a corporation with its principal place of business 
 
“100”, Inc., 436 A.2d 206, 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (same); Acacia Pipeline Corp. v. 
Champlin Exploration, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. App. 1989) (same).  But see In 
re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (D. Md. 1981) (opining 
plaintiff’s reliance on Pennsylvania Fire for this proposition was misplaced), aff’d, 704 
F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Dist. Court, 1 P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) 
(concluding Supreme Court “has abandoned the reasoning” of Pennsylvania Fire). 
 243 Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 184 S.W. 999, 1020 (Mo. 
1916), aff’d, 243 U.S. 93 (1917). 
 244 Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 94; cf. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota, 525 F. Supp. at 1277 (reasoning 
Pennsylvania Fire therefore “did not hold that consent was a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction in the absence of any contact between defendant and Missouri”). 
 245 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945) (articulating that 
the earlier standards of “presence” and “consent” were legal fictions); see also 
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality) (noting 
that the prior “purely fictional” doctrine of “consent” for jurisdiction over 
nonresident corporations appointing an in-state agent was “cast aside” by 
International Shoe). 
 246 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 247 Id. 
 248 486 U.S. 888 (1988). 
 249 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Anderson 1987). 
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in Ohio, contended that its suit for breach of contract against 
Midwesco, an Illinois corporation, was not barred by limitations 
because Midwesco had not designated an agent in Ohio for service of 
process.250  Midwesco responded that such a tolling provision violated 
the Commerce Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed.251 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court accepted, without discussion, 
that, under the relevant Ohio long-arm statute, the appointment of 
an agent for service of process would operate as consent to the 
assertion of general jurisdiction by the Ohio courts.252  By appointing 
an agent for service of process, the Court postulated Midwesco would 
thereby subject itself to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts as to 
“any suit,” irrespective of whether the factual underpinning of the 
suit had any connection to Ohio.253  The Court proclaimed that 
designating “an agent subjects the foreign corporation to the general 
jurisdiction of the Ohio courts in matters to which Ohio’s tenuous 
relation would not otherwise extend.”254  Because requiring a foreign 
corporation to submit to general jurisdiction in the absence of 
minimum contacts was a “significant burden” exceeding any local 
interest of Ohio, the Court held the tolling provision violated the 
Commerce Clause by placing an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.255 
Bendix, however, did not actually involve the issue of the 
substantiality of contacts necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction 
predicated on unrelated forum activities.256  In fact, the Court 
explicitly distinguished consensual jurisdiction under the Ohio 
statute from “the minimum contacts necessary for supporting 
personal jurisdiction.”257  The Court thus did not retreat from its prior 
pronouncement that, under the International Shoe minimum contacts 
test, the presence of an agent is not dispositive.258 
Instead, the Court presumed the agent’s appointment, under 
Ohio law, operated as “consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio 
courts.”259  Consent, of course, is another basis for personal 
jurisdiction, outside the parameters of the minimum contacts 
 
 250 Bendix, 486 U.S. at 890. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 889, 892-93. 
 253 Id. at 892. 
 254 Id. at 892-93. 
 255 Id. at 893-95. 
 256 See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889-95. 
 257 Id. at 893. 
 258 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 259 Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889 (emphasis added). 
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analysis.260  Accordingly, Bendix, properly understood, did not involve 
the issue addressed by this Article, but instead proceeded on the 
assumption (perhaps even an erroneous assumption) that the Ohio 
registration statute purported to exact a defendant’s consent to the 
forum’s jurisdiction for all causes of action asserted against it.261 
The preceding decisions reveal, then, that the Supreme Court 
has employed two distinct modes of analysis since International Shoe to 
evaluate whether the appointment of an agent establishes general 
jurisdiction.  The first considers whether the appointment under the 
particular state statute operates as the defendant’s consent to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the state for any and all causes of action, 
and, if so, whether such exacted consent is constitutional.262  This was 
the issue considered in Bendix, and it also has been addressed by 
numerous other federal and state courts.263  But any contemplation of 
 
 260 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) 
(noting a “variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or 
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court” irrespective of the power of 
the forum to serve process under International Shoe); cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991) (holding adhesion contract between Florida 
cruise company and Washington passengers stipulating Florida as the forum for all 
disputes was enforceable); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 
(1964) (upholding contractual agreement between a New York equipment supplier 
and its Michigan customer requiring the customer to appoint an agent for service of 
process in New York and consent to the jurisdiction of New York’s courts). 
 261 Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889, 892-93.  The provisions of the Ohio Code, however, do 
not clearly establish that the appointment of an agent constitutes a consent to the 
general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.04.1(A) 
(Anderson 1985) provides that “[e]very foreign corporation for profit that is licensed 
to transact business in this state . . . shall have and maintain an agent . . . upon whom 
process against the corporation may be served . . . .”  Id.  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit 
held after Bendix that the Ohio Code provisions did not in fact operate as a consent 
to jurisdiction, reasoning that the Ohio Supreme Court itself “rejected the 
proposition that service of process may be equated with personal jurisdiction.”  
Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Wainscott v. St. 
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio 1976)). 
 262 Bendix, 486 U.S. at 892-93. 
 263 See, e.g., Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181-83 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding statutory registration and appointment provisions of the Texas 
Business Corporation Act did not operate as a consent to jurisdiction); Sandstrom v. 
ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 89 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (opining the appointment of 
an agent under Maine’s registration statute was not a consensual submission to 
jurisdiction); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 
1983) (concluding defendant did not consent to jurisdiction under Arkansas 
registration statute); Smith v. Lloyd’s of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1118 & n.7 (5th Cir. 
1978) (interpreting Georgia registration statute as requiring more than the mere 
presence of an appointed agent for amenability and questioning the constitutionality 
of a broader interpretation); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 
1278 (D. Md. 1981) (holding exacted consent under West Virginia registration 
statute was an insufficient basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction in the absence of 
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the appropriate resolution of this issue is outside this Article’s focus 
on general jurisdiction predicated on minimum contacts rather than 
consent.264 
 
minimum contacts), aff’d, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Dist. Court, 1 
P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) (holding the appointment of an agent does not operate as 
a consent to jurisdiction); Juarez v. United Parcel Serv. de Mex. S.A. de C.V., 933 
S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding “the designation of an agent for 
service of process in Texas does not amount to a general consent to jurisdiction”).  
But see Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding nonresident 
corporation amenable because “Pennsylvania law explicitly states that the 
qualification of a foreign corporation to do business is sufficient contact to serve as 
the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, 
Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding nonresident corporation’s 
registration under Minnesota statute operated as jurisdictional consent for all causes 
of action even in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum); Read v. Sonat 
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d 1229, 1230-31 (Miss. 1987) (concluding 
nonresident corporation qualified to do, but not actually performing, business in the 
forum was amenable in Mississippi for accident occurring Louisiana because 
minimum contacts had “nothing to do” with jurisdiction predicated on service on a 
registered agent); Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 328 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Neb. 1982) (holding 
Arkansas trucking company consented to Nebraska’s jurisdiction by appointing an 
agent as required by the federal Motor Carrier Act, despite the fact the accident with 
the Nebraska plaintiffs occurred in Arizona); Augsbury Corp. v. Petokey Corp., 470 
N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (App. Div. 1983) (reasoning registration to do business in New 
York is “a form of constructive consent to personal jurisdiction which has been found 
to satisfy due process”); Sharkey v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 373 N.W.2d 421, 425-26 (S.D. 
1985) (concluding insurer’s registration to do business under South Dakota law was 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction even though the policy was executed and the 
insured died in Wyoming); Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 
(Tex. App. 1975) (holding Illinois corporation registered to do business under Texas 
Business Corporations Act “consented to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of 
all lawsuits” within Texas, including underlying lawsuit arising out of a truck accident 
in Louisiana with the Texas plaintiffs).  Some courts, perhaps to avoid any 
constitutional difficulty from exacted consent, have adopted a hybrid approach, 
limiting the efficacy of a corporation’s consent to situations in which the corporation 
actually conducts some quantum of business activities in the forum.  See, e.g., Harry S. 
Peterson Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 778, 780-81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding service of process on registered agent of corporation performing 
unspecified “substantial” business in Georgia sufficient for general jurisdiction); 
Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 716 P.2d 513, 516-18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) 
(finding Washington corporation amenable in Idaho to dispute-blind jurisdiction 
based on its consent under the Idaho registration statute and its actual exercise of 
forum business activities under its registration). 
 264 See supra note 14.  Commentary addressing the propriety of appointment and 
registration as a consent to jurisdiction includes the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44 & cmts. a, c (1971), which contends that a foreign 
corporation validly consents to its amenability in the state “as to all causes of action” 
specified under the particular state registration statute.  But see D. Craig Lewis, 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment of an Agent: 
An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1990) (arguing 
persuasively that the exaction of consent to jurisdiction for unrelated causes of action 
in exchange for the privilege of conducting business in the forum violates the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, due process, and equal protection). 
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The second mode of analysis considers whether the mere 
appointment of the agent is in itself such a substantial and 
continuous activity in the forum to subject the defendant to 
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts analysis for general in 
personam jurisdiction.  Here, Perkins established that the activities 
requiring such an appointment under state law do not provide the 
conclusive standard for general jurisdiction.265  Accordingly, the mere 
fact that a corporation has appointed an agent for service of process, 
or should appoint an agent for service of process under state law, is 
not sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction.  A distinction exists 
between applying for the privilege of doing business and actually 
conducting business within the forum, and only the actual conduct of 
business constitutes the requisite purposefully directed activities for 
general jurisdiction under International Shoe’s progeny.266  Some 
federal courts have even expressed that the mere designation of an 
agent is “of no special weight” in the jurisdictional calculus.267  Yet 
irrespective of the appropriate “weight” to be afforded, courts 
routinely opine that the mere appointment of an agent does not 
establish the requisite minimum contacts for adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.268 
 
 265 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 266 See, e.g., Siemer, 966 F.2d at 181-83 (holding Delaware corporation with 
principal place of business in Kansas not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas in 
suit brought by foreign nationals for plane crash in Egypt because qualifying to do 
business and appointing a registered agent in Texas, “from any conceivable 
perspective, hardly amounts to ‘the general business presence’ of a corporation so as 
to sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction”); Sandstrom, 904 F.2d at 89-90 (holding 
nonresident corporation that secured a license to do business and appointed an 
agent for service of process in Maine without actually ever conducting any business in 
the forum was not subject to general jurisdiction because “preparations to do 
business at some indeterminate future date” was not the purposeful availment “of the 
privilege of conducting its affairs in the forum state”); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 
444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (determining nonresident drug company’s 
application to do business and appointment of an agent did not affect general 
jurisdictional calculus because “[a]pplying for the privilege of doing business is one 
thing, but the actual exercise of that privilege is quite another”); Armstrong v. 
Aramco Servs. Co., 746 P.2d 917, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (positing that a license to 
conduct business “in no way obviates the requirement that a nonresident corporate 
defendant have conducted substantial or systematic and continuous business activities 
in the state”) (emphasis in original). 
 267 Ratliff, 444 F.2d at 748; see also Siemer, 966 F.2d at 181 (quoting Ratliff). 
 268 See, e.g., Sofrar, S.A. v. Graham Eng’g Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (holding nonresident defendant was not amenable to dispute-blind 
jurisdiction because “personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant cannot be 
found on the basis of a defendant’s registration to do business in the state and 
designation of a corporate agent alone”); Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. 
Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (averring that “[s]ervice on a designated agent 
alone does not establish minimum contact”); DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. 
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Thus, the appointment of a statutory agent alone is not of a 
sufficiently substantial nature to support the exercise of general 
jurisdiction under the International Shoe model.  Instead, the actual 
course of conduct of business in the forum by the nonresident 
corporation must be examined, including the physical situs of the 
business transactions and the quantum and quality of such 
transactions. 
2. In-State Office or Store 
Conducting business operations through an office, store, or 
other tangible physical location in the forum state is traditionally 
sufficient for general jurisdiction.269  As an example, the Second 
 
Rptr. 2d 683, 694 (Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that Delaware holding corporation 
with a principal place of business in Pennsylvania was not subject to general 
jurisdiction in California for its subsidiary’s forum conduct merely because the 
holding company designated an agent for service of process in California and 
qualified to do business in the state); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 540 A.2d 
482, 486-87 (Md. 1988) (holding that Goodyear’s appointment of a resident agent 
“would not alone be sufficient to subject it to suit” in Maryland for cause of action 
“entirely unrelated to its contacts with [the] State”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Abreem 
Corp., 449 A.2d 1200, 1201 (N.H. 1982) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over 
defendant registered to do, but not doing, business in New Hampshire when forum 
was “not related to the parties or the litigation”); Conner v. ContiCarriers & 
Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 417-18 (Tex. App. 1997) (plurality holding that 
nonresident corporation’s certificate of authority to do business, presence of agent 
for service of process, and sporadic business contacts with Texas were insufficient to 
establish dispute-blind jurisdiction). 
 269 See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding 
Tennessee professional corporation amenable to general jurisdiction in Mississippi 
when it conducted all its affairs every fifth business day in Mississippi clinic); 
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding 
nonresident corporation’s manufacturing plant in Mississippi sufficient to support 
the forum’s exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction); Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 74, 75-76 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding Best Western subject to general 
jurisdiction in California for injury occurring in Mexico to California resident 
because it had a business office in California soliciting guests for its affiliate 
members, it had designated agent for service of process, and it had licensed 295 
members of its organization in California); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Gitchoff, 369 N.E.2d 
52 (Ill. 1977) (predicating jurisdiction on the presence of a forum sales office); Reyes 
v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 109-11 (La. 1991) (holding 
Hong Kong corporation’s establishment of corporate office in Louisiana from which 
it conducted a substantial portion of its ship management business for five years 
subjected corporation to jurisdiction of Louisiana courts in claim by Honduran 
seaman injured in international waters off the coast of Oregon); James v. Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding requisite minimum 
contacts existed for jurisdiction in Texas over Illinois railroad with office in Texas 
generating $75 million in business annually, but holding the exercise of general 
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice”); Hein v. 
Taco Bell, Inc., 803 P.2d 329, 330-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding Taco Bell 
subject to general jurisdiction in Washington for injury occurring in California to 
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Circuit in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.270 held that the two parent 
holding corporations of a vast, international conglomerate of 
affiliated oil and gas corporations were amenable to dispute-blind 
jurisdiction in New York because of their New York investor relations 
office through which the companies cultivated American capital 
markets.271  Despite the fact that this New York office performed only 
minimal activities in comparison to the corporation’s world-wide 
activities, the court exposited that the continuous operation of the 
New York office established the propriety of jurisdiction.272 
Wiwa and other similar decisions are in accord with the 
antecedent opinions relied upon in International Shoe to illustrate 
general jurisdiction.273  Each of these earlier decisions involved 
corporate agents conducting business from a forum locale.274  In 
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,275 for instance, Judge Cardozo held 
that a Pennsylvania coal company’s solitary New York sales office 
established its amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction in New York.276  
Certainly, then, adjudicatory jurisdiction predicated on a forum 
 
Washington resident as a result of at least sixteen restaurants in Seattle and hundreds 
of employees in Washington); see also 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 108.41[3] (3d ed. 1997) (“The general jurisdiction contact threshold of 
‘continuous and systematic’ typically requires the defendant to have an office in the 
forum state . . . .”); cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) 
(noting that “territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s 
affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of a suit there”). 
 270 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 271 Id. at 92-93.  While the office was nominally a part of their American subsidiary 
Shell Oil Company, the parent corporations ultimately paid for all the expenses of 
the office and the office existed solely to service the needs of the parents.  Id. at 93. 
 272 Id. at 98-99.  The investor relations office’s budget was a mere $500,000 per 
year while the companies had world-wide sales of approximately $190 billion in 2000.  
Id. at 93. 
 273 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing cases). 
 274 See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898) (holding British 
corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for altercation occurring in Britain 
because the corporation was doing business in New York “through a mercantile firm, 
its regularly appointed agents”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 117 N.E. 913, 
914-15 (Mass. 1917) (holding Kansas railroad subject to jurisdiction in Massachusetts 
for a suit based upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in another state 
because the railroad appointed a Boston independent passenger agent conducting 
business from an office in the forum), aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1917) (concluding New York 
could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania coal company for a cause of action 
having no relationship to New York because the coal company had a branch sales 
office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight salesmen, and clerical assistants 
from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders for continuous coal shipments 
from Pennsylvania to New York). 
 275 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917). 
 276 Id. at 916-18. 
  
864 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:807 
business location has a long pedigree. 
Nevertheless, while the presence of a forum office is often 
critical, such an office, standing alone, is not always enough to confer 
general jurisdiction.277  Even the Supreme Court’s early decisions 
recognized that a forum office did not suffice if the defendant did 
not conduct business of the requisite nature and character.278  Thus, 
there must also be evidence of continuous, substantial business 
activities undertaken from the physical location.279  As a recent 
example, the Fifth Circuit held in Submersible Systems, Inc. v. 
Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V.280 that dispute-blind jurisdiction was 
not appropriate merely because of the presence of the defendant’s 
office within the forum.281  The defendant had contracted to purchase 
a marine drilling rig from a vendor in Mississippi, and maintained an 
office at the shipyard with three employees to oversee the 
construction.282  The Fifth Circuit, analogizing to Helicopteros, 
pronounced that a forum office merely monitoring the construction 
of the purchase did not establish the requisite forum activities to 
support jurisdiction for a cause of action wholly unrelated to its in-
state contacts.283 
Thus, a forum office is not the sine qua non of dispute-blind 
jurisdiction.  The presence of an office alone in the forum does not 
establish the propriety of jurisdiction.284  And, conversely, while the 
absence of a forum office is certainly significant to the jurisdictional 
calculus,285 this does not mandate that the exercise of general 
 
 277 See, e.g., In re Rationis Enters., Inc., 261 F.3d 264, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(instructing district court on remand to hold an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction 
because mere fact that nonresident defendant had a local sales office and telephone 
listing in the forum was not dispositive); MacInnes v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257 
F.2d 832, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding presence of New York reservation office not 
sufficient for amenability over claim by New York citizen injured at Florida resort 
when situs of business transactions was Florida); Coastal Video Communications 
Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“In traditional 
terms, the placing of a store or salesman in a state is not sufficient to confer general 
jurisdiction over a defendant without some evidence that the store or salesman 
actually generated sufficient sales in the forum state for the contact to be considered 
continuous and systematic.”). 
 278 See, e.g., Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 532-34 
(1907) (concluding that forum office alone did not support jurisdiction). 
 279 See, e.g., Coastal Video, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
 280 249 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 281 Id. at 419-20. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 See id.; see also In re Rationis Enters., Inc., 261 F.3d at 269-70; Coastal Video, 59 F. 
Supp. 2d at 571. 
 285 See, e.g., Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri, A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 
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jurisdiction over a defendant without a regular place of business in 
the forum is erroneous.286 
As the Supreme Court cautioned in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz,287 jurisdiction “may not be avoided merely because the 
defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”288  Burger King’s 
justification is that “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial 
life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail 
and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need 
for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.”289  
Of course, the indubitable proposition that business is often 
conducted without any type of physical presence within the forum 
does not inexorably establish that such presence is not necessary for 
general jurisdiction, rather than the specific jurisdiction at issue in 
Burger King.290  As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
finding general jurisdiction, as well as the precedent the Court has 
cited approvingly that upheld this jurisdictional basis, all involved a 
defendant with at least some type of forum locale from which 
business was conducted on its behalf.291 
 
1995) (holding dispute-blind jurisdiction inappropriate over Norwegian shipbuilder 
because the “lack of a regular place of business in Washington [was] significant, and 
[was] not overcome by a few visits”); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 
2d 426, 429 (D. Md. 2002) (finding nonresident defendant advertising and executing 
forty-six transactions with forum residents in less than a year not amenable to 
dispute-blind jurisdiction because such contacts were “insufficient to conclude that 
[the defendant] is ‘essentially domiciled’ in Maryland”). 
 286 See, e.g., Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List 
Mgmt., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware 
corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of its $1.75 million in 
annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from its broadcasts of 
infomercials on forty-eight cable stations while finding that jurisdiction could not be 
asserted over a related defendant based on the mere fact that the parties’ contract 
involved a Florida corporation); Alderson v. Southern Co., 747 N.E.2d 926, 940 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001) (finding Indiana power company amenable to dispute-blind 
jurisdiction in Illinois despite the absence of any physical locale in Illinois because it 
sold its electric output to an Illinois corporation for use by Illinois residents under a 
contract governed by Illinois law). 
 287 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 288 Id. at 476; see also Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869-70 (Ala. 1985) 
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476); Travel Opportunities, 726 So. 2d at 315 (same). 
 289 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
 290 Id. at 472-73 & n.15, 479-80. 
 291 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) 
(holding Philippine mining company’s maintenance of corporate office in Ohio 
used to conduct a “continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited 
wartime activities of the company” was sufficiently substantial to permit Ohio to 
adjudicate the dispute even though plaintiff’s cause of action had no relationship to 
company’s Ohio activities); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898) 
(concluding British corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for altercation 
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Nevertheless, conditioning general jurisdiction on a place of 
business situated within the forum is problematic.  Indeed, if the 
Court had intended such a superficial benchmark, it certainly could 
have decreed that the requisite minimum contacts for general 
jurisdiction demand at least a business locale in the forum.  But 
instead, the Court explicitly rejected the use of any mechanical rules 
in resolving jurisdictional queries.292  And its refusal to employ a 
physical locale requirement as a proxy for general jurisdiction was 
appropriate since such a construct would, in some cases, lead to 
absurd results.293 
A quintessential example is Alderson v. Southern Co.294  One of the 
defendants in that case, State Line Energy, an Indiana limited liability 
company, owned a power plant abutting the state line between 
Indiana and Illinois. The power plant exploded, injuring employees 
of an Indiana contractor.295  Although the power plant was physically 
located just on the Indiana side of the state line,296 the electric output 
of the power plant was almost exclusively provided to an Illinois 
corporation for distribution to Illinois residents, pursuant to a power 
purchase contract executed in Illinois and governed by Illinois law.297  
 
occurring in Britain because the corporation was doing business in New York 
“through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. 
Co. v. Reynolds, 117 N.E. 913, 914-15 (Mass. 1917) (holding Kansas railroad subject 
to jurisdiction in Massachusetts for a suit based upon promissory notes made, issued, 
and negotiated in another state because the railroad appointed a Boston 
independent passenger agent conducting business from an office in the forum), 
aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18 
(N.Y. 1917) (concluding New York could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania 
coal company for a cause of action having no relationship to New York because the 
coal company had a branch sales office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight 
salesmen, and clerical assistants from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders 
for continuous coal shipments from Pennsylvania to New York). 
 292 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 293 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding 
corporation owning horse track located in New Mexico, but as close to the Texas 
state line as possible because El Paso citizens provided the vast majority of its patrons, 
subject to jurisdiction in Texas for claims by Texas horse trainer regarding alleged 
violations of New Mexico Racing Commission rules). 
 294 747 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 295 Id. at 930-31. 
 296 Id.  As one witness testified, the main entrance of the plant was just barely on 
the Indiana side of the border; indeed, the road leading to this entrance was partially 
in Illinois.  Id. at 935.  The plant was actually connected to the Chicago sewer system, 
and Chicago emergency crews responded on the day of the explosion that was the 
basis of the suit.  Id. 
 297 Id. at 931.  State Line Energy agreed to supply all of its normal operating 
capacity to the Illinois corporation, Commonwealth Edison.  Commonwealth Edison 
also had a right of first refusal on any excess capacity.  Id.  However, on a couple of 
occasions, State Line Energy sold excess capacity to utilities in Ohio and Illinois.  Id. 
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Under these circumstances, this Indiana company was certainly 
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Illinois, despite the lack of 
any type of physical locale in the forum.  As the court expounded, 
holding that State Line Energy’s lack of an office in Illinois was 
dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction would ignore “the economic 
reality of its business”—that it sold almost all its product to an Illinois 
corporation for use by Illinois residents under a contract governed by 
Illinois law and that its plant relied on governmental services, such as 
sewer and emergency protection, from Chicago, Illinois.298  Its 
connections with Illinois were thus at least as substantial and 
meaningful to its business as its contacts with Indiana, mandating that 
general jurisdiction was appropriate in Illinois despite the absence of 
an in-state business locale. 
Therefore, the absence of a forum office or store, just like the 
presence of such a location, is not determinative.  Although whether 
the defendant maintains a forum business location is a significant 
jurisdictional factor, the quality and quantity of business activity 
conducted by the defendant in the forum must also be inspected, 
which can be an arduous task. 
3. Revenue-Generating Activities 
The judicial appraisals of a defendant’s amenability to dispute-
blind jurisdiction predicated on its revenues attributable to the 
forum, or its revenues as a result of solicitation efforts in the forum, 
appear hopelessly confused.299  In this context, in particular, existing 
doctrine evinces “a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent 
results.”300  Nevertheless, scrutinizing the lower court decisions 
consonant with the Supreme Court’s intimations establishes some 
guiding precepts. 
While the Supreme Court has issued only two holdings on 
 
at 933.  Because the power from the plant was not provided at all to Indiana 
residents, State Line Energy requested an exemption from regulation by the Indiana 
Utility Regulatory Commission.  Id. at 932-33. 
 298 Id. at 940-41. 
 299 Compare, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding 
that 2,000 sales in five years in an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was 
sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction), with Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 
370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding hundreds of millions of dollars in forum sales 
did not suffice for dispute-blind jurisdiction under similar circumstances), and Price 
& Sons v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 831 P.2d 600, 601 (Nev. 1992) (concluding 
that “[s]ales and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign corporation, without 
more, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”). 
 300 Severinson v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
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general jurisdiction since adopting the minimum contacts test,301 two 
other decisions perhaps provide additional illumination.  In Rush v. 
Savchuk,302 the Supreme Court did not dispute the proposition, which 
was vital to the state court’s holding under review, that State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had sufficient jurisdictional 
contacts for even unrelated causes of action in each of the fifty 
states.303  The Court apparently concurred with the premise that, with 
respect to a vast nationwide enterprise like State Farm, dispute-blind 
jurisdiction might be appropriate in a number of states.304 
On the other hand, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.305 indicates 
that not all revenue-generating forum activities satisfy the 
substantiality requirement for general jurisdiction.  The defendant in 
Keeton, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in 
California, sold ten to fifteen thousand copies of its magazine in New 
Hampshire every month.306  This aggregated to the sale of between 
120,000 and 180,000 magazines annually, generating at least $219,000 
in revenue per year at the time suit was filed.307  Nevertheless, the 
Court hinted these contacts might not justify general jurisdiction, 
stating such forum conduct “may not be so substantial as to support 
jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to those activities.”308 
Unfortunately, though, Rush and Keeton leave many questions 
unanswered.  First, of course, because neither case announced a 
holding regarding whether the activities at issue were of the requisite 
substantial nature for general jurisdiction, the value of the Court’s 
comments is debatable.  Second, even accepting the Supreme Court’s 
dicta, the decisions provide minimal detail.  Assuming the Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower court in Rush that State Farm, a large 
national insurer with agents in every state, was amenable to 
 
 301 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins 
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 302 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
 303 Id. at 330. 
 304 See id. (noting that “State Farm is ‘found,’ in the sense of doing business, in all 
50 States and the District of Colombia” and that the insurer’s “forum contacts would 
support in personam jurisdiction even for an unrelated cause of action”). 
 305 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 306 Id. at 772. 
 307 See id.  Keeton filed her lawsuit in October 1980.  See Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1188 (N.H. 1988) (detailing procedural history of 
lawsuit).  At that time, the subscription price for the magazine was $22.00 per year, 
or $1.833 an issue, with a cover price of $2.95 per issue.  See HUSTLER, Mar. 1980, at 2 
(copy on file with Litigated Literature Section, Tarlton Law Library, University of 
Texas School of Law).  The 2003 subscription price is $41.95 a year, or $3.496 an 
issue, with a cover price of $7.99.  See http://www.subscription.larryflynt.com. 
 308 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80. 
  
2004 GENERAL JURISDICTION 869 
jurisdiction anywhere in the United States, the Court did not denote 
the rationale, or even the defendant’s activities, which justified the 
imposition of the state’s judicial power.309  And in Keeton, the Court 
did not imply that revenues alone in the forum could never be 
enough for general jurisdiction; rather, the implication was merely 
that the magazines sold in New Hampshire in that case may not have 
met the substantiality requirement.310  Thus, Keeton only illustrates 
that 120,000 to 180,000 annual magazine sales in the forum may not 
suffice, providing no guidance as to either why such sales are 
insufficient or what, if any, level of sales are sufficient.311 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, lower courts rarely cite either 
Rush or Keeton in resolving general jurisdiction queries.  While the 
Keeton dictum occasionally has been relied upon by courts as 
additional support for the defendant’s non-amenability under 
dispute-blind principles,312 the opinion has been ignored by decisions 
finding general jurisdiction.  Instead, courts determining that the 
exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction is appropriate often rely on a 
fiscal approach gauging the defendant’s forum revenues.313 
The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in Michigan National Bank v. 
Quality Dinette, Inc.314 that two closely held Alabama corporations’ 
combined four hundred sales totaling just over $625,000 in Michigan 
 
 309 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980). 
 310 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80. 
 311 Id. 
 312 See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 n.9 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(concluding forum solicitation efforts of foreign national defendant in Massachusetts 
were not as regular as Hustler Magazine, Inc.’s distribution efforts in New Hampshire 
that Keeton suggested were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction); 
Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 4-5 (N.C. Ct. App.) (comparing the dollar 
volume of sales the nonresident defendant corporation made to forum customers to 
the level of sales Keeton hinted were insufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction), aff’d, 
349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986) (per curiam). 
 313 See, e.g., Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List 
Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware 
corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of its $1.75 million in 
annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from its broadcasts of 
infomercials); Colletti v. Crudele, 523 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding 
Florida trucking company, realizing $5,000 to $10,000 in revenues from 
approximately a dozen annual trips for local industrial consignees to Illinois, subject 
to general jurisdiction for accident with Illinois residents occurring in Kentucky); 
Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (concluding general 
jurisdiction appropriate in Pennsylvania over a Minnesota trucking company for an 
accident occurring in Ohio because $735,000 of the company’s $20 million 
nationwide gross receipts were attributable to its trucking activities in Pennsylvania, 
its trucks traveled 2.6 million miles on Pennsylvania roads, and it purchased over 
500,000 gallons of fuel for its trucks in Pennsylvania). 
 314 888 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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through an independent sales representative and mail order 
solicitations warranted dispute-blind jurisdiction in Michigan.315  The 
court avowed that such sales, even though representing only three 
percent of the companies’ total sales, indicated the requisite 
continuous and systematic portion of the defendants’ general 
business necessary for general jurisdiction.316  And other courts have 
predicated general jurisdiction on even more limited total revenues 
and sales made to forum residents.317 
Other decisions have reached similar results by examining the 
percentage of total sales or revenues derived from the forum.318  For 
instance, in Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd.,319 the Belizean corporation’s 
sale of approximately eighteen percent of its shrimp to Florida 
importers was the primary activity supporting dispute-blind 
jurisdiction.320  Yet, while eighteen percent perhaps sounds 
substantial, what if the corporation’s worldwide revenues had only 
been $100,000?321  Or, as a converse illustration, less than one-tenth of 
one percent of California Federal Savings & Loan Association’s 
 
 315 Id. at 466. 
 316 Id.  As support, the Sixth Circuit cited two Michigan state cases, Kircos v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 247 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), and June v. 
Vibra Screw Feeders, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).  In June, however, 
the defendant’s contacts were actually sufficiently related to the dispute to support 
specific jurisdiction, as the Michigan plaintiff sued his former employer for breach of 
contract to recover commissions he was allegedly owed for selling the defendant’s 
products in Michigan.  See id. 
 317 See, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that 
2,000 sales through the telephone, the mail, and an independent manufacturer’s 
representative in a five-year period in an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was 
sufficient to subject a nonresident Missouri corporation to dispute-blind jurisdiction 
in Alabama for an injury occurring in Tennessee to a Tennessee resident); Colletti, 
523 N.E.2d at 1229 (finding Florida trucking company with $5,000 to $10,000 in 
annual revenues from forum subject to general jurisdiction); Kircos, 247 N.W.2d at 
317 (concluding revenues of $32,117 in the last year from Michigan customers 
through a Michigan dealer, direct mail, and advertising supported general 
jurisdiction). 
 318 See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999) (using foreign defendant’s sale of eighteen percent of its product in Florida as 
one of the contacts to support conclusion that defendant had engaged in continuous 
and systematic business activities in Florida in claim by Belizean citizen injured in 
Costa Rica); Kircos, 247 N.W.2d at 317 (relying on defendant’s realization of an 
average of 2.78 percent of its total revenue from Michigan customers to support 
general jurisdiction finding). 
 319 739 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 320 Id. at 620-21.  While other forum contacts were listed as well, the percentage of 
sales to Florida was always discussed first by the court and appeared central to its 
holding.  See id. at 619, 620-21. 
 321 The Woods court did not specify the total worldwide shrimp sales made by the 
Belizean corporation.  See id. 
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depositors, deposits, and loans were traceable to Pennsylvania in the 
mid-1980’s, but this aggregated to over seven hundred Pennsylvanian 
depositors with $10 million in deposits and an equal amount of 
loans.322  Certainly, then, percentages alone are meaningless. 
More importantly, though, regardless of whether revenues, sales, 
or the percentage of either derived from forum residents is the 
court’s polestar, primarily relying on a quantitative fiscal analysis 
pretermits the qualitative aspect of general jurisdiction.  As discussed 
previously, Helicopteros mandates that the general jurisdictional 
calculus incorporates a qualitative analysis; in other words, quantity is 
not enough.323  Indeed, the New Hampshire magazine sales in Keeton 
were quantitatively extensive, more so in absolute numbers than in 
many of the cases finding general jurisdiction.324  Nevertheless, the 
Court implied that such sales were not qualitatively “so substantial” as 
to support general jurisdiction.325 
The evident question is how to distinguish forum revenue-
generating activities that are substantial from those that are not.  
While the Court did not provide the answer in Keeton, some of its pre-
International Shoe opinions that the Court continues to employ when 
deciding general jurisdiction queries may shed some insight.326 
For instance, advertising and solicitation of sales alone did not 
satisfy the precursor to general jurisdiction.327  It did not suffice that 
 
 322 Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 323 See supra Part I. 
 324 Compare Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), with Ex parte 
Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that 2,000 forum sales in 
an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was sufficient for dispute-blind 
jurisdiction), and Colletti v. Crudele, 523 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
(holding a company with $5,000 to $10,000 in annual forum revenues subject to 
general jurisdiction), and Kircos v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 247 N.W.2d 316, 
317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (finding forum revenues of $32,117 in the prior year 
supported general jurisdiction). 
 325 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80. 
 326 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 
(1984) (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)); 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952) (citing, inter 
alia, Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), and Barrow 
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 315 (1945) (citing, inter alia, Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quiney Railway Co., 
205 U.S. 530 (1907), and People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 
(1918)). 
 327 See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at 87 (holding defendant’s activities of 
advertising and sending soliciting agents to the forum were insufficient for 
jurisdiction); Green, 205 U.S. at 533-34 (decreeing solicitation in forum did not 
support amenability). 
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the defendant conducted activities in the forum if those activities 
were merely to solicit transactions occurring in another state.328  Thus, 
in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quiney Railway Co.,329 the Court held 
that an Iowa railroad was not amenable to jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania for an injury occurring in California to a Pennsylvania 
citizen based on the solicitation efforts of its Philadelphia 
employees.330  Such efforts, the Court highlighted, did not culminate 
in an in-state transaction when the tickets were sold, delivered, and 
used in Illinois.331  In contrast, in those situations in which the 
defendant did undertake in-state transactions and business on a 
regular basis, the propriety of jurisdiction was upheld.332 
Notably, these Supreme Court decisions never quantified the 
fiscal effects of the defendant’s forum activities.  Instead, the Court 
focused on the quality and nature of the corporation’s business 
activities in the state.  Soliciting did not suffice, but conducting in-
state business transactions on a continuous and systematic basis did.  
Thus, the quantity of revenues generated from forum residents is not 
what is controlling to ascertain substantiality, but rather how those 
revenues are generated. 
A number of modern decisions, especially from the federal 
appellate courts, apparently concur.  These courts refuse to place 
primary emphasis on a quantitative analysis of revenues generated 
from forum residents.333  Rather, these decisions emphasize 
 
 328 See supra note 327. 
 329 205 U.S. 530 (1907). 
 330 Id. at 532-33. 
 331 Id. at 534. 
 332 See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1898) (holding British 
steamship corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for injury occurring in 
Britain based on selling tickets in the forum). 
 333 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 
1996) (finding that, while $4 million in forum sales alone may not have sufficed, 
such sales combined with corporation’s relationship with its independent dealers, its 
visits to those dealers, and its targeted marketing in the forum satisfied minimum 
contacts aspect of general jurisdiction in claim when all alleged acts and omissions 
occurred outside the forum, but subsequently holding that the exercise of 
jurisdiction was unreasonable); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199-
1200 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding nonresident corporation’s employment of 
representatives in Maryland from 1981-1987 soliciting $9 million to $13 million in 
annual sales did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction because “advertising 
and solicitation activities alone do not constitute the ‘minimum contacts’ required 
for general jurisdiction”); Conti v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding nonresident corporation’s annual forum sales of $900,000 
through one of its two Ohio distributors was insufficient to establish general 
jurisdiction); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that hundreds of millions of dollars in sales to Texas dealers and companies did not 
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qualitative aspects of the transactions, including the situs of the 
transactions, the defendant’s control of in-state distribution channels, 
and, in some unique cases, advertisements specifically targeted or 
tailored to forum residents.334 
 a. Situs of transactions 
A predominant factor in an appropriate substantiality query is 
the situs of the negotiation, execution, and performance of the 
revenue-generating transaction.  To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit in 
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.335 held that Beech, a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Kansas, was not amenable to 
dispute-blind jurisdiction in Texas, despite selling over $300 million 
in manufactured products over a five-year period to eighteen Texas 
corporations, because all the sales contracts had been negotiated and 
executed, as well as performed through the transfer of title, outside 
Texas.336  The court reasoned that, under such circumstances, Beech 
had not invoked the protection or benefits of Texas law.337  
Accordingly, even though the defendant’s total revenues derived 
from Texas residents were quantitatively prodigious, the court held 
that the defendant’s execution of out-of-state contracts with forum 
residents did not satisfy the required substantiality for general 
jurisdiction. 
 
suffice for dispute-blind adjudicative jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated, 
executed, and performed outside Texas); Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 3-5 
(N.C. Ct. App.) (holding $520,000 of annual sales to forum residents did not support 
general jurisdiction), aff’d, 349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986) (per curiam); Am. Type 
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 809-10 (Tex. 2002) (determining 
that, although the quantity of the nonresident defendant’s contacts, including 
revenues derived from $350,000 in annual sales to Texas residents, perhaps 
suggested “a significant relationship with Texas,” the quality of its contacts did not 
support jurisdiction when it performed its services and executed its contracts outside 
of Texas); J&J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 926-27 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding 
Alabama corporation’s $3.5 million of shrimp boat sales to Texas residents did not 
support general jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated, executed, and title 
transferred in Alabama). 
 334 See infra Parts IV.A.3.a-c. 
 335 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 336 Id. at 373, 375-76.  The action was a perfect example of dispute-blind 
jurisdiction, as the suit was brought in Texas by survivors of Louisiana residents who 
had purchased an aircraft from Beech in Louisiana and were killed in a crash in 
Mississippi during a flight from Mississippi to Louisiana.  Id. at 372.  The aircraft had 
not been designed, manufactured, serviced, or repaired in Texas, and had never 
been owned by a Texas resident.  Id. at 373.  Thus, no one even attempted to argue 
that the action “relate[d] in any way to Beech’s contacts with Texas.”  Id. 
 337 Id. at 376. 
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A number of decisions have employed a similar approach.338  
Nonetheless, other courts have dismissed the import of the situs of 
the transactions to the jurisdictional calculus,339 while most courts 
simply ignore it completely.340 
 
 338 See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(holding nonresident corporation’s $9 million to $13 million in annual sales to 
forum residents did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction when orders 
were placed directly with the company); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 
1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding nonresident’s corporation’s bareboat charters to its 
Louisiana subsidiaries did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction when 
charters were executed and payments under the charters were remitted outside the 
forum); Gehling v. St. George’s Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir. 
1985) (concluding foreign medical school’s admission of six percent of its students 
from Pennsylvania did not establish the school’s amenability to dispute-blind 
jurisdiction on plaintiff’s causes of action unrelated to its forum activities because the 
income derived from Pennsylvania residents was not the result of in-state activities, 
but of educational services provided in Grenada); Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. 
v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. 2002) (holding Maryland corporation’s 
$350,000 annual revenues derived from Texas residents did not suffice for dispute-
blind jurisdiction when company “perform[ed] all its business services outside Texas, 
and carefully construct[ed] its contracts to ensure it [did] not benefit from Texas 
laws”); J&J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 926-27 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding 
Alabama corporation’s $3.5 million of shrimp boat sales to Texas residents did not 
support general jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated, executed, and title 
transferred in Alabama); cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 
560, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Bearry on the basis that there was no 
suggestion that sales at issue were executed outside the state or were deliberately 
structured to avoid general jurisdiction); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Babcock Mex., 
S.A. de C.V., 597 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing importance of 
the locale of the transfer of title to general jurisdiction query). 
 339 See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that $10 million in loans made by a Georgia bank to Missouri residents 
was sufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction over the bank in Missouri even 
though all the loans were executed in Georgia); Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 
867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that approximately four hundred annual sales in an 
amount of $65,000 to $85,000 to forum residents through the telephone, the mail, 
and an independent manufacturer’s representative when title was transferred outside 
the forum was sufficient to subject a nonresident Missouri corporation to dispute-
blind jurisdiction in Alabama for an injury occurring in Tennessee to a Tennessee 
resident). 
 340 See, e.g., Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 
1989) (concluding two closely held Alabama corporations’ combined four hundred 
sales totaling just over $625,000 in two-year period in Michigan through an 
independent sales representative and mail order solicitations warranted dispute-
blind personal jurisdiction in Michigan without discussing the locale of the transfer 
of title other than to note the defendant did not pay any Michigan sales tax); Estate 
of Rick v. Stevens, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030-33 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding 
Minnesota tractor-trailer leasing corporation amenable to Iowa’s general 
adjudicatory jurisdiction—in a claim arising from an accident with an Iowa resident 
occurring in Wisconsin—based on its nine unrelated lease contracts with Iowa 
residents without any discussion of the locale of the negotiation, execution, and 
performance of the lease contracts); Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. 
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But the situs of the transactions should not be ignored.  A 
critical distinction exists between doing business with the residents of 
a state and conducting business transactions in the state.341  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in Burger King recognized this difference by 
decreeing that a defendant’s contract with an out-of-state party does 
not necessarily subject the defendant to even specific jurisdiction in 
the foreign state.342  On the contrary, “the real object of the business 
transaction” must be evaluated, by scrutinizing the parties’ 
negotiations, the terms of the executed contract, and the parties’ 
actual course of dealing, to ascertain whether the defendant is 
amenable to jurisdiction based on a contract.343  Certainly this 
rationale applies a fortiari to general jurisdiction, which requires 
more extensive and substantial forum activities. 
 
Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding Delaware corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of 
its $1.75 million in annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from 
its broadcasts of infomercials on forty-eight cable stations without any mention of the 
situs of the title transfer for such goods).  A number of other decisions have also not 
considered the situs of the transactions in reaching the converse holding that 
dispute-blind jurisdiction was inappropriate because the sales to forum-based 
residents were de minimis.  See, e.g., Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding “minimal” sales to forum residents did not 
establish necessary contacts for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Regent Lighting Corp. v. 
Am. Lighting Concept, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that 
the defendant’s level of sales to forum residents was insufficient for dispute-blind 
jurisdiction); Dominion Gas Ventures, Inc. v. N.L.S., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 
(N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding nonresident defendant “entering into transactions” with 
eight forum residents, constituting two to seven percent of it annual revenues, not 
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction). 
 341 See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Indian corporation exporting substantial 
rice through forum ports was not subject to dispute-blind general jurisdiction as it 
was doing business with the forum rather than in the forum); cf. Bancroft & Masters, 
Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, 
while Georgia golf club was amenable under specific jurisdiction principles, it was 
not subject to general jurisdiction in California based on selling golf tournament 
tickets and merchandise to California residents and executing license agreements 
with two television networks and a few California vendors because such activities were 
“doing business with California, but [did] not constitute doing business in 
California”); Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (holding Mexican telephone carrier receiving millions of dollars each 
month in settlement revenues under correspondent agreements with carriers in the 
United States attributable to Texas residents was subject to specific, but not general, 
jurisdiction in Texas because, as such payments were for servicing the Mexican 
portion of a call from Texas to Mexico, the Mexican corporation was merely doing 
business with United States carriers rather than doing business in Texas). 
 342 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). 
 343 Id. at 478-79 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. 
Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943)). 
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Additionally, the Supreme Court’s intimations in its 
jurisdictional decisions are in accord.  The Court’s pre-International 
Shoe opinions distinguished between the defendant’s in-state 
solicitations of transactions that then occurred outside the state, 
which were insufficient for jurisdiction, and the defendant’s actual in-
state transactions, which did support amenability.344  Plus, this same 
distinction could explain the discrepancy between the Rush and 
Keeton dicta.  An insurance contract is generally governed by the laws 
of the state in which the insured or the insured’s property is 
located;345 thus, State Farm was perforce conducting business 
transactions in each state that it had insureds.  In contrast, there is no 
indication that Hustler Magazine, Inc. was negotiating, executing, 
and performing contracts in New Hampshire by selling its magazines 
in the forum—rather, it used independent distributors to circulate its 
magazine there.346  At most, Hustler may have been doing business 
with New Hampshire residents. 
To be faithful to the Supreme Court’s guidance, then, dispute-
blind jurisdiction requires an appraisal of the true object of the 
defendant’s forum business transactions by evaluating the situs of the 
negotiation, execution, and performance of the revenue-generating 
transactions.  Courts must differentiate business transactions 
conducted in the forum from doing business with forum residents.  
Yet, while the situs of the transactions must at least always be 
considered, it is not always dispositive.  In some situations, the in-state 
transactions alone may not be enough to support jurisdiction,347 while 
 
 344 Compare People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918), and 
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907), with Barrow 
S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898). 
 345 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1971).  
Additionally, a number of states have promulgated statutes mandating the 
application of that state’s laws to insurance contracts with forum residents.  See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 27-14-22 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 21.51.300 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-1115 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-122 (West 1999); 
FLA. STAT. ch. 627.632 (1996 & Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.629 (West 
1995); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-209 (1997 & Supp. 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, 
§ 22 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 60A.08 (1996 & Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-7 
(2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.200 
(1999). 
 346 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d, 
465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 347 See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92-93 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding 
that a British corporation that conducted forum negotiations and extensive 
solicitations to obtain $585,000 in orders in a two-year period from a Massachusetts 
corporation was not subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting $4 million in forum 
sales may not have alone sufficed for dispute-blind jurisdiction). 
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perhaps under certain unique circumstances, the actual negotiation, 
execution, or performance of transactions in the state may not be 
necessary.348  Hence, other factors must also be considered. 
 b. In-state networks to distribute goods and services 
Another important component to the substantiality query is 
whether the nonresident defendant employs or controls distributors, 
dealers, or agents in the forum to disperse its goods or perform its 
services.  Sometimes the members of such a “network” are actually 
employees of the defendant, which frequently results in the 
defendant’s amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction based on its 
employees regularly conducting business in the forum.349  But, even 
when the defendant does not directly employ its distributors, dealers, 
or agents, their presence in the forum favors the exercise of 
jurisdiction if the defendant utilizes them to conduct business 
transactions within the state.350 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.,351 for 
instance, the Second Circuit held that the requisite minimum 
contacts existed for dispute-blind jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant based on $4 million in forum sales in a seven-year period, 
its relationship with its independent dealers in the forum, and its 
advertisements targeted to the forum.352  The court initially 
articulated that the defendant’s sales were material to the 
jurisdictional calculus because there was no indication that the 
transactions were negotiated, executed, or performed outside the 
forum.353  While acknowledging that such sales, standing alone, may 
not have established the required minimum contacts, the court 
 
 348 See infra Part IV.A.3.c. 
 349 See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate in Ohio over Connecticut 
corporation with principal place of business in Virginia that employed multiple 
distributors in Ohio through which it made millions of dollars of sales even though 
none of the allegedly infringing items was sold in Ohio). 
 350 See, e.g., Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc., 745 F.2d 346, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding Delaware corporation operating Texas amusement park amenable to 
general jurisdiction in suit brought by Louisiana resident for injuries suffered at the 
park in part because corporation employed sales representative in Louisiana and 
authorized all Louisiana travel agencies to sell tickets to its facilities); Frummer v. 
Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (N.Y. 1967) (concluding the 
required “presence” in New York for jurisdiction over a British hotel corporation for 
a claim by a New York citizen injured in Britain existed as a result of the defendant’s 
corporate agent’s conduct of business in the forum). 
 351 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 352 Id. at 573. 
 353 Id. at 571-72. 
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exposited that the defendant’s relationships with its dealers, 
including previously maintaining a forum office and making 150 visits 
to its forum dealers, “tip[ped] the balance” in favor of jurisdiction.354 
Metropolitan Life is consistent with one of the Supreme Court’s 
pre-International Shoe opinions, Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. 
Reynolds.355  In Reynolds, the Court affirmed by memorandum opinion 
the jurisdictional holdings of the Massachusetts state court.356  The 
state court found a Kansas railroad amenable to jurisdiction for a suit 
based upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in 
another state because the railroad appointed a Boston independent 
passenger agent who, while also conducting business on his own 
account, engaged in business transactions for the railroad in 
Massachusetts.357  Thus, the fact that the railroad appointed an 
independent agent to conduct its business affairs in the forum 
supported jurisdiction rather than insulating it from the state’s 
judicial power. 
Nevertheless, in order to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
other early pronouncements that the solicitation of business by 
forum-based employees is insufficient,358 the existence of a forum-
based network or dealer should not suffice for dispute-blind 
jurisdiction unless the nonresident corporation is actually 
negotiating, executing, or performing transactions in the forum 
through such an agent, as in the Reynolds case.  As the Court held in 
another pre-International Shoe case, Green v. Chicago, Burlington & 
Quiney Ry. Co., the presence of even corporate employees in the 
forum does not support jurisdiction when their activities do not lead 
 
 354 Id. at 570-73.  The court, however, subsequently determined that the exercise 
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the factors from Asahi Metal Industry Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).  See Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 573-75. 
 355 255 U.S. 565 (1921). 
 356 Id.; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952) 
(explaining that the significance of Reynolds is demonstrated “by the opinions of the 
state court below”). 
 357 Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 113 N.E. 413, 413-15 (Mass. 1916) and 
117 N.E. 913, 914-15 (Mass. 1917), aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921). 
 358 See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918); 
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907); see also 
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 215-17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding defendant’s 
business contacts too fragmentary for general jurisdiction when it employed eight 
sales representatives in the forum); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 
(4th Cir. 1971) (holding nonresident defendant’s employment of five detail men in 
forum to promote its products insufficient to support dispute-blind general 
jurisdiction); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970) 
(finding jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
activities impermissible when the “defendant’s only activities consist of advertising 
and employing salesmen to solicit orders”). 
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to in-state transactions.359  Accordingly, most courts recognize, as a 
general rule, that the actions of independent dealers and agents 
alone will not support dispute-blind jurisdiction.360  Instead, an in-
state network should only be a relevant factor to the extent it further 
bolsters the supposition that the defendant is conducting business 
transactions in the state rather than merely with forum residents. 
 c. Targeted advertisements or marketing 
The Supreme Court’s pre-International Shoe opinions consistently 
held that in-state solicitations and advertisements did not embody the 
type of forum contacts necessary to support jurisdiction.361  Not 
surprisingly, then, modern decisions routinely adjudge the placement 
of advertisements in nationally-distributed publications as insufficient 
for general jurisdiction.362  A number of courts have likewise found 
 
 359 Green, 205 U.S. at 532-34. 
 360 See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that forum presence of an independent 
sales agent importing and distributing Indian corporation’s rice was insufficient to 
establish dispute-blind general jurisdiction when the sales agent had no authority to 
contract on the corporation’s behalf); Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 
729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding “sales and sales promotion by 
independent nonexclusive sales representatives” were insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction over a West German corporation in California when the cause of action 
was unrelated to such forum activities) (internal citation omitted); Adell Corp. v. 
Elco Textron, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 752, 756 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding dispute-blind 
jurisdiction was inappropriate because “sales by an independent distributor are not 
enough by themselves to constitute continuous and systematic contact with Texas”); 
Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods., Inc., v. Pac. Fitness Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1049, 1052-
53 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (concluding independent distributor’s forum sales of 
unrelated products insufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction); Fisher 
Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 347 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1959) (concluding more contacts 
are necessary for assuming dispute-blind general jurisdiction “than sales and sales 
promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales representatives”); 
Carretti v. Italpast, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 132 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding minimal 
resales by forum distributor purchasing products in Italy insufficient to establish 
dispute-blind jurisdiction in California over Italian seller). 
 361 See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at 87; Green, 205 U.S. at 533-34. 
 362 See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 
2001) (concluding “the mere placement of advertisements in nationally-distributed 
publications cannot be regarded as ‘continuous and systematic’ in nature”); Bearry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1987) (declaring the nonresident 
defendant’s “nation-wide advertising program does not support a finding of general 
jurisdiction”); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) 
(iterating that “mere placement of advertisements in journals of national distribution 
cannot be regarded as ‘continuous and systematic’ in nature in a given state”); 
Armstrong v. Aramco Servs. Co., 746 P.2d 917, 922 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
nonresident defendant not amenable to general jurisdiction predicated on 
advertisements in national publication circulated in the forum); Mayo v. Tillman 
Aero, Inc., 640 So. 2d 314, 319-20 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding nonresident 
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that advertising and solicitation efforts alone, even when targeted or 
directed at the forum, do not constitute the requisite “minimum 
contacts” for general jurisdiction.363  But there are unique 
circumstances in which perhaps targeted or directed forum 
marketing or advertising may suffice. 
An example is Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp.364  In that case, a 
corporation operated a horse track that, while sited in New Mexico, 
was located as close to El Paso, Texas (where parimutuel horse racing 
was illegal) as allowed under New Mexico’s racing and gambling 
laws.365  The track “saturated” El Paso with “substantial advertising” 
because it depended almost exclusively on the patronage of El Paso 
citizens for its revenues.366  As the Fifth Circuit posited, the 
corporation therefore “was as much doing business in Texas as it was 
in New Mexico.”367  While the court was not entirely perspicuous 
regarding the relationship of the corporation’s Texas contacts to the 
dispute,368 the court apparently decreed that jurisdiction was proper 
under such circumstances “even though the suit [bore] no relation to 
the activities deemed necessary and sufficient to constitute minimum 
 
California corporation advertising its pilot training operations in international and 
national publications reaching forum residents was not subject to general or specific 
jurisdiction). 
 363 See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(holding nonresident corporation’s employment of seventeen to twenty-one 
representatives in Maryland from 1981-1987 soliciting $9 million to $13 million in 
annual sales did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction because “advertising 
and solicitation activities alone do not constitute the ‘minimum contacts’ required 
for general jurisdiction”); Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 
1258-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding forum advertisements for Venezuelan corporation’s 
Aruba hotel did not establish general jurisdiction in claim by forum resident for 
injuries sustained at the hotel); Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 
F.2d 61, 66 n.8 (3d Cir. 1984) (concluding that placing promotional advertisements 
in local magazine was insufficient for jurisdiction); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444 
F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding forum advertising did not support dispute-
blind jurisdiction); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970) 
(finding jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
activities impermissible when the “defendant’s only activities consist of advertising 
and employing salesmen to solicit orders”). 
 364 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 365 Id. at 748.  Indeed, the track was so close to El Paso that it was visible from the 
district judge’s El Paso apartment.  Id. 
 366 Id. 
 367 Id; see also Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1383, 1391-92 (E.D. 
Tex. 1989) (holding New Mexico ski lodge subject to general jurisdiction in Texas 
for injury to Texas resident at lodge because of its extensive forum solicitation 
activities culminating in forty-seven percent of its business from Texas residents, as 
well as its other contacts, such as its prior incorporation in Texas, its recruitment of 
employees in Texas, and its use of Texas travel agencies). 
 368 Wilkerson, 554 F.2d at 749-50. 
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contacts [in the forum].”369 
Nevertheless, a corporation’s solicitation of residents from a 
neighboring state should not, standing alone, be enough for 
jurisdiction.370  In order to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance on the substantiality of forum activities, dispute-blind 
jurisdiction requires at least the equivalent of in-state business.  To 
illustrate, a California resort would not appear to be conducting the 
equivalent of business transactions in Texas by advertising its resort in 
both national and local media in an attempt to draw guests from 
Texas and other states.  Yet the requisite correlation perhaps exists 
when the primary object of the business is to engage in transactions 
with residents of a particular adjoining state, such as in Wilkerson 
where the horse track was situated next to the state line and actively 
 
 369 Id. at 750. 
 370 See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910-11 (4th Cir. 
1984) (holding Georgia hospital not amenable to jurisdiction in neighboring South 
Carolina based on its forum solicitation efforts); Giangola v. Walt Disney World Co., 
753 F. Supp. 148, 156 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding Walt Disney World not amenable to 
jurisdiction in claim by New Jersey resident for injury in Florida as a result of its 
extensive forum advertising campaign); Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 854 P.2d 
461, 462-63 (Or. 1993) (finding Nevada casino’s regular forum advertisements to 
attract Oregon residents to its casino insufficient to establish its amenability to either 
general or specific jurisdiction in Oregon for claim by Oregon resident injured at the 
casino); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) 
(concluding Washington hospital was not subject to general jurisdiction in Oregon 
despite advertisements in Oregon paper and telephone listing in Oregon to solicit 
Oregon patients across state line to Washington hospital); Riviera Operating Corp. v. 
Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905, 910-11 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding Nevada casino’s 
solicitation efforts to attract Texas residents were insufficient to establish general 
jurisdiction over claim by Texas resident injured in Nevada).  But see Gorman v. 
Grand Casino of La., Inc.-Coushatta, 1 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Tex. 1998) 
(holding Louisiana casino subject to general jurisdiction in Texas for injury 
occurring in Louisiana to Texas resident predicated on casino’s extensive and 
pervasive forum advertising on billboards, television, radio, and other media); 
Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding 
Walt Disney World amenable to general jurisdiction in suit by Pennsylvania resident 
for injuries occurring in Florida because of Walt Disney’s extensive advertising 
campaign in Pennsylvania); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670, 
675-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding general jurisdiction over Wisconsin inn that 
directly targeted Minnesota residents through direct mail and advertisements in 
Minnesota publications when Minnesota resident was injured at inn); Maro v. Potash, 
531 A.2d 407, 409-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (holding Pennsylvania 
concessionaire at Veteran’s Stadium in Philadelphia subject to general jurisdiction in 
New Jersey for alleged injury to New Jersey resident at the stadium as result of 
stadium’s massive marketing and advertising efforts taken to attract New Jersey 
residents, resulting in millions of dollars of revenues for concessionaire over fifteen-
year lease).  Of course, all these case finding general jurisdiction based on 
solicitations from a neighboring state involved at least some contacts with a 
relationship to the dispute, although it is not clear under current doctrine whether 
specific jurisdiction could in fact be exercised in these cases.  See supra note 98. 
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targeted, as its predominant source of revenue, the business of Texas 
residents.371 
 Moreover, targeted marketing may be relevant in another 
context as well.  Continuous targeted advertising and solicitation 
efforts culminating in some quantum of in-state transactions are 
more substantial forum activities than engaging in the same quantum 
of in-state transactions without such directed marketing.  By directing 
such efforts at the forum, the corporation is engaging in more 
qualitatively significant activities, with both corresponding additional 
forum benefits and expectations that its in-state transactions will 
subject it to the state’s judicial prerogative for any and all causes of 
action.  Thus, courts occasionally rely on such advertisements as an 
additional factor supporting dispute-blind jurisdiction over 
corporations negotiating, executing, or performing transactions in 
the state.372 
In sum, those forum revenue-generating activities indicating that 
the corporation is conducting business transactions in the state, 
rather than merely with forum residents, are of a sufficiently 
substantial nature to support general jurisdiction.  Typically, this 
occurs when the corporation negotiates, performs, or executes 
transactions in the state, especially if such transactions are aided by 
targeted forum advertisements or distributors, dealers, agents, or 
employees in the state.  But other corporate activities may suffice as 
well, including perhaps targeted marketing under the right 
circumstances, consonant with the Supreme Court’s directive that  
“talismanic jurisdiction formulas” are unavailing.373 
4. Websites 
Modern technology has engendered new jurisdictional 
challenges.  One of these challenges is the extent to which a 
nonresident defendant’s Internet activity subjects it to personal 
jurisdiction in another forum.  The best known case addressing this 
issue is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.374 
Zippo involved a claim that an Internet domain site, with 3,000 
 
 371 Wilkerson, 554 F.2d at 749-50. 
 372 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 
1996) (finding that, while $4 million of in-state sales alone may not have sufficed, 
such sales combined with corporation’s targeted marketing in the forum and 
relationship with its independent dealers satisfied minimum contacts aspect of 
dispute-blind jurisdiction, but subsequently holding that the exercise of jurisdiction 
was unreasonable). 
 373 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 & n.29 (1985). 
 374 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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paying subscribers in the forum state of Pennsylvania, infringed upon 
another company’s trademark.375  The only question before the court 
was whether the defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction as a 
result of this conduct.376 To resolve the jurisdictional query, the court, 
relying on “well developed personal jurisdiction principles,” 
constructed a sliding scale categorizing a defendant’s Internet usage 
into a spectrum with three zones.377  At one end of the spectrum, the 
defendant uses the transmission of computer files over the Internet 
to enter into contracts with residents of other states, subjecting the 
defendant to jurisdiction.378  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
defendant establishes a mere passive website that does nothing more 
than advertise, which is not sufficient for jurisdiction.379  In between 
these two extremes are those websites allowing the exchange of 
information over the Internet, in which jurisdiction “is determined by 
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 
information that occurs on the Website.”380  The Zippo court held that 
because the defendant was purposefully availing itself of the benefits 
and protections of the forum’s laws by engaging in electronic 
commerce with Pennsylvania residents, the defendant was amenable 
under specific jurisdiction principles.381 
 Zippo’s sliding scale framework was thus developed in the 
particular context of resolving the purposeful availment inquiry for 
specific jurisdiction.382  Indeed, the court distinguished the 
defendant’s proffered authority on the basis that the cited cases 
involved general jurisdiction rather than specific jurisdiction.383 
Nonetheless—and despite the frequent recognition that general 
jurisdiction requires more extensive forum activities than specific 
jurisdiction384—numerous courts have co-opted the Zippo framework 
for general jurisdictional queries.385  Some of these courts have 
 
 375 Id. at 1121. 
 376 Id. at 1122 (noting plaintiff conceded that only specific jurisdiction was at issue 
in the case). 
 377 Id. at 1124. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 381 Id. at 1126-27. 
 382 Id. at 1124-26. 
 383 Id. at 1126 n.7. 
 384 See supra note 155. 
 385 See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 
2003) (positing, as an alternative basis for general jurisdiction, that the nonresident 
defendant’s website was “highly interactive and very extensive” under the “sliding 
scale” test); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-
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decreed that the presence of an interactive website accessible to 
forum residents supports the exercise of general in personam 
jurisdiction.386  But such holdings ignore the appropriate parameters 
of general jurisdiction. 
While technological change indubitably may increase the need 
for jurisdiction over nonresidents, such change, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Hanson v. Denckla,387 cannot herald “the eventual 
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts.”388  Yet this is exactly what would occur if the sine qua non of 
general jurisdiction was merely an interactive or commercial website.  
Today, such interactive and commercial websites are common.  As a 
result, contorting the Zippo framework to apply to general jurisdiction 
would render countless businesses around the globe subject to the 
 
97 (10th Cir. 1999) (employing sliding-scale categories in evaluating whether website 
supported general jurisdiction, but concluding that website was merely a passive 
informational site not establishing amenability); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 
333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Zippo framework, but holding that the 
nonresident defendant’s website was passive and therefore did not support general 
jurisdiction); Mieckowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 787-88 (E.D. Tex. 1998) 
(holding nonresident manufacturer of bunk bed, which was purchased and sold by 
its original owner in another state and subsequently asphyxiated a child in Texas, 
subject to Texas’s general jurisdiction based on its somewhat interactive website and 
forum sales); Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370, 374-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(employing sliding-scale categories to conclude that nonresident defendant’s website 
was insufficient to support general jurisdiction); Townsend v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d 
913, 922 (Tex. App. 2002) (applying three category sliding scale to hold passive 
website containing only contact and product information insufficient to support 
general jurisdiction in Texas); Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 
707, 718, 724-25 (Tex. App. 2000) (concluding website allowing Texas residents to 
submit comments and questions to representatives of German corporation was 
interactive and therefore a factor to consider in determining whether general 
jurisdiction existed in Texas for accident occurring in Texas to Texas resident but 
involving an automobile originally sold in Germany and not intended for the United 
States market); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 772-73 (Tex. App. 
1999) (using three category sliding scale to find defendant’s website “somewhat 
interactive” because it allowed users to input data to locate the nearest sales 
representative and holding that, although website alone was not sufficient for 
jurisdiction, the combination of the defendant’s ability to solicit sales through its 
subsidiaries, its contacts related to the litigation, and its website were enough), 
disapproved on other grounds, BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 
794 n.1 (Tex. 2002). 
 386 See, e.g., Mieckowski, 997 F. Supp. at 787-88 (concluding general jurisdiction 
appropriate in part because of defendant’s somewhat interactive website); Daimler-
Benz, 21 S.W.3d at 718, 724-25 (concluding interactive website was a factor to 
consider in determining whether general jurisdiction existed in Texas); Jones, 995 
S.W.2d at 772-73 (finding defendant’s website “somewhat interactive” and therefore 
a factor supporting general jurisdiction). 
 387 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 388 Id. at 251. 
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general jurisdiction of every state in the United States.389  But merely 
because a website is interactive and could be accessed by forum 
residents does not mean that the nonresident has engaged in the 
requisite continuous and substantial forum activities necessary for 
general jurisdiction.390 
 Accordingly, the better reasoned opinions focus not on the 
characteristics of the website, but rather on the nature of the 
transactions between the nonresident defendant and the residents of 
the forum state.391  The mere fact that a defendant maintains a 
website, even one that can be used for commercial activities with 
forum residents, should be insufficient for general, as opposed to 
specific, jurisdiction.392  Instead, the general jurisdictional query 
 
 389 Cf. GTE News Media Servs. Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (recognizing that predicating jurisdiction on the accessibility of a website 
in the forum would allow any forum in the country to exercise personal jurisdiction 
in Internet-related cases). 
 390 Cf. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding Zippo sliding 
scale is “not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated 
contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite 
substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general 
jurisdiction”). 
 391 See, e.g., Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (holding Columbia’s website providing the 
opportunity to subscribe to the Columbia Journalism Review and submit applications 
for admission to the University was not “substantial” activity in Texas as required 
under Supreme Court precedent for general jurisdiction when less than twenty 
Texas residents subscribed each year); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 
F.3d 506, 511-13 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding district court erred in dismissing 
action for lack of minimum contacts without providing plaintiff an opportunity to 
conduct discovery regarding whether dispute-blind jurisdiction existed based on the 
frequency and volume of the defendant’s transactions with forum residents through 
its website because the advent of the Internet did not eviscerate traditional 
jurisdiction principles); GTE News Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1350 (articulating that the 
Internet should not “vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court 
jurisdiction”); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (D. Md. 
2002) (holding “active” website did not suffice to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction 
when the nonresident defendant had engaged in only forty-six transactions with 
forum residents because such activities were “not enough to establish general 
jurisdiction, no matter what medium was used to conduct the transactions”); Dagesse 
v. Plant Hotel, 113 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D.N.H. 2000) (explaining that a “proper 
analysis of the jurisdictional effects of an internet web site must focus on whether the 
defendant has actually and deliberately used its web site to conduct commercial 
transactions or other activities with residents of the forum”). 
 392 See, e.g., Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (concluding Zippo scale was helpful in specific 
jurisdiction cases but not general jurisdiction cases); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 
874 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that, while specific jurisdiction was appropriate, general 
jurisdiction did not exist in Ohio over Washington defendants registering Internet 
domain names in part because “maintain[ing] a website that is accessible to anyone 
over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction”); ALS Scan, Inc. v. 
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting Zippo 
framework for specific jurisdiction, but concluding that even “numerous and 
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should revolve around the traditional criteria of the qualitative and 
quantitative nature of the actual forum activities conducted by the 
defendant.  Even the Zippo court presumably would agree, as its 
sliding scale was intended to be “consistent with well developed 
personal jurisdiction principles,”393 rather than eviscerating the axiom 
that the defendant’s amenability to general jurisdiction depends on 
“substantial” forum activities.394 
The accessibility of an interactive website, then, should have 
approximately the same jurisdictional significance as the 
appointment of a statutory agent—neither is of the requisite 
substantial nature, standing alone, for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction under the International Shoe model.  Instead, the actual 
course of conduct of business in the forum by the nonresident 
corporation is the jurisdictional linchpin.  But the remaining 
dilemma is how to gauge whether such activities are substantial, 
continuous, and systematic enough to justify dispute-blind 
jurisdiction. 
B. A Suggested Three-Pronged Approach 
As discussed previously, International Shoe premised general 
jurisdiction on a defendant’s “continuous” forum activities adjudged 
“so substantial and of such a nature” that its amenability on causes of 
action unrelated to such activities was justified.395  As worded, this 
conception appeared to imply two requirements to satisfy the 
requisite connection for due process—that the defendant’s forum 
activities must be both of a “substantial nature” and “continuous.” 
Helicopteros thereafter confirmed this dual nature of the general 
jurisdiction minimum contacts query.  Helicol’s purchases and 
related trips, while certainly continuous and ongoing, were 
nevertheless deemed an insufficient jurisdictional predicate, 
exhibiting that the nature of the defendant’s forum activities must be 
substantial as well.396  Conversely, Helicol’s contract-negotiating 
session in Houston was arguably qualitatively substantial,397 but the 
Court dismissed its import to the jurisdictional calculus because it 
 
repeated electronic connections with persons” in the forum through an Internet 
website “do not add up to the quality of contacts necessary for a State to have 
jurisdiction over the person for all purposes”). 
 393 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
 394 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
 395 Id. 
 396 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984). 
 397 Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985). 
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could not quantitatively “be described or regarded as a contact of a 
‘continuous and systematic’ nature.”398  Thus, both the qualitative and 
the quantitative sufficiency of the defendant’s forum activities must 
be scrutinized. 
Unfortunately, however, as illustrated in the preceding doctrinal 
analysis, the lower courts often do not properly appraise both 
substantiality and continuity, instead basing jurisdiction on the 
existence of only one of the necessary constituents.399  To ameliorate 
this omission, then, the minimum contacts analysis for general 
jurisdiction should consist of two interrelated components—first, a 
qualitative evaluation of the substantiality of the nature of 
defendant’s forum activities, and, second, a quantitative analysis of 
the continuity and regularity of such activities.  Finally, if the 
necessary contacts exist, then additional factors must be considered 
to insure that the exercise of jurisdiction is both fair and reasonable. 
1. Substantiality and the Defining Activities of a 
Commercial Domiciliary 
Although several courts have recognized the need for 
incorporating a substantiality component in the minimum contacts 
analysis for general jurisdiction, the challenge is discerning those 
activities of a nonresident defendant that satisfy the requirement.400  
The Supreme Court’s decrees establish that a temporary principal 
place of business is sufficient,401 while purchases and related trips in 
the forum are not of the requisite substantial nature.402  Earlier 
decisions of the Court add that a defendant’s advertising and 
solicitation efforts from an in-state office do not suffice,403 yet 
jurisdiction may be predicated on the actual conduct of business in 
the forum from such a locale.404  Similarly, according to some modern 
opinions, merely doing business with the state’s residents is not 
enough, but a defendant conducting business in the state through 
negotiating, performing, or executing transactions there may be 
 
 398 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. 
 399 See supra Parts III & IV.A. 
 400 See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 187 (iterating that the 
lower courts requiring “substantial” contacts for general jurisdiction “rarely attempt 
to develop the content of this ‘substantiality’ requirement”). 
 401 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952). 
 402 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. 
 403 See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918); 
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907). 
 404 See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 109 (1898). 
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subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction.405  The enigma, of course, is the 
underlying framework justifying these disparate holdings. 
The solution proposed by this Article is that the substantiality 
query compares the nonresident defendant’s forum activities to the 
in-state activities of an entity domiciled or based in the forum.  Under 
this comparison, the nature of the defendant’s forum operations 
should indicate activities at least analogous to the types of in-state 
activities that define a commercial domiciliary. 
This proposal therefore necessitates some consideration of the 
in-state activities that characterize a commercial entity as a 
domiciliary of the forum.  While the term “domicile” typically is 
employed in reference to a natural individual’s permanent “home,” 
the law also recognizes that a business entity may have a “home base,” 
or domicile, outside the state in which it is incorporated or 
chartered.406  The Supreme Court initially acknowledged this concept 
in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,407 holding a Delaware corporation 
established a commercial domicile in West Virginia by making that 
state “the actual seat of its corporate government.”408  Lower courts 
have similarly iterated that a company may obtain a commercial 
domicile in the state of its principal place of business, that is, where it 
conducts the majority of its activities or directs and manages its 
affairs.409 
This common-law conception of commercial domicile thus 
appears to be the functional equivalent of the “principal place of 
business” standard adopted for corporate citizenship under the 
 
 405 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 406 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. i (1971) 
(explaining term “commercial domicil” is used to indicate the state in which main 
office and principal place of business of corporation is located for taxation 
purposes); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 32 (2001) (iterating that a 
corporation may obtain a “commercial domicile” in the state in which it actually 
functions and is managed).  “Commercial domicile” also has a slightly different 
meaning employed in international law and the law of war that is irrelevant for 
present purposes.  See id. 
 407 298 U.S. 193 (1936). 
 408 Id. at 211-12. 
 409 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 156 P.2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (holding 
railroad’s commercial domicile was in California when it conducted its day-to-day 
transportation operations in the state, thereby obtaining the greatest proportion of 
its corporate benefits there); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 
597 N.E.2d 1327, 1335 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992) (defining commercial domicile as the 
location of the majority of the company’s business or the nerve center of the 
business); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. 1967) 
(explaining commercial domicile of a corporation is its principal place of business or 
the locale from which corporate activities are managed and directed); see also supra 
note 406. 
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diversity statute410 and the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.411  In applying this 
statutory standard, courts typically focus on one or more of the 
following: (1) the locale of the company’s “nerve center” or source of 
power, direction, control, or decision-making; (2) the situs of a 
substantial portion of its production, service, or other business 
activities; or (3) the totality of all the corporation’s activities, 
including the location of its nerve center, production facilities, 
administrative offices, and business operations.412  These criteria 
illustrate a company must at least be supervising the conduct of its 
business, producing its goods and services, or selling its goods or 
services in the state to have any possibility of being considered a 
locally based business—if it is not performing any of these activities in 
the state, its domicile will be in another state in which it does conduct 
such activities. 
The proposed substantiality query compares these activities 
characterizing a business domiciled in the state to the nonresident 
defendant’s forum activities.  If the nonresident defendant is 
directing its business operations from the state, producing its goods 
or services in the state, or selling such goods or services through in-
state business transactions, it is conducting activities analogous to 
those that may demarcate a local business.  While a local business is 
ultimately considered “local” because it conducts relatively more of 
such activities in the forum than anywhere else, the substantiality 
prong of general in personam jurisdiction is not concerned with the 
quantity of the defendant’s forum activities but rather their 
qualitative nature. 
The quality of defendant’s forum activities must be, in the words 
of International Shoe, “of such a nature as to justify suit” in the absence 
of any nexus between the litigation and the forum.413  Shoe’s “of such a 
nature” standard appears to contemplate activities of a particular 
type, which the Court subsequently confirmed by holding that this 
standard is satisfied when the defendant operates a “limited . . . part 
 
 410 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002).  Section 1332(c) provides that a “corporation shall be 
deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the 
State where it has its principal place of business . . . .”  Id. 
 411 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) (1898).  The diversity statute borrowed the term 
“principal place of business” from this provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  See S. 
REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5-6, 31 (1958)), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102-03, 
3133. 
 412 See, e.g., Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 914-15 (10th Cir. 
1993); Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162 (6th Cir. 1993); J.A. Olson Co. v. 
City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 407-10 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 413 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
  
890 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:807 
of its general business” in the state.414  Thus, the defendant’s forum 
activities must be of a special type—those types of activities that are 
part of its “general business” and therefore could define the 
defendant as a domiciliary.  The nonresident accordingly does not 
actually have to have its principal place of business or commercial 
domicile in the forum; instead, the nonresident must merely conduct 
a portion of its general business operations in the state of a 
sufficiently substantial nature, which occurs when the nonresident 
conducts forum activities analogous to those defining or 
characterizing a local business. 
This proposed standard corresponds with the Supreme Court’s 
prior jurisdictional holdings.  In Helicopteros, for instance, Helicol’s 
continuous forum contacts included the purchase of helicopters and 
training for its pilots from a Texas corporation to support its business 
of providing helicopter transportation in South America.415  Helicol’s 
forum activities were thus not analogous to the in-state direction of 
operations or provision of services that are the hallmark of a local 
company.  This is evident as Helicol’s purchasing and training 
activities could not, irrespective of quantitative prodigiousness, 
establish a Texas domicile when Helicol performed those activities 
characterizing a local business—executing, performing, and 
supervising its helicopter service contracts—outside the forum, in 
South America.416  A similar rationale explicates the Supreme Court’s 
pre-International Shoe holdings that forum solicitation and advertising 
without accompanying in-state transactions are insufficient for 
 
 414 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952); see also 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). 
 415 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409, 417-18. 
 416 See id.  While courts have on rare occasions opined in dicta that purchases 
might be a relevant consideration in determining the principal place of business of a 
corporation, see J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 1987), 
even those cases discussing this possibility have either ignored or downplayed the 
importance of corporate purchases in their analyses.  See, e.g., id. (omitting any 
discussion of purchases in its analysis); Mosser v. Crucible Steel Co. of Am., 173 F. 
Supp. 953, 955-56 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (directing parties to provide evidence as to where 
corporation made its purchases, but deeming failure of corporation to provide an 
answer to this query immaterial when corporation conducted its primary production 
and supervisory activities in Pennsylvania).  While perhaps purchases could arguably 
tip the balance in determining a corporation’s principal place of business if its 
production, supervisory, and sales activities were otherwise equivalent in two or more 
states, it is inconceivable that a corporation could ever establish a principal place of 
business in a state solely through its purchases there when it conducts all its other 
operations in another state.  Purchases are thus not an activity that can be said to 
define or characterize a commercial domiciliary, unless perhaps the entity’s sole 
business operations are providing purchasing services to other companies. 
  
2004 GENERAL JURISDICTION 891 
general jurisdiction.417  No matter how much advertising is done in a 
forum, the corporation is not acting comparably to a local business if 
its production, sales, and supervisory activities are occurring outside 
the state. 
Conversely, the corporate office in Perkins, from which the 
defendant was conducting all of its business operations during the 
war, was temporarily the defendant’s principal place of business.418  
Thus, the defendant’s forum activities were closely analogous to the 
in-state activities of a commercial domiciliary as its “nerve center” was 
at least briefly located in the forum.  But less substantial activities 
than a temporary principal place of business also support dispute-
blind jurisdiction.  For example, a nonresident defendant regularly 
performing business with forum residents from a physical location in 
the state is conducting the same types of activities that may 
characterize a local business, as one basis for commercial domicile is 
engaging in a high proportion of such business transactions in the 
state.  The mere fact that the in-state activities may be somewhat 
trivial in comparison to the defendant’s world-wide business is 
immaterial for purposes of the general jurisdiction substantiality 
query—what is significant is that the defendant engages in an in-state 
business activity (such as selling its goods or services to forum 
residents) that may define a purely local business.  Hence, as the 
Supreme Court’s pre-International Shoe decisions held, a nonresident 
with a sales office repeatedly conducting in-state transactions with 
forum residents is amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction.419 
The proposed comparison to the activities of a commercial 
domiciliary does not mandate that the maintenance of a forum 
business location is required for dispute-blind jurisdiction.  A 
nonresident can perform the defining activities of a local business 
even without having any of its agents permanently ensconced in the 
forum.  For example, Alderson v. Southern Co. appropriately held that 
an Indiana power company with its sole plant in Indiana was 
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Illinois because it sold all of 
its product to an Illinois corporation for use by Illinois residents 
under a contract governed by Illinois law.420  The activities the 
defendant conducted in Illinois—negotiating, executing, and 
performing contracts selling product there on a continuous basis—
 
 417 See People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918). 
 418 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-48. 
 419 Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898); see also Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1917). 
 420 747 N.E.2d 926, 940-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
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are potential predicates for commercial domicile. 
On the other hand, merely because a corporation’s product is 
eventually purchased in the state does not establish that the 
corporation is engaging in activities similar to those of a commercial 
domiciliary.  A local business typically conducts negotiations for its 
revenue-generating activities in the forum or at least makes strategic 
decisions regarding such negotiations from the forum.  Bearry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp. accordingly reached the correct result in denying 
dispute-blind jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation selling 
millions of dollars of products to the forum when such sales were 
negotiated, executed, and performed outside the forum.421  In such a 
case, the nonresident is not conducting the activities in the forum 
that a commercial domiciliary would conduct; instead, it is 
performing the typical activities of a local business outside the state. 
 This approach thus appears to provide the courts with an 
analytical model that comports with the holdings of the Supreme 
Court and numerous lower federal and state courts.422  While the 
 
 421 818 F.2d 370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 422 See supra notes 415-21 and accompanying text.  Other examples would lead to 
similar results.  For instance, the proposal explains the insubstantiality, standing 
alone, of such potential forum contacts as registering to do business in the state or 
maintaining an interactive website.  See supra Parts IV.A.1 & 4.  Registering to do 
business in the forum is not an activity that would define a local business.  Likewise, 
merely maintaining an interactive website that can be accessed in the state is not by 
itself an activity defining a forum domiciliary—only if the entity is conducting 
business transactions in the state through the website could it possibly be said that its 
activities are comparable to a local company. 
The proposal would also explain the disparate holdings of the federal circuits on 
the propriety of dispute-blind jurisdiction predicated on an office within the forum.  
The Fifth Circuit held in Submersible Systems, Inc. v. Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V., 249 
F.3d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2001), that a three-person forum office to oversee the 
construction of a marine drilling rig the nonresident corporation was purchasing was 
insufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction, whereas the Second Circuit 
concluded in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2000), that 
a similarly sized investor relations office was enough for general jurisdiction.  Both 
these holdings appear correct under this Article’s model.  Activities related to the 
purchase of the rig were not the type of activities that could establish a corporate 
domicile for the nonresident defendant in Submersible Systems, although using an 
investor relations office to cultivate capital markets was at least the type of activity 
that could establish the domicile of the parent holding corporations in Wiwa.  See also 
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
forum manufacturing plant supported the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction, a 
correct result under this Article’s proposal because the operation of a manufacturing 
plant is the type of activity that may establish a corporation’s domicile). 
Finally, the proposal is also in accord with the decisions discussed earlier 
emphasizing the qualitative aspects of a nonresident defendant’s revenue-generating 
activities in the forum.  See supra Part IV.A.3.  To illustrate, the Second Circuit 
appears to have reached the correct result in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
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proposal would not furnish a clear solution to every query, this 
actually accords with the Supreme Court’s admonition that 
jurisdictional determinations will in some instances be “grey” rather 
than “black and white.”423  Yet the proposed comparison does provide 
a suitable benchmark, consonant with the Supreme Court’s holdings 
and intimations, for differentiating among these “shades of grey,” as 
well as a cogent methodology to insure that the courts are asking the 
right questions.424 
If employing this methodology reveals that the defendant did 
not conduct any activities of a qualitatively substantial nature in the 
forum, the assertion of dispute-blind jurisdiction is improper.  On the 
other hand, if the defendant did engage in activities of the requisite 
substantial nature, such activities must also be quantitatively 
“continuous and systematic”425 to insure that the nonresident 
defendant is truly acting comparably to a local business. 
2. Continuous and Systematic Forum Activities 
The terminology “continuous and systematic” indicates that the 
defendant’s forum activities must be constant and occurring at 
regular intervals.  But this apparently facile formulation masks two 
uncertitudes.  First, under what circumstances are a defendant’s 
activities sufficiently regular and constant to justify the assertion of 
dispute-blind jurisdiction?  And, second, over what period of time 
should the defendant’s forum activities be evaluated? 
In many cases, of course, resolving the first query will not be 
 
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 570-73 (2d Cir. 1996), by holding that the minimum 
contacts necessary for general jurisdiction were established by the nonresident 
defendant’s $4 million in sales presumably executed in the forum, its relationships 
with its forum dealers, and its advertisements targeted to the forum.  Extensive sales 
transactions executed within the state through forum advertisements and a forum 
distribution network are the types of activities that could establish a corporate 
domicile. 
 423 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). 
 424 Perhaps it could be argued that this proposal is merely a refinement of the pre-
existing central business activities model for general jurisdiction.  See supra Part III.D.  
Certainly there are similarities between the two approaches—both attempt to 
evaluate substantiality through a measure of the importance of the nonresident’s in-
state activity.  Nevertheless, the proposed comparison to the defining in-state 
activities of a local business differs in two material respects that minify the infirmities 
of the central business activities template.  First, this proposal offers a more concrete 
standard for substantiality which is not as susceptible to the vagaries plaguing judicial 
interpretations of those activities that are “central” to a business.  See id.  Second, the 
comparison to a local business provides an underlying rationale for general 
jurisdiction that is absent from the central business model.  Compare supra Part III.D, 
with infra Part V.B. 
 425 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952). 
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problematic.  A nonresident defendant operating a forum place of 
business on a daily basis or making multiple daily sales in the forum is 
engaging in the requisite constant, regularly occurring forum 
activities.426  Conversely, solitary or sporadic forum activities by the 
defendant are insufficient to support dispute-blind jurisdiction, 
which explains Helicol’s non-amenability despite its arguably 
qualitatively substantial forum contract negotiation session.  As the 
Helicopteros Court remarked, a single forum activity “cannot be 
described or regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and systematic’ 
nature.”427  Other courts have likewise held that sporadic forum 
activity occurring on an infrequent basis—even if qualitatively 
substantial—is insufficient to allow the state to exercise its general 
adjudicative authority.428 
The difficulty, however, involves those defendants conducting 
perhaps weekly, monthly, or quarterly activities in the forum.  Are in-
state activities occurring at such intervals sufficiently continuous and 
systematic?  To resolve this dilemma requires some contemplation of 
the objective of the “continuous and systematic” requirement.  In 
other words, why are “continuous and systematic” activities a 
prerequisite for the assertion of general jurisdiction? 
My suggestion is that constant, regular forum conduct 
demonstrates a quantum of activities analogous to those of at least 
 
 426 See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 427 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). 
 428 See, e.g., Covenant Bank for Sav. v. Cohen, 806 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1992) 
(holding advertising in forum newspaper on two occasions in fourteen-month period 
and sporadic servicing of loans made to forum residents were not the “regular and 
substantial” forum activities required for general jurisdiction); Curran v. Fisherman 
Marine Prods., Inc., 773 So. 2d 285, 288-89 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding nonresident 
corporation’s $150,000 in forum sales of shrimp in fourteen transactions over an 
eleven-year period was “ad hoc and sporadic” rather than “continuous and 
systematic” as required to support general jurisdiction); Bosarge v. Master Mike, Inc., 
669 So. 2d 510, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding similarly that nonresident 
defendant’s six contacts over a four-year period were “ad hoc and sporadic”); Arcon, 
Inc. v. Malone, No. 12-01-00214-CV, 2002 WL 1428497 (Tex. App. June 28, 2002) 
(holding nonresident corporation’s six forum construction projects performed 
irregularly over a three-year period were not continuous and systematic as required 
for general jurisdiction).  This principle may also be the explanation supporting the 
apparently well-settled rule that a nonresident defendant’s participation at a forum 
trade show is insufficient for general jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Doering v. Copper 
Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. 
Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1995); Michel v. Rocket Eng’g Corp., 45 S.W.3d 
658, 673 (Tex. App. 2001).  While the courts have not yet articulated the rationale 
for this maxim, one possibility is that such forum trade shows are usually only held 
once or perhaps twice a year rather than the much more frequent contact typically 
required for activities to be described as “continuous and systematic.” 
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small local businesses.  Thus, not only must the nonresident 
defendant perform forum activities qualitatively comparable to the 
activities defining a commercial domiciliary, it must also conduct 
these activities with a frequency that approximates at least some 
forum businesses as well.  It is not necessary that the defendant 
conducts forum activities to such an extent that the state becomes its 
domicile or principal place of business; instead, the comparison is 
whether the defendant’s in-state activities are quantitatively 
equivalent to at least some local businesses. 
A forum-based enterprise typically would not only engage in one 
or two qualitatively substantial activities in the forum each year;429 
thus, such sporadic activities are insufficient to complete the analogy 
to the operation of a local company.  On the other hand, a 
nonresident defendant operating a forum store on a daily basis or 
making multiple sales on a daily basis is acting similarly to a number 
of undisputedly local businesses with respect to both the type and 
quantum of activities conducted. 
Because the linchpin to this Article’s proposed minimum 
contacts analysis is whether the nonresident defendant’s forum 
actions are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of a 
forum-based enterprise, the requisite frequency of forum activity to 
satisfy the “continuous and systematic” prong depends on the type of 
activities the defendant is conducting in the forum and a comparison 
to local businesses performing similar activities.  This technique may 
be illustrated by analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ritenhouse v. 
Mabry.430  In Ritenhouse, the court held that a medical professional 
corporation conducting business every fifth business day from a 
forum clinic performed the necessary “systematic and continuous” 
activities for general jurisdiction.431  The nonresident defendant’s 
forum activities there consisted of operating an in-state medical 
clinic, which certainly is qualitatively comparable to the activities of 
many local medical centers.  But is the weekly operation of a clinic 
sufficiently continuous and systematic?  Under this Article’s 
approach, the relevant comparison is whether a local clinic might be 
open only once a week.  Although this is admittedly a close question 
because most clinics operate more frequently, it is not unheard of (at 
 
 429 There may be exceptions, however, for businesses negotiating contracts for 
large-scale projects that take months or even years to complete, such as commercial 
buildings.  See infra note 433 and accompanying text. 
 430 832 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 431 Id. at 1390.  The court found that the cause of action did not arise out of the 
professional corporation’s contacts with the forum because the patient was a referral 
at a time when the corporation did not conduct any business in the forum.  Id. 
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least in rural parts of the country) for a doctor to have a facility in a 
small community open on a weekly basis. 
Yet while Rittenhouse is thus arguably correct in the context of the 
operation and conduct of a medical clinic from a forum location on a 
weekly basis, the same result would not be appropriate for a 
nonresident defendant merely performing a single weekly forum sale 
of a standard household good.432  Under such circumstances, the 
nonresident would not be acting comparably to a local business, 
which presumably would engage in more frequent in-state 
transactions.  Of course, this will depend somewhat on the type of 
transactions the defendant is performing in the state.  Some 
businesses might perform larger-scale projects in the forum that even 
a local company would only execute on a monthly or quarterly 
basis.433 
Thus, the realities of the defendant’s activities in the forum must 
be contemplated.  Although the archetypical “continuous and 
systematic” activities would occur each business day, activities 
occurring less frequently, albeit still on a regular basis, may suffice if 
such activities are the types of activities that a forum-based enterprise 
might conduct on a comparable basis. 
This comparison also provides guidance on resolving the second 
quandary, the relevant time period for assessing whether the 
defendant’s forum contacts satisfy the “continuous and systematic” 
standard.  Perkins appears to have adopted the Supreme Court’s pre-
International Shoe jurisprudence that the ultimate resolution of the 
defendant’s amenability for unrelated causes of action hinges upon 
its forum activities at the time it is served with summons.434  
 
 432 Cf. Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1053-54 
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding nonresident defendant’s $230,000 in forum sales over a 
three-year period was not a “continuous and substantial” activity when company did 
not have daily or regular contact with the forum). 
 433 As an example, oil rig brokers might typically transact only a few sales a year.  
For a case law example employing this principle, see Michigan National Bank v. 
Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989), noting that the defendants’ 
performance of “at least one sale in Michigan each and every month” when the 
average sale exceeded $1,000.00 indicated the defendants “conducted a ‘continuous 
and systematic part of their general business’ in Michigan.”  While the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding is perhaps dubious, the case does illustrate the necessity of considering the 
realities of the nonresident defendant’s business. 
 434 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45, 448 (1952) 
(holding assertion of jurisdiction was not unfair when corporation was engaging in 
continuous and systematic business activities in Ohio at the time its president was 
served with process).  Pre-International Shoe opinions frequently iterated that the 
nonresident must be doing business within the state at the time of service of 
summons to be amenable to jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. 
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Nonetheless, a mere one-time snapshot of the defendant’s in-state 
contacts, standing alone, would not necessarily provide a basis for a 
meaningful comparison to a local business.  Thus, the nonresident’s 
activities over a period of time preceding service must also be 
considered, as the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Helicopteros 
by analyzing Helicol’s Texas activities over a seven-year period.435  
Evaluating the defendant’s activities over a period of time insures that 
its activities are truly quantitatively analogous to a business domiciled 
in the state and not merely an anomaly on a particular date. 
The lower courts specifically addressing this issue generally 
concur, positing that a period “reasonable under the circumstances” 
should be employed.436  Typically, under this standard the courts 
perpend the defendant’s contacts over the two to seven years 
preceding the filing of suit.437  While the evaluation of the defendant’s 
 
Nat’l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1923) (recognizing sole question for decision was 
whether, at the time of service of process, defendant was doing business in the state 
in such a manner as to warrant the inference it was present there); Rosenberg Bros. 
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517-18 (1923) (same); Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that 
an essential requirement for jurisdiction is that the corporation is served while it is 
present within the state).  The Supreme Court’s insistence that the defendant must 
have been engaging in the requisite forum activities before being served with process 
appears appropriate as service is the procedure by which the state asserts in personam 
jurisdiction over the nonresident.  See Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 
U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946). 
 435 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409-11 (1984). 
 436 See, e.g., Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (concluding general jurisdiction should “be assessed by evaluating 
contacts of the defendant with the forum over a reasonable number of years, up to 
the date the suit was filed”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 
560, 569-570 (2d Cir. 1996) (demonstrating through case law examples that contacts 
are commonly assessed over a reasonable period of time before the plaintiff’s filing 
of the complaint); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648 (D. Utah 
1998) (agreeing with Metropolitan Life that a period of time “reasonable under the 
circumstances” until the date of filing suit should be employed to assess compliance 
with the “continuous and systematic” standard). 
 437 See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92-93 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(considering all contacts established in the two years preceding the filing of the 
complaint); Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 570 (employing a six-year period prior to the 
filing of the lawsuit); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1198-1200 (4th Cir. 
1993) (examining defendant’s activities in the six years before suit was filed); Mich. 
Nat’l Bank, 888 F.2d at 466 (analyzing defendant’s annual sales for the two years 
preceding the lawsuit); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 372-76 (5th Cir. 
1987) (employing a five-year period); Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 
So. 2d 103, 109-11 (La. 1990) (analyzing contacts over a five-year period); Bachman 
v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (employing a three-year 
period before suit was filed).  Some courts have reasoned that a longer relationship 
with the forum may be a factor favoring the exercise of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1125 
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activities should also include the intervening period between filing of 
suit and service of process,438 this distinction probably would seldom, 
if ever, be material.439  Rather, the key is that a period of time 
predating the state’s attempt to exercise its sovereign authority over 
the nonresident defendant must be scrutinized to insure that the 
nonresident is acting comparably to a forum domiciliary.  In some 
instances, inspecting the defendant’s post-service activities to assure 
that any in-state activities that commenced shortly before service 
continued thereafter may be permissible in order to demonstrate that 
the defendant is conducting ongoing business in the state 
comparable to local companies. 440 
To summarize, if the court determines the defendant’s forum 
conduct includes those qualitatively substantial activities that may 
define a commercial domiciliary, the court should next discern 
whether such activities occurred in a comparable frequency to at least 
some local businesses over a reasonable period of time preceding the 
service of summons.  If so, the requisite minimum contacts exist for 
general jurisdiction.  But before dispute-blind adjudication is 
appropriate, the court must also cogitate whether exercising 
jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of “fair play and 
 
(9th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that defendant’s sole forum activity of grain shipments 
over a one-year period was less continuous and systematic than the seven years of 
purchases in Helicopteros); Noonan, 135 F.3d at 93 (noting that defendant’s two-year 
history of forum activities was “far less continuous than the ten years of activity” in an 
earlier precedent); Hein v. Taco Bell, Inc., 803 P.2d 329, 330 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) 
(relying on twenty-four years of forum contacts as factor supporting the exercise of 
general jurisdiction). 
 438 See supra note 434 and accompanying text.  None of the lower courts has 
proffered a rationale for preferring the date of filing over service.  See, e.g., Noonan, 
135 F.3d at 93 n.8; Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 569-70; Nichols, 991 F.2d at 1198; Haas, 
28 F. Supp. 2d at 648.  Nor is such a rationale readily apparent.  The date the lawsuit 
is filed, while important for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction and the statute of 
limitations, has little, if any, connection to the forum’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.  Instead, as the Supreme Court has 
recognized, service of process is the mechanism the state uses to assert its sovereign 
prerogative over the nonresident defendant.  See Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104; Miss. 
Pub., 326 U.S. at 444-45. 
 439 In most instances, service is accomplished shortly after the filing of the 
complaint.  Indeed, in many state courts and in the federal courts, the plaintiff’s 
action may be dismissed if service is not accomplished within sixty to 120 days after 
the filing of the complaint.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (requiring service of 
summons and complaint to be made within 120 days after filing of the complaint). 
 440 See, e.g., Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 787-88 (E.D. Pa. 
1986) (considering evidence of nonresident defendant’s extensive forum advertising 
campaign beginning six months before suit was filed but continuing for some time 
thereafter). 
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substantial justice.”441 
3. “Fair Play and Substantial Justice” Considerations 
The due process limitations on a state’s adjudicatory power 
depend in part on the “reasonableness” or “fairness” of maintaining 
the lawsuit in the forum.442  The Supreme Court has therefore 
directed that other factors besides the defendant’s forum contacts 
should be considered “to determine whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial 
justice.’”443  The relevant factors include the burden on the 
defendant, the state’s interest in adjudging the dispute, the plaintiff’s 
interest in acquiring an effective remedy, the judicial system’s interest 
in efficiency, and the interests of the states in their substantive social 
policies.444 
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,445 the Supreme Court 
relied on these factors to hold that California’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation embroiled in an 
indemnification dispute with a Taiwanese corporation in California 
state court “would be unreasonable and unfair,” regardless of the 
defendant’s forum contacts.446  But the Supreme Court did not 
specifically resolve whether these factors also apply to assertions of 
general jurisdiction rather than the specific jurisdiction that was at 
issue in Asahi and its prior decisions adopting these criteria.447 
Yet there is no cogent rationale precluding the application of 
these five fairness or reasonableness factors to dispute-blind queries.  
Indeed, the factors were derived from International Shoe’s decree that 
due process demands that a defendant have “minimum contacts” 
with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”448  
Because the term “minimum contacts” subsumes both specific and 
 
 441 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
 442 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 443 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). 
 444 Id. at 477. 
 445 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 446 Id. at 116.  The Court posited that the burden on the defendant was severe, 
while the interests of the plaintiff and the state in adjudicating the dispute in 
California were slight.  Id. at 114-15.  Additionally, the Court asserted that extreme 
caution and restraint were necessary before employing American conceptions of in 
personam jurisdiction in the international context.  Id. at 115. 
 447 See, e.g., id. at 116; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 
 448 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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general jurisdiction, the factors gauging “fair play and substantial 
justice” should consequently apply to general jurisdiction as well. 
Moreover, the need for the fairness factors is frequently more 
pronounced in general jurisdiction cases.  As an example, asserting 
dispute-blind jurisdiction over foreign national corporations often 
implicates Asahi’s admonition that “‘great care and reserve’” should 
be exercised before “‘extending our notions of personal jurisdiction 
into the international field.’”449 The international relations and 
comity concerns underlying Asahi are only heightened by applying 
the American conception of general jurisdiction, which is viewed with 
abhorance by many other nations,450 to disputes without any 
relationship to the United States.  Employing this jurisdictional basis 
to adjudicate controversies solely between two foreign nationals 
impacts the justified expectations of the parties as well as the 
“procedural and substantive policies of other nations.”451  The only 
method under the current due process jurisdictional model to 
alleviate this concern and insure a careful weighing of the procedural 
and substantive international interests at stake is through the fairness 
or reasonableness factors.452 
 
 449 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 450 See Juenger, supra note 206, at 162. 
 451 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. 
 452 Cf. id.  Certainly, additional potential techniques other than the Due Process 
Clause exist to limit the exercise of general jurisdiction against foreign nationals, 
such as a treaty or a jurisdictional statute.  See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 
supra note 5, at 212-13.  But treaty prospects appear bleak, at least for the immediate 
future, since negotiations regarding the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments reached an impasse.  
Additionally, in the absence of a treaty, it is highly unlikely that Congress will enact a 
jurisdictional statute.  While yet another possibility is that a more stringent minimum 
contacts standard for the amenability of foreign national corporations might have 
been developed, this also has not occurred. 
The Supreme Court has never intimated that a different contacts analysis applies 
to foreign nationals.  Neither Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 416-18 (1984), nor Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-
48 (1952), emphasized the foreign citizenship of the defendants.  In fact, Helicopteros 
primarily relied for its substantiality holding on an earlier precedent involving a 
domestic corporation, indicating that the rigor of the minimum contacts analysis 
does not depend on the defendant’s nationality.  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18 
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).  While the 
Solicitor General did file an amicus brief in Helicopteros urging that predicating 
jurisdiction on purchases would harm United States exports, any effect this may have 
had on the Court is not reflected in the written opinion, other than perhaps serving 
as an explanation for the Court’s dubious conclusion that specific jurisdiction had 
been conceded.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
The decisions of the lower federal and state courts have likewise not developed a 
different minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction over foreign nationals.  
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Thus, the Asahi factors should be incorporated into the general 
jurisdiction calculus.  Their underlying concerns are often implicated 
in dispute-blind queries.  Moreover, the factors’ genesis, in the 
International Shoe tenet of “minimum contacts” consonant with 
notions of “‘fair play and substantial justice,’” implies that the 
considerations apply to any minimum contacts analysis, regardless of 
the relationship of the contacts to the dispute.453  Finally, scrutinizing 
these factors in resolving general jurisdiction queries is consistent 
with the weight of judicial doctrine.454  Indeed, several decisions have 
specifically held that the exercise of jurisdiction under the particular 
 
While one case, Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1998), implied that 
“courts must exercise even greater care [in evaluating the defendant’s contacts] 
before exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals,” the court did not 
actually provide any details on how to exercise the requisite “greater care,” instead 
merely relying on a precedential comparison to general jurisdiction opinions 
involving domestic corporations.  Id. at 93.  Thus, there is no direct support in the 
case law for a more stringent minimum contacts analysis for foreign national 
corporations. 
Moreover, in today’s global, interconnected economy, predicating the minimum 
contacts analysis on the defendant’s national citizenship is fallacious.  Because of the 
deficiencies of specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is sometimes necessary to 
assure American plaintiffs an accessible forum against foreign businesses.  See 
Borchers, supra note 4, at 132, 139; Juenger, supra note 206, at 159-60.  Often this is 
not burdensome for the foreign corporation, which indeed may have been formed, 
owned, and controlled by United States citizens.  See, e.g., Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.  
Thus, rather than creating an arbitrary distinction in the minimum contacts analysis 
based on the citizenship of the defendant, the preferable course is to employ the 
reasonableness factors to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases falling 
under the Asahi paradigm—where the plaintiff’s and forum’s interests in 
adjudicating the dispute are slight while the burden on the defendant is severe. 
 453 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 454 See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (positing that, even assuming the requisite minimum 
contacts for general jurisdiction were present, the exercise of jurisdiction would still 
be unreasonable under the fairness factors); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco 
Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding exercise of general jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable under five-factor test from Asahi); Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. 
Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “Asahi’s 
interpretation of International Shoe as entailing separate contacts and reasonableness 
inquiries is not limited to the specific jurisdiction context”); Dalton v. R & W Marine, 
Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over the two nonresident defendants would violate the Asahi factors); 
Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing 
minimum contacts and five “fair play and substantial justice” criteria as the two stages 
to the judicial inquiry into general jurisdiction); Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, 
Inc., 854 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, 
Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 108-09 (La. 1991) (listing cases using fairness factors in general 
jurisdiction query).  But see Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Behagen v. 
Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 744 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984). 
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circumstances of that case would be unreasonable, although 
sufficient contacts existed for general jurisdiction.455 
In sum, the proposed model for dispute-blind jurisdiction 
encompasses three queries.  First, whether the nonresident 
defendant’s activities occurring in the state are of a substantial 
nature, judged by comparing the in-state conduct of the defendant to 
the defining activities of a commercial domiciliary.  Second, whether 
these substantial forum activities are also “continuous and 
systematic,” that is, whether the activities occur in a comparable 
frequency to some local companies engaging in similar activities.  
Third, assuming the requisite minimum contacts exist, whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial 
justice,” appraised by cogitating the burden on the defendant, the 
plaintiff’s interest in the forum, the forum’s interest in adjudging the 
controversy, the judicial system’s interest in efficiency, and the 
procedural and substantive policies of other states and nations. 
Employing this paradigm would provide a measure of decisional 
coherence to dispute-blind jurisprudence while remaining faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncements and intimations.  The only 
remaining issue is what, if anything, does this model display 
regarding the foundational rationale for the constitutional 
limitations on the assertion of general jurisdiction. 
V. THE QUIXOTIC PURSUIT OF A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Commentators have debated for decades now the underlying 
theoretical foundation for the constitutional limitations on a state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.  Some 
have urged that the limitations emanate primarily from notions of 
state sovereignty,456 while others posit that conceptions of fairness are 
 
 455 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 573-74 (holding exercise of general 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable under five-factor test from Asahi even though 
minimum contacts test for general jurisdiction satisfied); James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 
965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding the exercise of general 
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice” under five-
factor test after concluding sufficient contacts existed for general jurisdiction); cf. 
Amoco Egypt Oil, 1 F.3d at 851-52 (declining to resolve minimum contacts query 
because exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable); Dalton, 897 F.2d at 1363 
(averring that the exercise of general jurisdiction would violate the Asahi factors even 
if the requisite minimum contacts existed); Juarez v. United Parcel Serv. de Mex. S.A. 
de C.V., 933 S.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Tex. App. 1996) (declining to decide minimum 
contacts issue for general jurisdiction because the assertion of jurisdiction would 
violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). 
 456 See, e.g., Cebik, supra note 4, at 23-25 (suggesting jurisdictional limitations 
dependent upon sovereign interests of the states); Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra 
note 4, at 706, 722 (avowing that sovereignty implications are incorporated in 
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the underlying value.457  Yet critics protest that the very notion of any 
due process jurisdictional limitations is aberrant.  Some objectors 
contend the source of constitutional limitations should be the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,458 while various others avow the premise of 
any constitutional limitations on a state’s adjudicatory power is 
indefensible, unless perhaps the forum is so inconvenient that it 
impairs the defendant’s ability to mount a defense.459 
This Article does not attempt to resolve all these issues.  Instead, 
the objective is exploring the inferences regarding the theoretical 
foundation for general jurisdiction that may be appropriate in light 
of the preceding doctrinal analysis and three-pronged proposed 
model.  To accomplish this goal, the Article first analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s guidance on the source of the due process 
constitutional limitations on adjudicatory jurisdiction before 
proffering its suppositions. 
A. A Precedential and Theoretical Evaluation of Sovereignty and 
Fairness 
The Supreme Court’s early decisions described the limitations 
 
current due process calculus because otherwise state lines would be irrelevant to 
jurisdictional power). 
 457 See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of ‘State Sovereignty’ and the Curse of 
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 735-
36 (1983) (criticizing the role of sovereignty and state interests in adjudicatory 
jurisdiction doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1133 (1981) (advocating 
a due process analysis predicated on “injustice or undue harm to the individual 
litigant” that would dismiss any role for state sovereignty or federalism in the 
jurisdictional calculus). 
 458 See, e.g., Roger Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1989) (proffering a jurisdictional framework under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause because “[e]ven if the Fourteenth Amendment had 
never been adopted, states would be subject to significant constitutional restraints in 
exercising jurisdiction over noncitizens”). 
 459 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 94-
100 (1990) [hereinafter Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction ] 
(averring that the Due Process Clause should not limit assertions of state court 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, unless perhaps the forum is so inconvenient that it impedes 
the defendant’s ability to proffer a defense); Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2184 
(1997) (concurring with other commentators that personal jurisdiction should not 
be a constitutional issue); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-
Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 835-37, 846 (1981) (urging 
that the only constitutional limitation on personal jurisdiction consistent with the 
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is the requirement that the 
defendant have an opportunity to be heard). 
  
904 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:807 
on adjudicatory jurisdiction as stemming from the mutually exclusive 
sovereignty of the co-equal states in our federal system of 
government.460  In Pennoyer v. Neff,461 for instance, the Court, in 
adopting a rule equating a court’s jurisdictional reach with the 
physical presence of a person or properly attached property within 
the forum, relied on the supposedly well-established public law 
principles that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory” and the 
corollary proposition “that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction 
and authority over persons or property without its territory.”462  The 
Court explained that the extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction over 
a person or property by a state “would be deemed an encroachment 
upon the independence of the State in which the persons are 
domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as 
usurpation.”463 
International Shoe later shifted the emphasis from the mutually 
exclusive sovereignty of the states to fundamental conceptions 
regarding fairness and the defendant’s relationship to the sovereign 
power of the state.  In the words of International Shoe, the state’s 
exercise of jurisdiction, without the required minimum contacts, 
offends “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”464  
Minimum contacts exist if it is reasonable, “in the context of our 
federal system of government,” to compel the defendant to 
adjudicate in the forum.465  The Due Process Clause therefore 
precludes a state from exercising jurisdiction over a “defendant with 
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”466  These passages 
illustrate that both fairness and sovereign power supported the 
International Shoe standard. 
But since International Shoe, the Court has sometimes emphasized 
fairness and sometimes emphasized the sovereign power of the states 
as the basis for due process limits on jurisdiction.  Perkins, for 
instance, concluded that the sine qua non of the jurisdictional query 
 
 460 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197-204 (1977) (recognizing that its early 
decisions, which defined the jurisdiction of the state courts in accordance with the 
“principles of public law” regulating “the relationships among independent nations,” 
rested upon “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States”). 
 461 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 462 Id. at 722.  Pennoyer might have erred in its interpretation of these supposed 
international norms, however.  See Juenger, supra note 206, at 146-47. 
 463 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
 464 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 465 Id. at 317. 
 466 Id. at 319. 
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is “general fairness to the corporation.”467  The Court in Shaffer v. 
Heitner468 similarly described the International Shoe standard as “fairness 
and substantial justice.”469  Yet other cases emphasized a sovereignty 
rationale.  Hanson v. Denckla470 explained that personal jurisdiction 
limitations involve more than just the defendant’s litigation burdens 
but instead are “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power 
of the respective States.”471 
In its most comprehensive analysis of the issue to date, the Court 
in World-Wide Volkswagen articulated that the minimum contacts 
analysis served two functions: (1) protecting the defendant from 
undue litigation burdens, and (2) preventing state courts from 
overstepping their authority vis-à-vis other “co-equal sovereigns in the 
federal system.”472  While recognizing that the burdens of litigation in 
another state had substantially decreased as a result of advances in 
transportation and communication, the Court avowed that the 
geographical boundaries of the states continued to have jurisdictional 
significance due to “the principles of interstate federalism embodied 
in the Constitution.”473  Thus, even if the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the forum was reasonable, “the Due Process Clause, acting as an 
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the 
State of its power to render a valid judgment.”474 
The Court’s next decision, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites,475 created some uncertainty.  The Court there 
espoused that the personal jurisdiction requirement “represents a 
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a 
matter of individual liberty.”476  While recognizing its earlier 
pronouncements also discussed personal jurisdiction in terms of 
federalism and sovereignty, the Court reasoned that such sovereign 
 
 467 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). 
 468 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 469 Id. at 206; id. at 211 (referring to the “fairness standard of International Shoe”); 
see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (espousing that the essence of 
the due process calculus is whether, based on the defendant’s activity in the forum, 
“it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him to conduct his defense in that State”). 
 470 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 471 Id. at 250-51 (noting that the “restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts . . . are more than a guaranty of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation.  They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective States”). 
 472 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). 
 473 Id. at 293. 
 474 Id. at 294. 
 475 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
 476 Id. at 702. 
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power restrictions are not the result of a constitutional federalism 
principle but instead are “ultimately a function of the individual 
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,” which is the 
sole source of the limitations on a state’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.477 
Nevertheless, the state’s sovereign interests in the due process 
jurisdictional calculus should not be disregarded as a result of 
Bauxites.  The mere fact that the Due Process Clause is the source for 
the limitations on state judicial power does not support abolishing 
considerations of the forum state’s sovereign power and interests.  
Instead, an aspect of the liberty interest the Due Process Clause 
protects is the freedom from assertions of judicial power by a 
sovereign with whom the defendant has no “contacts, ties, or 
relations.”478  Thus, as the Court explained two years after Bauxites, 
part of the “fairness” of compelling a defendant to appear is whether 
the defendant’s forum contacts give rise to a legitimate state 
sovereign interest.479 
Some commentators nonetheless object that the Due Process 
Clause’s explicit guarantee of individual rights—rather than state 
interests—is incompatible with a jurisdictional doctrine predicated 
partially on sovereignty.480  Admittedly, from a textual and original 
intent perspective, this argument has some initial appeal.  The Due 
Process Clause provides that the states shall not deprive “any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”481  Textually, 
this phraseology appears to countenance a process-based individual 
right, especially considering the clause’s emphasis on precluding 
government deprivations of defined individual interests without the 
requisite “due process.”  In addition, a historical lens reveals no 
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended 
that an individual’s due process rights would encompass a right to be 
free from state jurisdictional assertions unless minimum forum 
 
 477 Id. at 702-03 n.10. 
 478 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 479 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-76 (1984). 
 480 See, e.g., Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 459, at 
92-93 (maintaining “the due process clause is a guarantor of personal rights,” which 
has absolutely no relationship to a conception of the clause “as an ‘arbitrator’ 
between jealous states” or “‘battling’ sovereigns”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of a 
Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1299 (1983) 
(contending that “[s]overeignty does not have a place in the original design of the 
due process clause”); Redish, supra note 457, at 1120 (recognizing that the Due 
Process Clause references “the rights of ‘persons,’ not states”). 
 481 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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contacts existed.482 
On the other hand, however, the doctrinal conception of “due 
process of law” has long since been unhinged from potential narrow 
interpretations emanating from the literal text or intent of the 
provision.  Shortly after the enactment of the Due Process Clause, the 
Court indicated that due process could be violated by state regulation 
unreasonably interfering with liberty or property rights.483  Since that 
time, the Court has consistently emphasized that the linchpin of the 
due process guarantee “‘is protection of the individual against 
arbitrary action of government.’”484  In accord with this 
understanding, the Court has repeatedly employed the Due Process 
Clause over the last century to prevent all types of arbitrary state 
interferences with liberty and property rights, including proscribing 
state action that shocks the conscience,485 imposes unfair retroactive 
legislative liability,486 awards excessive civil punishments,487 arbitrarily 
applies a state’s law to a controversy,488 or interferes with recognized 
personal autonomy rights such as abortion,489 private sexual 
conduct,490 contraception,491 marriage,492 and child rearing.493  While 
 
 482 See, e.g., Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 459, at 
88-89 (noting that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment never 
referenced personal jurisdiction); Redish, supra note 457, at 1124-25 (same); 
Whitten, supra note 459, at 805-07 (same). 
 483 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1877).  Even before the Civil War, there 
are potential indications that the Court considered the phrase “due process of law” 
in the Fifth Amendment to include a substantive reasonableness component.  See, 
e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857); Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).  At least two 
commentators have urged that a substantive aspect to due process was widely 
acknowledged even earlier.  See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of 
Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due 
Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941. 
 484 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). 
 485 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). 
 486 See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (providing fifth vote to invalidate Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit 
Act of 1992 relying on due process grounds rather than takings analysis employed by 
the plurality); id. at 554-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Kennedy 
that the Due Process Clause was the “natural home” for an argument regarding 
unfair retroactive legislation, but concluding Act did not violate due process). 
 487 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 
(2003). 
 488 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985). 
 489 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa.  v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-
65 (1973). 
 490 Lawrence v. Garner, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476-82 (2003). 
 491 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). 
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these disparate holdings cannot all be supported by the literal text or 
original intent of the Due Process Clause,494 their common strand is 
their mooring in judicial conceptions of the reasonableness of the 
state’s action in relation to the private interests at stake.  Thus, 
irrespective of the ongoing (and perhaps intractable) debate 
regarding the propriety of these holdings,495 employing the Due 
Process Clause to prohibit unreasonable state assertions of 
jurisdiction comports with the Court’s use of the guarantee to 
prevent other arbitrary judicial, legislative, and executive actions.496 
Of course, recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects 
persons from arbitrary governmental conduct provides little guidance 
in determining when the government’s conduct is actually “arbitrary” 
and therefore unconstitutional.  In resolving this query, the Court 
does not merely evaluate the nature of the individual right at issue 
alone, but instead analyzes the right in relation to the strength of the 
governmental interest and the necessity of the regulation at issue.497  
Thus, in considering whether an individual’s due process rights have 
been violated, it is necessary to weigh the governmental interest 
supporting the state’s actions.  And this governmental interest 
necessarily includes state sovereignty and federalism concerns in 
certain contexts. 
As an illustration, the Court has incorporated state sovereignty 
 
 492 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 493 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 494 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-5, at 1318 
(3d ed. 1999) (recognizing that substantive due process decisions are “both textually 
and historically suspect” under the Due Process Clause). 
 495 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES        
§ 1.4, at 16-18 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing “heated scholarly and public debate” over 
the protection of unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause). 
 496 While it might be argued that the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test for 
due process limitations on adjudicatory jurisdiction is sui generis from the usual 
substantive due process analysis identifying the liberty interest at issue and evaluating 
the governmental interest in light of the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Supreme 
Court has also created distinct tests for several other liberty interests.  For instance, 
regulations interfering with a woman’s liberty interest in choosing an abortion are 
subject to an “undue burden” analysis under Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 
(2000), and executive governmental actions in an emergency situation are evaluated 
under the “shocks the conscience” test discussed in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 847 (1998).  Additional examples include the due process tests for 
exemplary damages and choice of law, discussed infra in notes 498-503 and 
accompanying text. 
 497 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 495, § 10.1, at 765-67.  Fundamental rights 
are subject to strict scrutiny requiring that the regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling governmental interest, whereas non-fundamental rights must only pass 
the minimal rational basis test.  See id. 
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considerations into the due process analysis for reviewing punitive 
damage awards and choice of law determinations.  State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell498 and BMW of North America v. 
Gore499 both held that the exemplary damage awards at issue violated 
the substantive component of a litigant’s due process rights, in part 
because the respective awards infringed upon the sovereign interest 
of other states in our federal system by exacting punishment for acts 
committed outside the forum.500 Similarly, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts501 relied in part on the Due Process Clause to invalidate the 
application of Kansas law to all members of a class when the vast 
majority had no connection to Kansas because “for a State substantive 
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State 
must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests.”502  Shutts relied on earlier cases that likewise 
recognized the importance of “state interests” in determining 
whether a litigant’s due process rights have been violated through the 
imposition of a forum’s substantive law.503  These cases demonstrate 
that state sovereign interests properly influence the reasonableness, 
under the Due Process Clause, of the exercise of certain state powers. 
Sovereignty concerns likewise necessarily impact the 
reasonableness of the state’s assertion of jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant.  Only three potential governmental interests 
supporting a state’s assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction are readily 
apparent: state sovereign interests, providing a convenient forum to 
redress the injuries of its inhabitants, and insuring the efficient 
resolution of disputes.  But the latter two interests are inappropriate 
in a number of cases.  The plaintiff’s residence is both overinclusive 
and underinclusive, as the plaintiff’s status as a forum resident is not 
a sufficient jurisdictional basis,504 nor does his or her status as a 
nonresident preclude jurisdiction.505  The interest in insuring the 
efficient resolution of disputes is likewise problematic, as the Court 
 
 498 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). 
 499 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 500 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522-23; BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572-74. 
 501 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 502 Id. at 818 (internal citation omitted). 
 503 Id.; see also Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 
(1935); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930).  Dick is especially instructive 
because the Court rested its analysis entirely on the Due Process Clause without any 
consideration of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Dick, 281 U.S. at 408-10. 
 504 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (holding the state’s 
interest in protecting its minor residents does not grant personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant). 
 505 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984). 
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has recognized that a need for efficiency, while a consideration in the 
due process calculus, is not dispositive.506  Thus, the minimum 
contacts analysis necessarily incorporates state sovereign interests, 
which often is the only viable governmental interest to balance 
against the defendant’s interest. 
Moreover, current jurisdictional doctrine supports this 
conclusion, as state boundaries would become utterly meaningless in 
the due process calculus if sovereignty was not a consideration.  Yet 
the Supreme Court has never retreated from its statement in World-
Wide Volkswagen regarding the relevance of state lines for 
jurisdictional purposes.507  In fact, numerous decisions appraising the 
due process jurisdictional limitations involve defendants located in 
contiguous states to the forum.508  In many of these cases, defending 
the lawsuit there would hardly constitute an undue burden, yet the 
court nevertheless dismisses the action on jurisdictional grounds, due 
in part to the extra-territorial assertion of state sovereignty.509 
Bauxites thus did not purport to—nor could it have—excised 
sovereignty concerns from the Due Process Clause under our current 
jurisprudential model; instead, it merely held that the underlying 
source of the constitutional limitations emanate not from Article III 
or some independent constitutional federalism principle (which 
could not be waived by the litigants), but from an individual’s due 
process rights.510  Bauxites in actuality confirmed the “restriction on 
state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.,” but 
clarified that this restriction “must be seen ultimately as a function of 
 
 506 Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (“[T]he Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of 
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were 
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing 
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government 
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 507 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
 508 See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910-11 (4th Cir. 
1984) (Georgia/South Carolina border); Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 
759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (New Jersey/Pennsylvania border); Bachman v. 
Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (Oregon/Washington 
border). 
 509 See Wims, 759 F. Supp. at 270 & n.2 (transferring case from Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to District of New Jersey because in personam jurisdiction could not be 
exercised over New Jersey resident in Pennsylvania, but opining the controversy was 
“somewhat overblown, as the Federal Courthouse in Camden, New Jersey is less than 
two miles from this Courthouse”); see also Wolf, 745 F.2d at 910-11; Bachman, 724 P.2d 
at 860-62. 
 510 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 & n.10 (1982). 
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the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.”511  
Accordingly, the Due Process Clause, in preventing the exercise of 
arbitrary assertions of governmental power, insures both that the 
exercise of jurisdiction is fair and that the state has a sufficient 
sovereign interest to exercise its authority to compel the defendant to 
appear.  The question now is the extent to which these dual interests 
might justify this Article’s suggested model. 
B. The State Sovereignty Justification for the Analogy to a Local 
Business 
The linchpin of this Article’s proposed three-pronged approach 
is whether the defendant is engaging in continuous activities in the 
forum analogous to the activities characterizing a forum-based 
enterprise.  On a broad level, of course, this approach is an attempt 
to ascertain the “reasonableness” of the assertion of general 
jurisdiction.  But this level of abstraction is too generic to be a 
satisfactory underlying premise because any potential standard would 
necessarily depend on some notion of reasonableness.  Thus, the 
more pertinent issue is the extent to which a theory incorporating 
fairness concerns and/or state sovereign interests may support 
predicating the defendant’s amenability on an analogy to the 
activities of a commercial domiciliary. 
One difficulty with this inquest is that “fairness” is not a word 
with a singular meaning, not even in the jurisdictional context.  It 
includes protecting the defendant against undue litigation burdens,512 
insuring the defendant has a reasonable expectation that the claim 
could be brought in the forum,513 and mandating that the defendant 
obtained some forum benefits in exchange for its submission to the 
state’s jurisdictional power.514  Yet none of these three “fairness” 
 
 511 Id. at 702 n.10. 
 512 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
(explaining that the minimum contacts requirement “protects the defendant against 
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (articulating that the jurisdictional query 
depends in part on the court’s “‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result 
to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business”). 
 513 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980) (holding exercise of 
personal jurisdiction unfair when defendant had no expectation that his purchase of 
insurance in Indiana could subject him to suit in Minnesota); World-Wide Volkswagen, 
444 U.S. at 297 (requiring that “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there”). 
 514 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (concluding 
it is reasonable to require a defendant to submit to the state’s sovereign power if his 
alleged obligations arise from his enjoyment of the benefits and protections of the 
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rationales appears to support the proposed minimum contacts 
standard. 
The undue burden rationale has minimal application in most 
dispute-blind cases.  The defendants typically have the financial 
resources to defend themselves, especially considering that modern 
technological advances, such as electronic filings, facsimile 
transmissions, e-mail, video conferences, and even “older” 
developments like overnight mail and telephone conferences have 
made it far “less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a 
State where he engages in economic activity.”515  Although as a result 
of these developments many defendants would not be burdened by 
litigating in the forum, courts still often decline to find general 
jurisdiction.516  Even in those circumstances in which a defendant may 
be unduly burdened by litigating in the forum, the minimum 
contacts portion of the analysis does not typically evaluate this 
concern—instead the courts consider the defendant’s burden as one 
of the five Asahi factors.517 
The second rationale, focusing on the defendant’s expectations, 
is too circular to provide a meaningful theoretical justification for 
general jurisdiction.  A party’s “expectation” that it might be subject 
to suit depends primarily on the jurisdictional rules governing the 
assertion of sovereign power.  Any prospectively-applied jurisdictional 
standard would presumably impact expectations, thus precluding the 
defendant from being “surprised” and thereby comporting with this 
rationale.  Unless an expectation theory provides a specific 
explanation for predicating general jurisdiction on a comparison to a 
 
forum’s laws); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (holding that requiring corporation to 
defend suit in forum in which it incurs obligations arising out of its activities there is 
reasonable and just because the corporation is enjoying the benefits and protections 
of the forum’s laws). 
 515 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); cf. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. 
Supp. 43, 47 n.9 (D. Conn. 1997) (noting that “widespread use of facsimile 
equipment and overnight mail and the courts’ increasing use of telephone 
conferences in lieu of live conferences reduces the burden on nonresidents of 
litigation in a distant state”). 
 516 Cf. Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa. 
1991) (transferring case from Eastern District of Pennsylvania to District of New 
Jersey because in personam jurisdiction could not be exercised over New Jersey 
resident in Pennsylvania, but opining the controversy was “somewhat overblown, as 
the Federal Courthouse in Camden, New Jersey is less than two miles from this 
Courthouse”). 
 517 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) 
(discussing severe burdens on Japanese corporation being forced to defend lawsuit 
in California); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (noting burden on 
defendant will always be a primary concern in fairness factors). 
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local business rather than using some other standard, it is not a 
meaningful theoretical foundation. 
Perhaps one could argue that a legitimate expectation exists 
based on an innate concept of equivalent treatment—because the 
nonresident defendant is conducting operations in the forum similar 
to state-based entities, it should therefore expect similar jurisdictional 
consequences to attach.  This argument’s desideratum, however, is 
that the state-based entity’s domicile in the state creates an additional 
connection with the forum, not possessed by the nonresident 
defendant, establishing at least a tenuous relationship between the 
cause of action and the forum.  As an example, assume a major 
corporation with a principal place of business in Texas is sued for 
alleged employment discrimination suffered by a New York employee 
at the hands of New York supervisor.  While such a cause of action 
may not arise in Texas for purposes of specific jurisdiction, there is 
presumably at least an indirect relationship to Texas headquarters 
through the chain of command.  In contrast, such a relationship 
would not presumably exist if the major corporation was merely 
doing business in Texas rather than being headquartered in the state.  
The commercial domiciliary, then, will typically have an added 
relationship with the forum, increasing its expectation of being 
subject to the state’s jurisdictional power.  Thus, an expectations 
theory alone does not appear to justify the proposed model. 
A reciprocal benefits or exchange theory offers the most 
promise.  The premise supporting this theory is that the nonresident 
defendant is obtaining benefits from the state similar to those 
commercial domiciliaries enjoy by conducting forum activities 
quantitatively and qualitatively analogous to a local business.  Because 
such a local business is undoubtedly subject to the state’s general 
adjudicatory authority, a nonresident performing similar activities 
should be as well.  This conception bears some resemblance to 
Professor Brilmayer’s political insider approach, under which general 
jurisdiction is appropriate when the “defendant reaches the quantum 
of local activity in which a purely local company would engage” such 
that “relegating the defendant to the political processes is fair.”518  
While Professor Brilmayer evaluates the defendant’s quantity of 
forum activity in light of the exertion of political influence,519 rather 
than the qualitative and quantitative comparison to the in-state 
activities characterizing a domiciliary proposed here, both 
approaches consider the nonresident’s activities in light of those of a 
 
 518 Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 230, at 742. 
 519 See id. 
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local business.  And perhaps the nonresident’s comparable benefits 
and protections from the state’s laws could justify the assertion of 
general adjudicatory power. 
Although this quid pro quo theory is intuitively appealing, it 
appears difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s most recent 
personal jurisdiction pronouncement, Burnham v. Superior Court.520  
Burnham held that the Due Process Clause did not bar California’s 
exercise of “transient” or “tag” jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant personally summoned while in the state to answer a lawsuit 
unrelated to his forum activities.521  Although the Court was 
unanimous in its result, it splintered hopelessly on the supporting 
rationale.  Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion employed a historical 
approach, contending that transient jurisdiction is permissible 
“because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that 
define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”522  In contrast, Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence attempted to justify the assertion of general jurisdiction 
on an exchange theory, maintaining Mr. Burnham received 
significant state-provided benefits, such as the rights to travel, to 
police, fire, and emergency medical services, and to enjoy the “fruits 
of the State’s economy.”523  But Justice Brennan’s theory appears 
facile. 
California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham in a 
divorce action as an “exchange” for the forum benefits he received 
during a three-day visit would be neither a fair bargain nor consistent 
with prior precedent.  As Justice Scalia retorted, the three days of 
protection Mr. Burnham received from California while visiting the 
state were “powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, 
that it is ‘fair’ for California to decree the ownership of all Mr. 
Burnham’s worldly goods acquired during the 10 years of his 
marriage, and the custody over his children.”524  Moreover, this 
“exchange” cannot be reconciled with Kulko v. Superior Court,525 where 
the Court held that exercising jurisdiction in a child support action 
 
 520 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 521 Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., plurality).  Because transient jurisdiction thus allows the 
exercise of jurisdiction over any cause of action irrespective of its relationship to the 
forum, it is a form of general jurisdiction.  See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 6.2 (3d ed. 2000) (concluding “transient” jurisdiction predicated on in-state 
service is a “truly” general basis of jurisdiction). 
 522 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., plurality). 
 523 Id. at 637-39 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 524 Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., plurality). 
 525 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
  
2004 GENERAL JURISDICTION 915 
against Mr. Kulko predicated on the his three-day stop-over during 
which he was married in the state “would make a mockery of the 
limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”526  While Mr. Kulko’s visit was years earlier, he actually 
obtained greater ongoing benefits than Mr. Burnham did from the 
laws of California based on his marriage there.  The only additional 
contact Mr. Burnham possessed—that he was served with process 
while in the state—appears irrelevant to the reasonableness of the 
“exchange.”  Despite Justice Brennan’s Burnham concurrence, then, 
an exchange theory is not a viable framework for analyzing a state’s 
general adjudicatory power over those served with process in the 
forum.  The reciprocal benefits theory accordingly cannot provide a 
unified framework for dispute-blind jurisdiction. 
Because the underlying theory does not seem to be fairness, the 
due process limitations on the exercise of general jurisdiction 
apparently stem from limits on state sovereign authority.  This 
rationale is supported by the origins of the dispute-blind doctrine, 
prior precedent, and constitutional theory. 
As discussed previously, general jurisdiction is the modern 
progeny of the pre-International Shoe construct of “presence,”527 which 
relied on physical power as its foundation.528  Dispute-blind 
adjudicatory jurisdiction accordingly derives “from the power 
premise of Pennoyer.”529  Under this premise, the state’s status as an 
independent sovereign in our federal system grants it sovereign 
authority over its domiciliaries and those within its borders.530  
Although International Shoe shifted the analysis from power to 
reasonableness,531 the state still undoubtedly retains jurisdictional 
authority over residents and individual domiciliaries532 and 
corporations either incorporated or with their principal place of 
business or commercial domicile in the forum.533  The state likewise 
 
 526 Id. at 92-93. 
 527 See supra Parts II, III.E, IV. 
 528 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (stating that “[t]he foundation of 
jurisdiction is physical power”). 
 529 Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 206, at 380. 
 530 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
 531 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 532 See, e.g., Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.  While Milliken predated International Shoe, its 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due process” 
standard was incorporated into the minimum contacts analysis.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463). 
 533 See, e.g., Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 633 & n.111 
(noting that dispute-blind jurisdiction “over corporations where they are 
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may reasonably exercise jurisdiction over those acting—either by 
their in-state presence or forum business activities—like residents or 
domiciliaries at the time the state asserts its power through service of 
process. 
This understanding provides a basis to reconcile the Kulko and 
Burnham holdings.  While Mr. Kulko availed himself to a greater 
extent of the benefits and protections of California’s laws by being 
married in the state, he bore no similarity to a California resident at 
the time he was served with process, as he resided in New York.534  In 
contrast, Mr. Burnham was, in many respects, indistinguishable from 
the residents of California when the state asserted its sovereign 
prerogative via summons.  Although he did not have the right to vote 
in a state or local election, he was subject to California’s laws while he 
was present there using its roads, purchasing goods and services in 
the state, paying state and local taxes, and being protected by police, 
fire, and emergency services.  His similarity to a resident at the time 
of service provided the necessary state “contacts, ties, or relations” for 
the exercise of the state’s sovereign authority over him.535 
The same analysis may explicate the minimum contacts standard 
proposed in this Article.  The necessary contacts, ties, or relations 
exist for dispute-blind jurisdiction when the defendant is behaving in 
the forum, for most intents and purposes, as a commercial 
domiciliary by engaging in the same types of forum activities in a 
comparable quantity.  The sovereign state has undoubted sovereign 
power to regulate the activities of its commercial domiciliaries.  When 
a nonresident defendant performs similar forum activities in 
comparable quantities as a domiciliary, the same sovereign state 
interests are implicated—the only difference is that the nonresident 
defendant has a more substantial connection with another state, but 
that does not diminish the state’s sovereign interests in regulating an 
entity that is virtually indistinguishable from other local businesses.  
If, on the other hand, the defendant is not behaving as a typical 
domiciliary, the state does not have any general sovereign authority 
 
incorporated or where they have their principal place of business” is “so well 
accepted that it is never challenged”). 
 534 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S 84, 92-95 (1978). 
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to regulate the nonresident’s conduct, invalidating the state’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the defendant’s 
forum activities. 
This sovereignty rationale also appears consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s insistence that the ultimate resolution of the 
defendant’s amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction hinges upon its 
in-state activities when served with summons.536  The service of 
summons, of course, is the vehicle for the state’s assertion of 
sovereign power over the defendant.537  Evaluating the defendant’s 
contacts at the time the state asserts authority rather than when the 
cause of action arose makes sense only if state sovereign interests are 
the predominant underpinning for dispute-blind jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, a potential objection to this sovereignty 
framework is that it does not adequately explain why the state should 
have sovereign authority to assert plenary judicial authority over the 
defendant.  Is such an approach grounded in American federalism, 
constitutional dogma, international conceptions of sovereign power, 
or some other political science theory?  But arguably, under our 
constitutional scheme, this is the wrong question.  The relevant 
question under our Constitution is not “why” the state may assert its 
power, but rather why it is precluded from exercising its authority. 
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”538  
This provision, plus the structure of our federalism, allows the states 
to act unless the Constitution prohibits the activity.  The states possess 
the whole of the police power, subject only to constraints by the 
Constitution, thereby granting the states flexibility to serve as 
laboratories for experimentation.539 
Thus, the states may assert general adjudicatory jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants unless barred by the Due Process Clause.  
This clause, as interpreted by International Shoe, precludes a state from 
exercising jurisdiction over a “defendant with which the state has no 
 
 536 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45, 448 
(1952); Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat’l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923); 
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 537 See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); 
Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946). 
 538 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 539 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
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contacts, ties, or relations.”540  The thesis of this Article is that such 
due process limitations on a state’s exercise of general in personam 
jurisdiction primarily stem from the absence of any sovereign 
connection to those nonresident defendants that do not engage in 
forum activities closely analogous to state domiciliaries. 
Two provisos are necessary.  First, while this interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause does not limit the state’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction to the extent often advocated by other commentators on 
policy grounds,541 a state, of course, does not have to assert 
jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.542  The Due 
Process Clause operates only as a limitation on a state’s adjudicatory 
power, not a command that such power must be employed.543  Thus, 
the policy choices regarding whether the state should adopt a broad 
“doing-business” basis for jurisdiction must be distinguished from the 
constitutionality of the assertion of dispute-blind jurisdiction.  With 
respect to these constitutional limits on general in personam 
jurisdiction, the minimum contacts aspect of due process is 
transgressed only when the state attempts to subject a nonresident 
defendant not functioning as a domiciliary to its sovereign power. 
Second, the state sovereignty emphasis for the proposed 
minimum contacts analysis does not preclude considering other 
factors as well in making the jurisdictional determination.  Even if the 
defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum, the 
fairness or reasonableness factors thereafter insure that the state’s 
jurisdictional ambit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice” under the particular circumstances.  Thus, 
although the state may have a sovereign interest based on the 
defendant’s forum activities, exercising jurisdiction may in rare cases 
be unduly burdensome for the defendant, especially if the plaintiff’s 
interest in the forum is slight.  The third prong of the proposed 
analysis, then, limits the assertion of jurisdiction in accordance with 
the principle of fairness. 
Therefore, to some extent, both sovereignty and fairness 
concerns underlie the suggested analysis.  The predominant 
consideration is the sovereign interest of the state to establish the 
required connections and relationships between the defendant and 
the forum to satisfy the minimum contacts standard.  But even when 
such a sovereign interest exists, the “fair play and substantial justice” 
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concerns may preclude the state from employing its adjudicatory 
power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The existing doctrinal approaches to dispute-blind jurisdiction 
are deficient.  None of them provides a basis for the nonresident 
defendant to predict which activities will subject it to the sovereignty 
of the forum for all causes of action.  Nor do any of these approaches 
proffer a non-fictional, cogent underlying rationale justifying the 
exercise of such power. 
This Article suggests a three-pronged inquiry to ameliorate the 
shortcomings of the current models.  The first two components of 
this query, which are somewhat interrelated, appraise the qualitative 
and quantitative sufficiency of the defendant’s forum activities in 
comparison to a local business.  Initially, the qualitative sufficiency is 
judged by analogizing the defendant’s in-state operations to the 
activities that characterize a commercial domiciliary.  This 
comparison is satisfied if the nonresident defendant is conducting 
those types of activities in the forum—such as directing its business 
operations from the state, producing its goods or services in the state, 
or selling such goods or services through in-state business 
transactions—that typically define a local business.  Assuming this 
qualitative substantiality component is met, the second query 
examines the quantity and continuity of the defendant’s activities by 
ascertaining whether such activities have occurred in a comparable 
frequency to at least some local businesses over a reasonable time 
preceding the service of process.  Finally, assuming the necessary 
minimum contacts exist under the first two prongs, the last issue is 
whether jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice,” 
determined by considering the burden on the defendant, the 
plaintiff’s interest in the forum, the forum’s interest in adjudicating 
the dispute, the judicial system’s interest in efficiency, and the 
procedural and substantive policies of other states and nations. 
Under this proposed model, the due process limitations on the 
exercise of general jurisdiction stem primarily from the absence of 
sovereign state interests over those defendants not conducting 
activities in the forum similar to a domiciliary owing its allegiance to 
the state.  This sovereignty emphasis, of course, corresponds with the 
derivation of dispute-blind jurisdiction from the power premise of 
Pennoyer.  While certainly fairness is not irrelevant, as it is the 
motivating factor behind the fair play and substantial justice criteria, 
the predominant underpinning for the due process limitations is the 
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lack of the required sovereign connection between the forum and the 
defendant. 
The Article’s suggested approach and underlying theoretical 
foundation would provide a measure of decisional coherence to 
dispute-blind jurisdiction.  It is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holdings on general jurisdiction both before and after International 
Shoe, as well as comporting with the recent decrees of a number of 
federal appellate courts.  It could perhaps allow us to depart from the 
morass and clarify general jurisdiction. 
 
